
('lass 



PRESENTED BY 



THE 



PHILOSOPHY 



OP THE 



MORAL FEELINGS. 



JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M. D. F.R.S.E. 

AUTHOR OF "INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE INTELLECTUAL 
TOWERS," &C. 

FBOil THE SEOOffD ET)1NBDR%H EDiT'CR. 

4 

WITH ^UESTIOSS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF STUDENTS. 



NEW-YORK : 



PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS, 

NO. 82 CLIFF-STREET 



1839. 



I 



■J w 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1834, 

By Harper & Brothers, 

In the Clerk's Office of the Seuthem District of New-York. 



Gift ffORt 1 
Mfss AIMb H. 

Jan. 6,1982 



augvi 




mass 1944 
\ 



1* 



PUBLISHERS 9 ADVERTISEMENT. 



In issuing a few months since a new edition of 
Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, accompa- 
nied with Questions for the use of Schools and Col- 
leges, the publishers announced the intention, should 
the plan meet with sufficient encouragement, of giv- 
ing to the public the work on the Moral Feelings, 
enriched with a similar appendage. Their object in 
supplying these works with an apparatus of this 
kind, was to render them better adapted to the pur- 
poses of academic and collegiate study, and espe- 
cially to afford a useful aid to the teacher in dis- 
charging the duties of the recitation-room. This 
service, they have every reason to believe, has met 
with general approbation. In no less than from 
twelve to fifteen literary institutions of the first 
respectability, has it already been adopted as a text- 
book in the department of which it treats, and in 
several others they learn it is now under considera- 
tion with a view to its adoption. 

How far the furnishing the work with questions 
may have contributed, in addition to its intrinsic 
merit, to the almost unprecedented popularity of ihe 
Treatise on the Intellectual Powers, it may not be 
easy to say ; but the publishers consider the con- 
dition above mentioned to have been so amply ful- 
filled, and the experiment so entirely to have suo 



ADVERTISEMENT. 

ceeded, that they are induced, without further delay, 
to redeem the pledge given to the public, and accord- 
ingly send forth the present work endowed like its 
predecessor. 

From the fact that the chairs of moral philosophy 
in a number of seminaries of learning, have already 
adopted it as a manual for their classes, they cannot 
doubt that a reception equally favourable awaits it at 
the hands of those for whom in a special manner it 
is designed. In the preparation of the present vol- 
ume, the publishers have availed themselves of the 
valuable services of the same hand to which they 
were indebted for the supplement to the other ; and 
under the strong confidence that this edition has 
superior claims to any former one to rank as a per- 
manent classic in the department of moral science, 
they cheerfully consign it to the hands of its readers. 



PREFACE. 



In a former work,* the author endeavoured 
to delineate, in a simple and popular form, 
the leading facts relating to the Intellectual 
Powers, and to trace the principles which 
ought to guide us in the Investigation of 
Truth. The volume which he now offers 
to the public attention is intended as a sequel 
to these Inquiries ; and his object in it is to 
investigate, in the same unpretending man- 
ner, the Moral Feelings of the Human Mind, 
and the principles which ought to regulate 
our volitions and our conduct as moral and 
responsible beings. The two branches of 
investigation are, in many respects, closely 
connected ; and, on this account, it may often 
happen that, in the present work, principles 
are assumed as admitted or proved, which in 
the former were stated at length, with the 
evidence by which they are supported. 

[* No. XXXVII of the Family Library.] 
A2 



CONTENTS. 

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

SECTION I. 

NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENCE 
OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 

Division of the Mental Powers into Intellectual and 

Moral 15 

Harmony which ought to exist between these classes - 16 
Causes by which this harmony is interrupted, — and 

means of counteracting them -------17 

Interest of the Science of the Moral Feelings - - - 18 
Peculiar sources of Knowledge bearing upon it, — from 

the light of Conscience, — and Divine Revelation 20 



SECTION II. 

FIRST TRUTHS IN THE SCIENCE OF THE 
MORAL FEELINGS. 

Analogy between First Truths, or Intuitive Principles 

of Belief, in Intellectual and in Moral Science - 22 
Classification of First Truths in Moral Science • • 26 
I. Impression of Future Existence. 



V1U CONTENTS. 

2. Belief in the existence and attributes of a 

Great First Cause, and Moral Governor. 

3. Conviction of duties which a man owes to 

other men. 

4. Impression of Moral Responsibility. 
Importance of these convictions, as intuitive 

articles of belief --------- 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
MORAL FEELINGS. 



Analysis of Man as a Moral Being -----. 35 

I. The Desires — The Affections — and Self- 

love. 

II. The Will. 

III. The Moral Principle, or Conscience. 

IV. The Moral Relation of Man toward! 

the Deity. 



PART I. 



THE DESIRES — THE AFFECTIONS — AND 
SELF-LOVE. 



SECTION I. 

THE DESIRES 48 

1. Desire of the Animal Propensities - - • - 44 

3. Desire of Wealth — Avarice ------ 44 



CONTENTS. IX 

Pago 

3. Desire of Power — Ambition - - - - • - 45 

4. Desire of Superiority — Emulation - - - 46 

5. Desire of Society ----- ---47 

6. Desire of Esteem or Approbation - - - - 47 

7. Desire of Knowledge --------50 

8. Desire of Moral Improvement ----- 51 
— Desire of Action ---------52 

Importance of a due Regulation of the Desires 53 



SECTION II. 

THE AFFECTIONS .... 56 

I. Justice -------------57 

1. Justice to the Interests of others — Integrity - 60 

2. Justice to the Freedom of Action of others - 60 

3. Justice to the Reputation of others - - - - 60 

4. Justice in estimating the Conduct and Char- 

acter of others ---------61 

5. Justice to the Opinions of others — Candour - 62 

6. Justice to the Feelings of others - - - - 63 

7. Justice to the Moral Condition of others - - 64 

II. Compassion and Benevolence ----- 65 

1. Benevolence towards the Distresses of others 67 

2. Benevolence towards the Reputation of others 68 

3. Benevolence towards the Character and Con- 

duct of others, — including Forgiveness of 
Injuries -----------68 

4. Benevolence towards the Feelings of others - 69 

5. Benevolence towards improving the Moral 

Condition of others --------70 

III. Veracity -..-70 

1. The Love of Truth — in the reception of it - 71 



X CONTENTS. 

2. Veracity in delivering statements, — including 

Sincerity -----------73 

3. Truth of Purpose, or correct Fulfilment of 

Promises --- ..76 

IV. Friendship, Love, and Gratitude - • • - 76 

V. Patriotism - - - ..••••••77 

VI. The Domestic Affections •-•••• 78 

The Defensive Affections, Anger, Jealousy, 

Resentment ----------81 

Important Influence produced upon the Exercise of the 
Affections, 

By Attention 83 

By Habit - - - - 86 

Feeling of Moral Approbation attached to the Exercise I 
of the Affections 89 

Happiness arising from a due Exercise of the Affec- 
tions — Influence of Temper --------92 



SECTION III. 

SELF-LOVE 96 

Sense in which the term is employed - - - • 96 

Tendency of a True and Rational Self-love - » • • 97 
Morbid Exercise of it, — Selfishness ---••- 100 
Disinterested Conduct and Self-denial • . •■• -101 



CONTENTS XI 



PART n. 

OF THE WILL 103 

Simple Volition, — its Origin from one of the Desires, 
or Affections ------------- 103 

Operation of Moral Causes on the Will ----- 104 
Nature of these Causes, and Source of the Diversity 

of their Operation in different Individuals - - - - 108 
Circumstances required for the Uniformity of their 
Operation : — 

V Knowledge 109 

Truths of Natural and Revealed Religion. 

2. Attention 112 

Its Influence on Moral Decisions. 

3. Moral Habits ----- 116 

Origin and Progress of Derangement of 

Moral Harmony. 
Influence of Habits upon Character - - - 118 
Means of correcting Injurious Moral Habits 120 
Practical Conclusions from these Principles. Important 
Influence of Moral Habits ------... 121 

Necessity and Probability of Divine Aid in correcting 
Moral Derangement ----------125 

Influence of the Mental Operation called Faith - - - 126 



PART III. 

OF THE MORAL PRINCIPLE, OR CON- 
SCIENCE 129 

Proofs of the Existence of Conscience as a distinct 
Principle of the Mind 129 

Nature of its Operation as the regulating Principle - 130 



XII CONTENTS. 

Analogy between it and Reason 131 

Its Influence in conveying an Impression of the Moral 
Attributes of the Deity ---------134 

Knowledge derived from this Source ------ 135 

Comparison of the Divine Attributes with the Actual 
State of Man 137 

Difficulties arising from this Comparison removed only 
by the Christian Revelation -------- 139 

Mental Process by which the Regulating Power of 
Conscience is impaired or lost ------- 141 

Influence of this Condition upon the Judgment in re- 
gard to Moral Truth 144 

Influence of Attention in Moral Decisions - - • - 146 



APPENDIX TO PART III. 

J I. — Op the Origin and Immutability of Moral 
Distinctions ; and Theories of Morals - - - 149 

Origin of our Idea of Virtue and Vice - - 151 

System of Mandeville 153 

of Clarke and Wollaston - - - - 154 

System of Utility 154 

Selfish System 155 

System of Paley ------ ,-- 157 

Defect of these Systems, in not acknowledg- 
ing the Supreme Authority of Conscience 160 
System of Dr. Smith, or Theory of Sympathy 162 
Province of Reason in Moral Decisions - 1 63 

$ II -Of the Harmony of the Moral Feelings 16? 

Consistency of Character arising from this 
Harmony, — and Defects of Character to 
which it is opposed -------- 171 



CONTENTS. X11J 



PART IV. 

OF THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN ^ 
TOWARDS THE DEITY .... 175 

View of the Divine Character in reference to this Re- 
lation - - . . - - 175 

Regulation of Moral Feelings which ought to arise out 
of it:— 176 

1. Habitual Effort to cultivate a sense of the Di- 

vine Presence, and to regulate the Moral 
Feelings and Character by it - - - - - 176 

2. Submission to the Appointments of Providence 18\ 

3. Sense of Moral Imperfection and Guilt, anl 

Supplication for Mercy, with Reliance on 
Divine Aid ----- - 181 

4. Sense of Gratitude, Affection, and Love - - 184 
Conduct and Character arising out of this Condition 

of the Moral Feelings ---------- 184 

Means of cultivating it ----------189 

Nature and Operation of Faith - - - - I JO 

Province of Faith in the Philosopny of tne Moral Feel- 
ings 190 

Truths which are its more immediate Object - 197 

Its Influence on the Moral Condition - - - - 199 

Province of Faith in the Scheme of Christianity - - 203 

Certain Errors regarding Faith - - .... 206 

Harmony of Christian Truth with the Philosophy of 

the Moral Feelings 208 

B 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 



SECTION I. 



NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF 
THE MORAL FEELINGS. 

Man is to be contemplated as an intellectual, and 
as a moral being. By his intellectual powers, he 
acquires the knowledge of facts, observes their 
connexions, and traces the conclusions which arise 
out of them. These mental operations, however, 
even in a high state of cultivation, may be directed 
entirely to truths of an extrinsic kind, — that is, to 
such as do not exert any influence either on the 
moral condition of the individual, or on his relations 
to other sentient beings. They may exist in an 
eminent degree in the man who lives only for him- 
self, and feels little beyond the personal wants or 
the selfish enjoyments of the hour that is passing 
over him. 

But when we contemplate man as a moral being, 
new relations open on our view, which present 



16 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

considerations of mightier import. We find him 
occupying a place in a great system of moral gov- 
ernment, in which he has an important station to 
fill and high duties to perform. We find him placed 
in certain relations to a great moral Governor, who 
presides over this system of things, and to a future 
state of being, for which the present scene is intended 
to prepare him. We find him possessed of powers 
which qualify him to feel these relations, and of 
principles calculated to guide him through the solemn 
responsibilities which attend his state of moral dis- 
cipline. 

These two parts of his mental constitution we 
perceive to be remarkably distinct from each other. 
The former may be in vigorous exercise in him 
who has little feeling of his moral condition; and 
the latter may be in a high state of culture in the 
man who, in point of intellectual acquirement, 
knows little beyond the truths which it most con- 
cerns him to know, — those great but simple prin- 
ciples which guide his conduct as a responsible 
being. 

In a well-regulated mind, these two departments 
of the mental economy must harmonize and co- 
operate with each other. Knowledge, received 
through the powers of sensation and simple in- . 
tellect, whether relating to external things or to 
mental phenomena, — and conclusions derived from 
these through the powers of reasoning, ought all to 
contribute to that which is the highest state of man, — 
his purity as a moral being. They ought all to lend 
their aid towards the cultivation of those principles 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 17 

o£ his nature which bind him to his fellow-men; 
and those higher principles still which raise his 
feeble powers to the Eternal Incomprehensible One, 
the first great cause of all things, and the moral 
governor of the universe. 

A slight degree of observation is sufficient to 
convince us, that such a regulated condition of the 
mental constitution does not exist in the generality 
of mankind. It is not my present purpose to in- 
quire into the causes by which this is primarily 
deranged; but it may be interesting to trace some 
of the circumstances which bear a part in producing 
the derangement. In our present state of being, we 
are surrounded with objects of sense ; and the mind 
is kept, in a great degree, under the influence of 
external things. In this manner it often happens, 
that facts and considerations elude our attention, and 
deeds escape from our memory, in a manner which 
would not occur, were the mind left at liberty to re- 
call its own associations, and to feel the influence 
of principles which are really part of the mental con- 
stitution. It is thus, that, amid the bustle of life, 
the attention is apt to be engrossed by considerations 
of a local and an inferior character; while facts 
and motives of the highest moment are overlooked, 
and deeds of our own, long gone by, escape from 
our remembrance. We thus lose a correct sense 
of our moral condition, and yield to the agency of 
present and external things, in a manner dispropor- 
tioned to their real value. For our highest concern 
as moral beings is with things future, and things 
unseen; and often with circumstances in our own 
B3 



'8 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

moral history long past, and perhaps forgotten. 
Hence the benefit of retirement and calm reflection, 
and of every thing that tends to withdraw us from 
the impression of sensible objects, and that leads us 
to feel the superiority of things which are not seen. 
Under such influence, the mind displays an aston- 
ishing power of recalling the past and grasping the 
future, — and of viewing objects in their true rela- 
tions to itself, and to each other. The first of these, 
indeed, we see exemplified in many affections, in 
which the mind is cut off, in a greater or less de- 
gree, from its intercourse with the external world, 
by causes acting upon the bodily organization. In 
another work I have described many remarkable 
examples of the mind, in this condition, recalling 
its old impressions respecting things long past and 
entirely forgotten : and the facts there stated call our 
attention in a very striking manner to its inherent 
powers and its independent existence. 

This subject is one of intense interest, and sug- 
gests reflections of the most important kind, re- 
specting the powers and properties of the thinking 
principle. In particular, it leads us to a period 
which we are taught to anticipate even by the in- 
ductions of intellectual science, when, the bodily 
frame being dissolved, the thinking and reasoning 
essence shall exercise its peculiar faculties in a 
higher state of being. There are facts in the mental 
phenomena which give a high degree of probability 
to the conjecture, that the whole transactions of life, 
with the motives and moral history of each indi- 
vidual, may be recalled by a process of the mind 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 19 

itself, and placed, as at a single glance, distinctly 
before him. Were we to realize such a mental 
condition, we should not fail to contemplate the 
impressions so recalled, with feelings very different 
from those by which we are apt to be misled amid 
the influence of present and external things. The 
tumult of life is over; pursuits, principles, and 
motives, which once bore an aspect of importance, 
are viewed with feelings more adapted to their true 
value. The moral principle recovers that authority, 
which, amid the contests of passion, had been ob- 
scured or lost ; each act and each emotion is seen 
in its relations to the great dictates of truth, and each 
pursuit of life in its real bearing on the great con- 
cerns of a moral being ; and the whole assumes a 
character of new and wondrous import, when viewed 
in relation to that Incomprehensible One, who is 
then disclosed in all his attributes as a moral gov- 
ernor. Time past is contracted into a point, and 
that the infancy of being ; — time to come is seen 
expanding into eternal existence. 

Such are the views which open on him who 
would inquire into the essence by which man is 
distinguished as a rational and moral being. Com- 
pared with it, what are all the phenomena of nature, 
— what is all the history of the world, — the rise and 
fall of empires, — or the fate of those who rule them. 
These derive their interest from local and transient 
relations, — but this is to exist for ever. That sci- 
ence, therefore, must be ccc^ideied as the highest 
of all human pursuits whicv kj jemplates man in 



20 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

his relation to eternal things. With its importance, 
we must feel its difficulties ; and, did we confine 
the investigation to the mere principles of natural 
science, we should feel these difficulties to be insur- 
mountable. But, in this great inquiry, we have 
two sources of knowledge, to which nothing analo- 
gous is to be found in the history of physical science, 
and which will prove infallible guides, if we resign 
ourselves to their direction with sincere desire to 
discover the truth. These are — the light of con- 
science, and the light of divine revelation. In 
making this statement, I am aware that I tread on 
delicate ground,-— and that some will consider an 
appeal to the sacred writings as a departure from the 
strict course of philosophical inquiry. This opinion, 
I am satisfied, is entirely at variance with truth ; 
and, in every moral investigation, if we take the in- 
ductions of sound philosophy, along with the dictates 
of conscience and the light of revealed truth, we 
shall find them to constitute one uniform and harmo- 
nious whole, the various parts of which tend, in a 
remarkable manner, to establish and illustrate each 
other. If, indeed, in any investigation in moral 
science, we disregard the light which is furnished 
by the sacred writings, we resemble an astronomer 
who should rely entirely on his unaided sight, and 
reject those optical .inventions which extend so re- 
markably the field of his vision, as to be to him the 
revelation of things not seen. Could we suppose a 
person thus entertaining doubts respecting the know- 
ledge supplied by the telescope, yet proceeding in a 
candid manner to investigate its truth, he would 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 2„ 

perceive in the telescopic observations themselves 
principles developed which are calculated to remove 
his suspicions. For, in the limited knowledge 
which is furnished by vision alone, he finds difficulties 
which he cannot explain, apparent inconsistencies 
which he cannot reconcile, and insulated facts which 
he cannot refer to any known principle. But, in 
the more extended knowledge which the telescope 
yields, these difficulties disappear ; facts are brougnt 
together which seemed unconnected or discordant ; 
and the universe appears one beautiful system of 
order and consistency. It is the same in the expe- 
rience of the moral inquirer, when he extends his 
views beyond the inductions of reason, and corrects 
his conclusions by the testimony of God. Dis- 
cordant principles are brought together ; doubts and 
difficulties disappear ; and beauty, order, and har- 
mony are seen to pervade the government of the 
Deity. In this manner there also arises a species 
of evidence for the doctrines of revelation, whicb 
is entirely independent of the external proofs of its 
divine origin ; and which, to the candid mind, invests 
it with all the characters of authenticity and truth. 

From these combined sources of knowledge, thus 
illustrating and confirming each other, we are en- 
abled to attain , in moral inquiries, a degree of cer- 
tainty adapted to their high importance. We do so 
when, with sincere desire to discover the truth, we 
resign ourselves to the guidance of the light which is 
within, aided as it is by that light from heaven which 
shines upon the path of the humble inquirer. Cul- 
tivated on these principles, the science is fitted to 



22 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

engage the most powerful mind, while it will impart 
strength to the most common understanding. It 
terminates in no barren speculations, but tends 
directly to promote peace on earth, and good-will 
among men. It is calculated both to enlarge the 
understanding, and to elevate and purify the feel- 
ings, and thus to cultivate the moral being for the 
life which is to come. It spreads forth to the view 
as a course which becomes smoother and brighter 
the farther it is pursued ; and the rays which illumi- 
nate the path converge in the throne of Him who is 
eternal* 



SECTION II. 



OP FIRST TRUTHS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
MORAL FEELINGS. 

The knowledge which we receive through our 
intellectual powers is referable to two classes. 
These may be distinguished by the names of ac- 
quired knowledge, and intuitive or fundamental 
articles of belief. The former is procured by the 
active use of our mental powers, in collecting facts, 
tracing their relations, and observing the deductions 
which arise out of particular combinations of them. 
These constitute the operations which I have referred 
to in another work, under the heads of processes of 
investigation, and processes of reasoning. The 



FIRST TRUTHS IN MORAL SCIENCE. 23 

full exercise of them requires a certain culture of the 
mental faculties, and consequently is confined to a 
comparatively small number of men. We perceive, 
however, that such culture is not essential to every 
individual, — for many are very deficient in it who 
yet are considered as persons of sound mind, and 
capable of discharging their duties in various situa- 
tions of life in a creditable and useful manner. 

But the knowledge which we derive from the 
other source is of immediate and essential importance 
to men of every degree ; and, without it, no indi- 
vidual could engage, with confidence, in any of the 
common transactions of life, or make any provision 
for his protection or comfort, or even for the con- 
tinuance of his existence. These are the principles 
also treated of, in a former work, under the name 
of First Truths. They are not, like our knowledge 
of the other kind, the result of any process either of 
investigation or of reasoning ; and for the posses- 
sion of them no man either depends upon his own 
observation or has recourse to that of other men. 
They are a part of his mental constitution, arising, 
with a feeling of absolute certainty, in every sound 
mind ; and, while they admit of no proof by pro- 
cesses of reasoning, sophistical objections brought 
against them can be combated only by an appeal to 
the consciousness of every man, and to the absolute 
conviction which forces itself upon the whole mass 
of mankind. 

If the Creator has thus implanted in the mind of 
man principles to guide him in his intellectual and 



24 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

physical relations, independently of any acquired 
knowledge, we might naturally expect to find him 
endowed, in the same manner, with principles adapted 
to his iriore important relations as a moral being. 
We might naturally expect, that, in these high con- 
cerns, he would not be left to the chance of know- 
ledge which he might casually receive either through 
his own powers of investigation or reasoning, ol 
through instruction received from other men. Im- 
pressions adapted to this important end we accord- 
ingly find developed in a remarkable manner, — and 
they are referable to that part of our constitution 
which holds so important a place in the philosophy 
of the mind, by which we perceive differences in the 
moral aspect of actions, and approve or disapprove 
of them as right or wrong. The convictions de- 
rived from this source seem to occupy the same 
place in the moral system, that first truths, or intui- 
tive articles of belief, do in the intellectual. Like 
them, also, they admit of no direct proofs by pro- 
cesses of reasoning ; and when sophistical argu- 
ments are brought against them, the only true answer 
consists in an appeal to the conscience of every un- 
eontaminated mind. This is a consideration of the 
f utmost practical importance ; and it will probably 
appear that many well intended arguments, respect- 
ing the first principles of moral truth, have been 
inconclusive, in the same manner as were attempts 
to establish first truths by processes of reasoning,-— 
because the line of argument adopted in regard to 
them was one of which they are not susceptible. 
The force of this analogy is in no degree weakened 



FIRST TRUTHS IN MORAL SCIENCE. 25 

by the fact, that there is, in many cases, an apparent 
difference between that part of our mental constitu- 
tion on which is founded our conviction of first 
truths, and that principle from which is derived our 
impression of moral truth : for the former continues 
the same in every mind which is neither obscured 
by idiocy nor distorted by insanity ; but the moral 
feelings become obscured by a process of the mind 
itself, by which it has gradually gone astray from 
rectitude. Hence the difference we find in the de- 
cisions of different men respecting moral truth, 
arising from peculiarities in their own mental con- 
dition ; and hence that remarkable obscuration of 
mind at which some men at length arrive, by which 
the judgment is entirely perverted respecting the 
first great principles of moral purity. When, there- 
fore, we appeal to certain principles in the mental 
constitution, as the source of our first impressions 
of moral truth, our appeal is made chiefly to a mind 
which is neither obscured by depravity nor bewil- 
dered by the refinements of a false philosophy : it 
is made to a mind in which conscience still holds 
some degree of its rightful authority, and in which 
there is a sincere and honest desire to discover the 
truth. These two elements of character must go 
together in every sound inquiry in moral science ; 
and to a man in an opposite condition we should 
no more appeal in regard to the principles of moral 
truth, than we should take from the fatuous person 
or the maniac our test of those first principles of in- 
tellectual truth, which are allowed to be original 
elements of belief in every sound mind. 
C 



26 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

To remedy the evils arising from this diversify 
and distortion of moral perception, is one of the 
objects of divine revelation. By means of it there is 
introduced a fixed and uniform standard of moral 
truth ; but it is of importance to remark, that, for 
the authority of this, an appeal is made to principles 
in the mind itself, and that every part of it challenges 
the assent of the man in whom conscience has not 
lost its power in the mental economy 

Keeping in view the distinction which has now 
been referred to, it would appear, that the first prin- 
ciples of moral truth, which are impressed upon the 
mind as a part of its original constitution, or arise in 
it by the most simple process of reflection, are chiefly 
the following. 

I. A deep impression of continued existence, — 
or of a state of being beyond the present life, — and 
of that as a state of moral retribution. 

II. A conviction of the existence and superin- 
tendence of a great moral Governor of the universe, 
— a being of infinite perfection and infinite purity. 
The belief in this Being, as the great first cause, 
arises, as we have formerly seen, by a simple step 

I of reasoning, from a survey of the works of nature, 
.aken in connexion with the First Truth, that every 
event must have an adequate cause. Our sense 
of his moral attributes is fixed, with a conviction of 
eaual certainty, upon the conscience or moral feel- 
ings. The impression, indeed, of the existence 
of one supreme and ruling intelligence is found in 
every ago of the world, and among every class of 



FIRST TRUTHS IN MORAL SCIENCE. 27 

mankind. Of the " summum illud atque eternum" 
of the ancient philosophy, and of God as he is 
revealed in the oracles of truth, certain essential 
attributes are the same, — infinite power and wisdom, 
and eternal existence. The ancient sages rose to 
sublime conceptions of his nature, while they felt the 
imperfection of their knowledge, and longed after a 
light which might guide them to himself; and it is 
striking to remark a similar feeling in a very difFerert 
state of society, in our own day. " I believe," said 
an African chief to one of the missionaries, " I be- 
lieve there is a God who made all things, — who gives 
prosperity, sickness, and death ; but I do not know 
him." 

III. A conviction of certain duties of justice, ve- 
racity, and benevolence, which every man owes to 
his fellow-men ; and an intuitive perception of the 
nature and quality of actions as right or wrong, in- 
dependently of all the consequences resulting from 
them either to the individual himself or to other men. 
Every man, in his own case, again, expects the 
same offices from others ; and on this reciprocity 
of feeling is founded the precept which is felt to be 
one of universal application, — to do to others as we 
would that they should do to us. 

IV. An impression of moral responsibility, or 
a conviction, that, for the due performance of these 
offices, man is responsible to the moral Governor 
of the universe ; and further, that to this Being he 
owes, more immediately, a certain homage of the 
moral feelings, entirely distinct from the duties of 
relative morality which he owes to his fellow-men. 



28 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

The consideration of these important objects of 
belief will afterward occur to us in various parts 
of our inquiry. They are stated here in reference 
to the place which they hold as First Truths, or in- 
tuitive articles of moral belief, lying at the founda- 
tion of those principles which are fixed in the 
conscience of the mass of mankind. For the truth 
of them we appeal, not to any process of reasoning, 
but to the conviction which forces itself upon every 
regulated mind. Neither do we go abroad among 
savage nations to inquire whether the impression 
of them be universal ; for this may be obscured in 
communities, as it is in individuals, by a course of 
moral degradation. We appeal to the casuist him- 
self, whether, in the calm moment of reflection, he 
can divest himself of their power. We appeal to 
the feelings of the man who, under the conscious- 
ness of guilt, shrinks from the dread of a present 
Deity, and the anticipation of a future reckoning. 
But chiefly we appeal to the conviction of him in 
whom conscience retains its rightful supremacy, and 
who habitually cherishes these momentous truths, 
as his guides in this life in its relation to the life that 
is to come. 

It appears to be a point of the utmost practical 
importance, that we should consider these articles 
of belief as implanted in our moral constitution, or 
as arising by the most simple step of reasoning or 
reflection out of principles which form a part of that 
constitution. It is in this way only that we can 
consider them as calculated to influence the masa 
©f mankind. For, if we do not believe them to 



FIRST TRUTHS IN MORAL SCIENCE. 29 

arise, in this manner, by the spontaneous exercise 
of every incorrupted mind, there are only two me- 
thods by which we can suppose them to originate ; 
the one is a direct revelation from the Deity, — 
the other is a process of reasoning or of investiga- 
tion, properly so called, analogous to that by which 
we acquire the knowledge of any principle in natural 
science. We cannot believe that they are derived 
entirely from revelation, because we find the belief 
existing where no revelation is known, and because 
we find the sacred writers appealing to them as 
sources of conviction existing in the mental consti- 
tution of every man. There is an obvious absurd- 
ity, again, in supposing that principles, which are 
to regulate the conduct of responsible beings, should 
be left to the chance of being unfolded by processes 
of reasoning, in which different m'nds may arrive 
at different conclusions, and in regard to which many 
are incapable of following out any argument at all. 
What is called the argument a prio i for the exist- 
ence and attributes of the Deity, foi instance, con- 
veys little that is conclusive to most minds, and to 
many is entirely incomprehensible. The same ob- 
servation may be applied to those well-intended and 
able arguments, by which the probability of a future 
state is shown from analogy and from the constitu- 
tion of the mind. These are founded chiefly on 
three considerations, — the tendency of virtue to pro- 
duce happiness, and of vice to be followed by 
misery, — the unequal distribution of good and evil 
in the present life, and the adaptation of our moral 
faculties to a state of being very different from that 
C2 



30 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

in which we are at present placed. There is much 
in these arguments calculated to elevate our con* 
ceptions of our condition as moral beings, and of 
that future state of existence for which we are des- 
tined ; and there is much scope for the highest 
powers of reasoning, in showing the accordance of 
these truths with the soundest inductions of true 
philosophy. But, notwithstanding all their truth and 
all their utility, it may be doubted whether they are 
to any one the foundation of his faith in another 
state of being. It must be admitted, at least, that 
their force is felt by those only whose minds have 
been in some degree trained to habits of reasoning, 
and that they are therefore not adapted to the mass 
of mankind. But the truths which they are intended 
to establish are of eternal importance to men of 
every degree, and we should therefore expect them 
to rest upon evidence which finds its way with un- 
erring aim to the hearts of the unlearned. The 
unanswerable reasonings of Butler never reached the 
ear of the gray-haired pious peasant ; but he needs 
not their powerful aid to establish his sure and certain 
hope of a blessed immortality. It is no induction of 
logic that has transfixed the heart of the victim of 
' deep remorse, when he withers beneath an influence 
unseen by human eye, and shrinks from the antici- 
pation of a reckoning to come. In both, the evi- 
dence is within, — a part of the original constitution 
of every rational mind, planted there by Him who 
framed the wondrous fabric. This is the power of 
conscience ; with an authority which no man can 
put away from him, it pleads at once for his own 



FIRST TRUTHS IN MORAL SCIENCE. 31 

future existence, and for the moral attributes of an 
omnipotent and ever-present Deity. In a healthy 
state of the moral feelings, the man recognises its 
claim to supreme dominion. Amid the degradation 
of guilt, it still raises its voice, and asserts its right 
to govern the whole man ; and, though its warnings 
are disregarded, and its claims disallowed, it proves 
within his inmost soul an. accuser that cannot be 
stilled, and an avenging spirit that never is quenched. 
Similar observations apply to the uniformity of 
moral distinctions, or the conviction of a certain line 
of conduct which man owes to his fellow-men. 
There have been many controversies and various 
contending systems in reference to this subject ; but 
I submit that the question may be disposed of in the 
same manner as the one now mentioned. Certain 
fixed and defined principles of relative duty appear 
to be recognised by the consent of mankind, as an 
essential part of their moral constitution, by as ab- 
solute a conviction as that by which are recognised 
our bodily qualities. The hardened criminal, whose 
life has been a series of injustice and fraud, when 
at length brought into circumstances which expose 
him to the knowledge or the retribution of his fellow 
men, expects from them veracity and justice, or 
perhaps even throws himself upon their mercy. He 
thus recognises such principles as a part of the 
moral constitution, just as the blind man, when he 
has missed his way, asks direction of the first per- 
son he meets, — presuming upon the latter possessing 
a sense which, though lost to him, he still considers 
as belonging to every sound man. In defending 



32 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 

himself, also, the criminal shows the same recog 
nition. For his object is to disprove the alleged 
facts, or to frame excuses for his conduct; he 
never attempts to question those universal principles 
by which he feels that his actions must be con- 
demned, if the facts are proved against him. With- 
out such principles, indeed, thus universally recog- 
nised, it is evident that the whole system of human 
things would go into confusion and ruin. Human 
laws may restrain or punish gross acts of violence 
and injustice ; but they can never provide for num- 
berless methods by which a man may injure his 
neighbour, or promote his own interest at the ex- 
pense of others. There are, in fact, but a very 
few cases which can be provided for by any human 
institution ; it is a principle within that regulates the 
whole moral economy. In its extent and import- 
ance, when compared with all the devices of man, 
it may be likened to those great principles which 
guide the movements of the universe, contrasted 
with the contrivances by which men produce parti- 
cular results for their own convenience ; and one 
might as well expect to move a planet by machinery, 
or propel a comet by the power of steam, as to 
preserve the semblance of order in the moral world, 
without those fundamental principles of rectitude 
which form a part of the original constitution of 
every rational being. 

Further, as each man has the consciousness ot 
these principles in himself, he has the conviction 
that similar principles exist in others. Hence arises 
the impression, that, as he judges of their conduct 



FIRST TRUTHS IN MORAL SCIENCE. 33 

by his own moral feelings, so will they judge of him 
by corresponding feelings in themselves. In this 
manner is produced that reciprocity of moral im- 
pression by which a man feels the opinion of his 
fellow-men to be either a reward or a punishment ; 
and hence also springs that great rule of relative 
duty, which teaches us to do to others as we would 
that they should do to us. This uniformity of moral 
feeling and affection even proves a check upon 
those who have subdued the influence of these feel- 
ings in themselves. Thus, a man who has thrown 
off all sense of justice, compassion, or benevolence 
is still kept under a certain degree of control by the 
conviction of these impressions existing in those by 
whom he is surrounded. There are indeed men in 
the world, as has been remarked by Butler, in 
whom this appears to be the only restraint to which 
their conduct is subjected. 

Upon the whole, therefore, there seems to be 
ground for assuming, that the articles of belief, 
which have been the subject of the preceding ob- 
servations, are primary principles of our moral 
constitution ; and that they correspond with those 
elements in our intellectual economy which are 
commonly called First Truths, — principles which 
are now universally admitted to require no other 
evidence than the conviction which forces itself upon 
every sound understanding. 



PHILOSOPHY 

OF 

THE MORAL FEELINGS. 



When we analyze the principles which distin- 
guish man as a moral being, our attention is first 
directed to his actions, as the external phenomena 
Dy which we judge of his internal principles. It fa 
familiar to every one, however, that the same 
action may proceed from very different motives, 
and that, when we have the means of estimating 
motives 01 principles, it is from these that we form 
our judgment respecting the moral condition of the 
individual, and not from his actions alone. When 
we consider separately the elements which enter 
Into the economy of an intelligent and responsible 
agent, they seem to resolve themselves into th* 
following : — 

I. His actual conduct, or actions. 

II. In determining his conduct, the immediate 
principle is his will, or simple volition. He wills 



36 ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 

some act, — -and the act follows of course, unless it 
be prevented by restraint from without, or by phy- 
sical inability to perform it. These alone can inter- 
fere with a man following the determination of his 
will, or simple volition. 

III. The objects of will or simple volition are 
referable to two classes — objects to be obtained, 
and actions to be performed to others ; and these 
are connected with two distinct mental conditions, 
which exist previously to the act of volition. In 
regard to objects to be obtained, this mental condi- 
tion is Desire. In regard to actions towards others, 
it is Affection. The desires and affections, there- 
fore, hold a place in the mind previous to volition. 
From one of them originates the mental state 
which, under certain regulations, leads to volition, 
or to our willing a certain act. The act, which is 
then the result of the volition, consists either in 
certain efforts towards attaining the object desired, 
or in certain conduct towards other men, arising out 
of our affections or mental feelings towards them. 
The desires and affections, therefore, may be con- 
sidered as the primary or moving powers, from 
which our actions proceed. In connexion with 
them we have to keep in view another principle, 
which has an extensive influence on our conduct in 
regard to both these classes of emotions. This is 
Self-love; which leads us to seek our own pro- 
tection, comfort, and advantage. It is a sound and 
legitimate principle of action when kept in its proper 
place: when allowed to usurp an undue influence, 



ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 37 

it degenerates into selfishness ; and it then interferes 
in a material degree with the exercise of the affec- 
tions, or, in other words, with our duty to other men. 

IV. We have next to attend to the fact, that 
every desire is not followed by actual volition to- 
wards obtaining the object ; and that every affection 
does not lead to the conduct which might flow from 
it. Thus, a man may feel a desire which, after 
consideration, he determines not to gratify. An- 
other may experience an affection, and not act upon 
it : he may feel benevolence or friendship, and yet 
act, in the particular case, with cold selfishness ; 
or he may feel the impulse of anger, and yet con- 
duct himself with forbearance. When, therefore, 
we go another step backwards in the chain of moral 
sequences, our attention is directed to certain prin- 
ciples by which the determination is actually decided, 
either according to the desire or affection which is 
present to the mind, or in opposition to it. This 
brings us to a subject of the utmost practical im- 
portance ; and the principles which thus decide the 
determination of the mind are referable to two 
heads. 

(1.) The determination or decision may arise out 
of a certain state of arrangement of the moving 
powers themselves, in consequence of which some 
one of them has acquired a predominating influence 
in the moral system. This usually results from 
habit, or frequent indulgence, as we shall see in a 
subsequent part of our inquiry. A man, for ex- 
ample, may desire an object, but perceive that the 
D 



38 ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 

attainment would require a degree of exertion 
greater than he is disposed to devote to it : this is 
the preponderating love of ease, a branch of self- 
love. Another may perceive that the gratification 
would impair his good name, or the estimation in 
which he is anxious to stand in the eyes of other 
men : this is the predominating love of approba- 
tion, or regard to character. In the same manner, 
a third may feel that it would interfere with his 
schemes of avarice or ambition ; and so in regard 
to the other desires. On a similar principle, a man 
may experience a strong impulse of anger, but per- 
ceive thai .here would be danger in gratifying it, or 
that he would promote his reputation or his interest 
by not acting upon it ; he may experience a be- 
nevolent affection, but feel that the exercise would 
interfere too much with his personal interest or 
comfort. 

(2.) The determination may arise from a sense 
of duty, or an impression of moral rectitude, apart 
from every consideration of a personal nature. This 
is the JMoral Principle, or Conscience : in every 
mind in a state of moral health, it is the supreme 
and regulating principle, preserving among the 
moving powers a certain harmony to each other, and 
to the principles of moral rectitude. It often excites 
to conduct which requires a sacrifice of self-love, 
and so prevents this principle from interfering with 
the sound exercise of the affections. It regulates 
the desires, and restrains them by the simple rule of 
purity : it directs and regulates the affections in th > 
same manner by the high sense of moral response 



ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 39 

bility : and it thus maintains order and harmony in 

the whole moral system. 

One of the chief diversities of human character, 
indeed, arises from the circumstance of one man 
being habitually influenced by the simple and 
straight-forward principle of duty, and another 
merely by a kind of contest between desires and 
motives of a very inferior or selfish nature. Thus 
also we acquire a knowledge of the moral tempera- 
ment of different men, and learn to adapt our 
measures accordingly in our transactions with them. 
In endeavouring, for example, to excite three indi- 
viduals to some act of usefulness, we come to 
know, that in one we have only to appeal to his 
sense of duty ; in another to his vanity or love of 
approbation ; while we have no hope of making 
any impression on the third, unless we can make it 
appear to bear upon his interest. 

V. The principles referred to under the preceding 
heads are chiefly those which regulate the con- 
nexion of man with his fellow-men. But there is 
another class of emotions, in their nature distinct 
from these ; though, in a practical point of view, 
they are much connected. These are, the emotions 
which arise out of his relation ^o the Deity. The 
regulation of the moral feelings, in reference to this 
relation, will therefore come to be considered in a 
department of the inquiry devoted to themselves, 
and in connexion with the views of the character and 
attributes of God, which we obtain from the light of 
reason and conscience, 



40 ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 

This analysis of the principles which constitute 
the moral feelings indicates the further division of 
our inquiry in the following manner : — 

I. The Desires, — the Affections, — and Self-love. 

II. The Will. 

III. The Moral Principle, or Conscience. 

IV. The moral relation of man towards the 

Deity. 

These constitute what may be called the active 
principles of man, or those which are calculated to 
decide his conduct as a moral and responsible 
being. In connexion with them, there is another 
class of feelings, which may be called passive or 
connecting emotions. They exert a considerable 
influence of a secondary kind ; but, in an Essay 
which is meant to be essentially practical, it perhaps 
will not be necessary to do more than enumerate 
them in such a manner as to point out their relation 
to the active principles. 

When an object presents qualities on account of 
which we wish to obtain it, we feel desire* If we 
have reason to think that it is within our reach, we 
experience hope; and the effect of this is to encourage 
us in our exertions. If we arrive at such a convic- 
tion as leaves no doubt of the attainment, this is 
confidence, one of the forms of that state of mind 
which we call faith. If we see no prospect of 
attaining it, we give way to despair, and this leads 
us to abandon all exertion for the attainment. 
When we obtain the object, we experience pleasure 
or joy ; if we are disappointed, we feel regret If 
again, we have the prospect of some evil which 



ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 41 

threatens us, we experience fear, and are thereby 
excited to exertions for averting it. If we succeed 
in doing so, we experience joy ; if not, we feel 
sorrow. If the evil seem unavoidable, we again 
give way to despair, and are thus led to relinquish 
all attempts to avert it. — Similar emotions attend on 
the affections. When we experience an affection, 
we desire to be able to act upon it. When we see 
a prospect of doing so, we hope ; if there seem to 
be none, we despair of accomplishing our object. 
When we have acted upon a benevolent affection, or 
according to the dictates of the moral principle, we 
experience self-approbation; when the contrary, 
we feel remorse. When either a desire or an affec- 
tion has acquired an undue influence, so as to carry 
us forward in a manner disproportioned to its real 
and proper tendencies, it becomes a passion. 
D2 



PART I. 



OP THE DESIRES, THE AFFECTIONS, AND 
SELF-LOVE. 



SECTION I. 

THE DESIRES. 

Dtf*iRE is the immediate movement or act of the 
maid towards an object which presents some quality 
on account of which we wish to obtain it. The 
objects of desire, therefore, embrace all those attain- 
ments and gratifications which mankind consider 
worthy of being sought after. The object pursued 
in each particular case is determined by the views, 
habits, and moral dispositions of the individual. In 
this manner, one person may regard an object as 
above every other worthy being sought after, which 
to another appears insignificant or worthless. The 
principles which regulate these diversities, and con- 
sequently form one of the great differences inhuman 
character, belong to a subsequent part of our inquiry. 

In forming a classification of the desires, we must 
be guided simply by the nature of the various objects 
which are desired. Those which may be specified 



44 DESIRES. 

as the most prevalent, and the most clearly to be dis- 
tinguished as separate, may be referred to the fol- 
lowing heads. 

I. The gratification of the animal propensities — 
commonly called the Appetites. These, which we 
possess in common with the lower animals, are im- 
planted in us for important purposes ; but they re- 
quire to be kept under the most rigid control, both 
of reason and the moral principle. When they are 
allowed to break through these restraints, and be- 
come leading principles of action, they form a char- 
acter the lowest in the scale, whether intellectual 01 
moral ; and it is impossible to contemplate a more 
degraded condition of a rational and moral being. 
The consequences to society are also of the most 
baneful nature. Without alluding to the glutton or 
to the drunkard, what accumulated guilt, degrada- 
tion, and wretchedness follow the course of the liber- 
tine, — blasting whatever comes within the reach of 
his influence, and extending a demoralizing power 
alike to him who inflicts and to those who suffer the 
wrong. Thus is constituted a class of evils, of 
which no human law can take any adequate cogni- 
zance, and which therefore raise our views, in a spe- 
cial and peculiar manner, to a Supreme Moral Gov- 
ernor. 

II. The desire of Wealth, commonly called Ava- 
rice ; though avarice is perhaps justly to be regarded 
as the morbid excess or abuse of the propensity. 
This is properly to be considered as originating in 



ANIMAL PROPENSITIES — WEALTH — POWER. 45 

the desire to possess the means of procuring other 
gratifications. But, by the influence of habit, the 
desire is transferred to the thing itself; and it often 
becomes a kind of mania, in which there is the pure 
love of gain, without the application of it to any other 
kind of enjoyment. It is a propensity which may, 
in a remarkable manner, engross the whole charac- 
ter, acquiring strength by continuance ; and it is then 
generally accompanied by a contracted selfishness, 
which considers nothing as mean or unworthy that 
can be made to contribute to the ruling passion. 
This may be the case even when the propensity is 
regulated by the rules of justice ; if it breakthrough 
this restraint, it leads to fraud, extortion, deceit, and 
injustice, — and, under another form, to theft or rob 
bery. It is therefore always in danger of being op- 
posed to the exercise of the benevolent affections, 
leading a man to live for himself, and to study only 
the means calculated to promote his own interest. 

III. The desire of Power, or Ambition. This is 
the love of ruling, — of giving the law to a circle whe- 
ther more or less extensive. When it becomes the 
governing propensity, the strongest principles of 
human nature give way before it, — even those of per- 
sonal comfort and safety. This we see in the con- 
queror, who braves every danger, difficulty, and priva- 
tion, for the attainment of power ; and in the states- 
man, who sacrifices for it every personal comfort, 
perhaps health and peace. The principle, however, 
assumes another form, which, according to its direc- 
tion, may aim at a higher object. Such is the desire 



46 DESIRES. 

of exercising power over the minds of men ; of per- 
suading a multitude, by arguments or eloquence, to 
deeds of usefulness ; of pleading the cause of the 
oppressed ; a power of influencing the opinions of 
others, and of guiding them into sound sentiments 
and virtuous conduct. This is a species of power, 
the most gratifying by far to an exalted and virtuous 
mind, and one calculated to carry benefit to others 
wherever it is exerted. 

IV. The desire of Superiority, or Emulation. 
This is allied to the former, except that it does not 
include any direct wish to rule, but aims simply at 
the acquirement of superiority. It is a propensity 
of extensive influence, and not easily confined within 
the bounds of correct principle. It is apt to lead to 
undue means for the accomplishment of its object ; 
and every real or imagined failure tends to excite 
hatred and envy. Hence it requires the most care- 
ful regulation, and, when much encouraged in the 
young, is not free from the danger of generating ma- 
lignant passions. Its influence and tendency, as in 
other desires, depend in a great measure on the ob- 
jects to which it is directed. It may be seen in the 
man who seeks to excel his associates in the gSLyety 
of his apparel, *he splendour of his equipage, or the 
luxury of hid table. It is found in him whose proud 
distinction is to be the most fearless rider at a stee- 
ple-chase or a fox-hunt, — or to perform some other 
exploit, the only claim of which to admiration con- 
sists in its never having been performed before. The 
same principle, directed to more worthy objects, 



SUPERIORITY—SOCIETY ESTEEM. 47 

may influence him who seeks to be distinguished in 
some high pursuit, calculated to confer a lasting 
benefit upon his country or on human kind. 

V. The desire of Society. This has been con- 
sidered by most writers on the subject as a promi- 
nent principle of human nature, showing itself at all 
periods of life, and in all conditions of civilization. 
In persons shut up from intercourse with their fellow- 
men, it has manifested itself in the closest attach- 
ment to animals ; as if the human mind could not 
exist without some object on which to exercise the 
feelings intended to bind man to his fellows. It is 
found in the union of men in civil society and social 
intercourse, — in the ties of friendship, and the still 
closer union of the domestic circle. It is necessary 
for the exercise of all the affections ; and even our 
weaknesses require the presence of other men. 
There would be no enjoyment of rank or wealth, 
if there were none to admire ; and even the misan- 
thrope requires the presence of another to whom his 
spleen may be uttered. The abuse of this principle 
leads to the contracted spirit of party. 

VI. The desire of Esteem and Approbation. 
This is a principle of most extensive influence, and 
is in many instances the source of worthy and useful 
displays of human character. Though inferior to 
the high sense of moral obligation, it may yet be con- 
sidered a laudable principle, — as when a man seeks 
the approbation of others by deeds of benevolence, 
public spirit, or patriotism, — by actions calculated to 



48 DESIRES. 

promote the advantage or the comfort either of com- 
munities or individuals. In the healthy exercise of 
it, a man desires the approbation of the good ; in 
the distorted use of it, he seeks merely the praise of 
a party, — perhaps, by deeds of a frivolous or even 
vicious character, aims at the applause of associates 
whose praise is worthless. According to the object 
to which it is directed, therefore, the desire of appro- 
bation may be the attribute either of a virtuous or a 
perverted mind. But it is a principle which, in 
general, we expect to find operating, in every well 
regulated mind, under certain restrictions. Thus, a 
man who is totally regardless of character, — that is, 
of the opinion of all others respecting his conduct, 
we commonly consider as a person lost to correct 
virtuous feeling. On the other hand, however, there 
may be instances in which it is the quality of a man 
of the greatest mind to pursue some course to which, 
from adequate motives, he has devoted himself, 
regardless alike of the praise or the disapprobation 
of other men. The character in which the love of 
approbation is a ruling principle is therefore modified 
by the direction of it. To desire the approbation 
of the virtuous leads to conduct of a corresponding 
kind, and to steadiness and consistency in such con- 
duct. To seek the approbation of the vicious, leads, 
of course, to an opposite character. But there is 
a third modification, presenting a subject of some 
interest, in which the prevailing principle of the man 
is a general love of approbation, without any discri- 
mination of the characters of those whose praise is 
sought, or of the value of the qualities on account 



ESTEEM AND APPROBATION. 49 

of which he seeks it. This is vanity, and it pro- 
duces a conduct wavering and inconsistent, — per- 
petually changing with the circumstances in which 
the individual is placed. It often leads him to aim 
at admiration for distinctions of a very trivial char- 
acter, — or even for qualities which he does not really 
possess. It thus includes the love of flattery. Pride, 
on the other hand, as opposed to vanity, seems to 
consist in a man entertaining a high opinion of him- 
self, while he is indifferent to the opinion of others ; 
thus we speak of a man who is too proud to be 
vain. 

Our regard to the opinion of others is the; origin 
of our respect to character in matters which do not 
come under the higher principle of morals ; and is 
of extensive influence in promoting the harmonies, 
proprieties, and decencies of society. It is thus the 
foundation of good breeding, and leads to kindness 
and accommodation in little matters which do not 
belong to the class of duties. It is also the source 
of what we usually call decorum and propriety, which 
lead a man to conduct himself in a manner becom- 
ing his character and circumstances, in regard to 
things which do not involve any higher principle. 
For, apart entirely from any consideration either of 
morality or benevolence, there is a certain line of 
conduct which is unbecoming in all men ; and there 
is conduct which is unbecoming in some, though it 
might not be in other men, — and in some circum- 
stances, though it might not be so in others. It is un- 
necessary to add, how much of a man's respectability 
in life often depends upon finding his way, with proper 
E 



50 DESIRES. 

discrimination, through the relations of society which 
are referable to this principle ; or, by how many ac- 
tions which are not really wrong a man may render 
himself despised and ridiculous. The love of es- 
teem and approbation is also of extensive influence 
in the young, — both in the conduct of education and 
the cultivation of general character ; and it is not 
liable to the objections, formerly referred to, which 
apply to the principle of Emulation. It leads also 
to those numerous expedients by which persons of 
various character seek for themselves notoriety or a 
name, or desire to leave a reputation behind them 
when they are no more. This is the love of posthu- 
mous fame, a subject which has afforded an exten- 
sive theme both for the philosopher and the hu- 
morist. > 

VII. The desire of Knowledge, or of Intellectual 
Acquirement, — including the principle of Curiosity. 
The tendency of this high principle must depend, as 
in the former cases, on its regulation, and the ob- 
jects to which it is directed. These may vary from 
the idle tattle of the day, to the highest attainments 
in literature or science. The principle may be ap- 
plied to pursuits of a frivolous or useless kind, and 
to such acquirements as lead only to pedantry or 
sophism ; or it may be directed to a desultory ap- 
plication, which leads to a superficial acquaintance 
with a variety of subjects, without a correct know- 
ledge of any of them. On the other hand, the pur- 
suit of knowledge may be allowed to interfere witb 
important duties which we owe to others, in the par- 



KNOWLEDGE — MORAL IMPROVEMENT. 51 

ticular situation in which we are placed. A well- 
regulated judgment conducts the propensity to wor- 
thy objects ; and directs it in such a manner as to 
make it most useful to others. With such due 
regulations, the principle ought to be carefully culti- 
vated in the young. It is closely connected with 
that activity of mind which seeks for knowledge on 
every subject that comes within its reach, and which 
is ever on the watch to make its knowledge more 
correct and more extensive 

VIII. The desire of Moral Improvement. This 
leads to the highest state of man ; and it bears this 
peculiar character, that it is adapted to men in every 
scale of society, and tends to diffuse a beneficial in- 
fluence around the circle with which the individual 
is connected. The desire of power may exist in 
many, but its gratification is limited to a few : he 
who fails may become a discontented misanthrope ; 
and he who succeeds may be a scourge to his spe- 
cies. The desire of superiority or of praise may 
be misdirected in the same manner, leading to inso- 
lent triumph on the one hand, and envy on the other. 
Even the thirst for knowledge may be abused, and 
many are placed in circumstances in which it cannot 
be gratified. But the desire of moral improvement 
commends itself to every class of society, and its 
object is attainable by all. In proportion to its in- 
tensity and its steadiness, it tends to make the pos- 
sessor both a happier and a better man, and to ren- 
der him the instrument of diffusing happiness and 
usefulness to all who come within the reach of his 



52 DESIRES. 

influence. If he be in a superior station, these re- 
sults will be felt more extensively ; if he be in an 
humble sphere, they may be more limited ; but their 
nature is the same, and their tendency is equally to 
elevate the character of man. This mental con- 
dition consists, as we shall afterward have occasion 
to show more particularly, in an habitual recognition 
of the supreme authority of conscience over the 
whole intellectual and moral system, and in an ha- 
bitual effort to have every desire and every affection 
regulated by the moral principle and by a sense 
of the Divine will. It leads to a uniformity of char- 
acter which can never flow from any lower source, 
and to a conduct distinguished by the anxious dis- 
charge of every duty, and the practice of the most 
active benevolence. 

The Emotions which have been now briefly men- 
tioned seem to include the more important of those 
which are referable to the class of desires. There 
is, however, another principle which ought to be 
mentioned as a leading peculiarity of human nature, 
though it may be somewhat difficult to determine 
the class to which it belongs. This is the Desire 
of Action, — the restless activity of mind, which leads 
it to require some object on which its powers must 
be exercised, and without which it preys upon itself, 
and becomes miserable. On this principle we are 
to explain several facts which are of frequent obser- 
vation. A person accustomed to a life of activity 
longs for ease and retirement, and when he has ac- 
complished his purpose, finds himself wretcned» 



ACTION REGULATION OF DESIRES. 53 

The frivolous engagements of the unoccupied are 
referable to the same principle. They arise, not 
from any interest which such occupations really 
possess, but simply from the desire of mental excite- 
ment, — the felicity of having something to do. The 
pleasure of relaxation, indeed, is known to those 
only who have regular and interesting employment. 
Continued relaxation soon becomes a weariness ; 
and, on this ground, we may safely assert, that the 
greatest degree of real enjoyment belongs, not to the 
luxurious man of wealth, or the listless votary of 
fashion, but to the middle classes of society, who, 
along with the comforts of life, have constant and 
important occupation. 

The mental condition which we calLDesire ap- 
pears to lie in a great measure at||he foundation of 
character; and, for a sound moral condition, it is 
required that the desires be directed to worthy ob- 
jects ; and that the degree or strength of the desire 
be accommodated to the true and relative value of 
each of these objects. If the desires are thus di- 
rected, worthy conduct will be likely to follow in a 
steady and uniform manner. If they are allowed to 
break from these restraints of reason and the moral 
principle, the man is left at the mercy of unhallowed 
passion, and is liable to those irregularities which 
naturally result from such a derangement of the 
moral feelings. If, indeed, we would see the evils pro- 
duced by desire, when not thus controlled, we have 
only to look at the whole history of human kind. 
What accumulated miseries arise from the want of 
E 2 



54 DESIRES* 

due regulation of the animal propensities, in the 
various forms in which it degrades the character of 
rational and moral beings. What evils spring from 
the love of money, and from the desire of power ; 
from the contests of rivals, and the tumults of 
party, — what envy, hatred, malignity and revenge. 
What complicated wretchedness follows the train of 
ambition, — contempt of human suffering, countries 
depopulated, and fields deluged with blood. Such 
are the results of desire, when not directed to ob- 
jects worthy of a moral being, and not kept under 
the rigid control of conscience, and the immutable 
laws of moral rectitude. When, in any of these 
forms, a sensual or selfish propensity is allowed to 
pass the due boundary, which is fixed for it by rea- 
son and the moral principle, the mental harmony is 
destroyed, and even the judgment itself comes to 
be impaired and distorted in that highest of all in- 
quiries, the search after moral truth. 

The desires, indeed, may exist in an ill-regulated 
state, while the conduct is yet restrained by various 
principles, — such as submission to human laws, a re- 
gard to character, or even a certain feeling of what 
is morally right, contending with the vitiated princi 
pie within. But this cannot be considered as the 
healthy condition of a moral being. It is only when 
the desire itself is sound that we can say the man 
is in moral health. This, accordingly, is the great 
principle so often and so strikingly enforced in the 
sacred writings, " Keep thy heart with all diligence, 
because out of it are the issues of life." " Blessed 
are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." Thus, 



REGULATION OF DESIRES. 55 

there are desires which are folly, and there are de- 
sires which are vice, even though they should not be 
followed by indulgence ; and there are desires which 
tend to purify and elevate the moral nature, though 
their objects should be beyond the reach of our full 
attainment in the present state of being. Perfect 
moral purity is not the lot of man in this transient 
state, and is not to be attained by his own unaided 
efforts. But, subservient to it is that warfare within, 
that earnest and habitual desire after the perfection 
of a moral being, which is felt to be the great object 
of life, when this life is viewed in its relation to that 
which is to come. For this attainment, however, 
man must feel his total inadequacy, — and the utmost 
efforts of human reason have failed in unfolding the 
requisite aid. The conviction is thus forced upon 
us that a higher influence is necessary, and this in- 
fluence is fully disclosed by the light of revealed 
truth. We are there taught to look for a power 
from on high, capable of effecting what human 
efforts cannot accomplish, — the purification of the 
heart. 



56 AFFECTIONS. 



SECTION II. 

THE AFFECTIONS. 

As the Desires are calculated to bring some gra- 
tification to ourselves, the Affections lead us to our 
relations to other men, and to a certain line of con- 
duct which arises out of these relations. They are 
to be viewed as original principles of our nature, 
planted in us for wise purposes, and the operation of 
them is to be considered as distinct both from that of 
the moral principle and of reason, — that is, from any 
sense of duty or the moral rectitude of the conduct 
to which they lead, and from any calculation of its 
propriety and utility. Thus, when the mother de- 
votes her attention by day and night to her infant, if 
from sickness or helplessness in want of her special 
care, and perseveres in doing so, with total disregard 
to her own ease, health, or comfort, she is not influ- 
enced either by a sense of duty, or by any feeling 
of the utility of her conduct ; she acts upon an im- 
pulse within, which she feels to be a part of her con- 
stitution, and which carries her forward in a particu- 
lar course of anxious and protracted exertion by the 
power of itself alone. This distinction appears to 
be of the utmost practical importance, and we shall 
have occasion to refer to it more particularly in the 
sequel. 



JUSTICE. 57 

An Affection, therefore, may be considered as an 
original feeling or emotion existing in ourselves, 
which leads us to a particular conduct towards other 
men, without reference to any principle except the 
intuitive impulse of the emotion itself. The affec- 
tions have been divided into the Benevolent and 
Malevolent ; but these titles appear to be incorrect, 
especially the latter, — as the due exercise of the 
emotions to which it refers does not properly include 
what is called malevolence. They only tend to 
guard us against certain conduct in other men ; 
and when they are allowed to go beyond this, that 
is, to actual malevolence or revenge, the application 
is morbid. It will therefore accord better with the 
nature of these emotions, to give them the names of 
Uniting and Defensive Affections : the former in- 
cluding justice, benevolence, veracity, friendship, 
love, gratitude, patriotism, and the domestic affec- 
tions ; the latter, jealousy, disapprobation, and 
anger. 

I. JUSTICE. 

There may be some difference of opinion in re- 
gard to the propriety of including justice among the 
affections ; but it seems to be more nearly allied to 
them than to any of the other classes of moral 
emotions which have been mentioned, and may, 
therefore, as a mere matter of arrangement, be con- 
veniently introduced here. Strictly speaking, it 
might perhaps be considered as a combined opera- 



58 AFFECTIONS. 

tion of an affection and the moral principle ; but this 
is matter of speculation alone. The important con- 
sideration relating to it is, that, in whatever man- 
ner it arises, the sense of justice is a primary and 
essential part of our moral constitution, conveying 
the distinct impression of certain conduct which a 
man owes to his fellowr-men, without regard to any 
considerations of a personal nature, and apart from 
all positive enactments or laws, either divine or hu- 
man. The requirements of justice embrace certain 
points in which every man has an absolute right, and 
in regard to which it is the absolute duty of every 
other man not to interfere with him. These rights 
have usually been divided into three classes ; what 
I have a right to possess, and what no man has any 
right to take from me, — what I have a right to do, 
and what no man has any title to prevent me from 
doing, — what I have a right to expect from other 
men, and what it is their absolute duty to perform. 
These principles form the basis of what is called 
Natural Jurisprudence, a code of relative duty de- 
riving its authority from impressions which are found 
in the moral feelings of all mankind, without regard 
to the enactments of any particular civil society. In 
the actual arrangements of civil communities, these 
great principles of justice are combined with others 
which are derived merely from utility or expediency, 
as calculated to promote the peace or the advantage 
of the community. These may differ in different 
countries, and they cease to be binding when the 
enactments on which they rest are abrogated or 



JUSTICE. 59 

changed. But no difference of place can alter, and 
no laws can destroy, the essential requirements of 
justice. 

In these observations, it will be remarked, the 
word Justice is used as expressing a principle of 
individual character ; and it is in this sense that it is 
to be properly classed with the affections. The term 
is employed in another sense, namely, that of dis- 
tributive and corrective justice, which regulates the 
claims of individuals in a community, requires resti- 
tution or compensation for any deviation from such 
claims, or punishes those who have violated them. 
It is in the former sense that justice is properly to 
be considered as a branch of the philosophy of the 
moral feelings ; but the same general principles 
apply to both. 

The sense of justice, therefore, consists in a feel- 
ing experienced by every man, of a certain line of 
conduct which he owes to other men in given cir- 
cumstances ; and this seems to be referable to the 
following heads i — attending to their interest, — not 
interfering with their freedom of action, — preserving 
their reputation, — estimating their character and mo- 
tives, — judging of their opinions, — consulting their 
feelings, — and preserving or improving their moral 
condition. As a guide for his conduct in particular 
instances, a man has usually a distinct impression of 
what he thinks due by other men towards himself; 
justice requires that he rigidly extend to others the 
same feelings and conduct which, in similar ch- 
cumstances, he expects from them. 



60 AFFECTIONS. 

(1.) Justice is due to the persons, property, and 
interests of others. This constitutes Integrity or 
Honesty. It, of course, implies abstaining from 
every kind of injury, and preserving a conscientious 
regard to their rights. In this last respect, it allows 
us to exercise a prudent attention to our own inter- 
est, provided the means be fair and honourable, and 
that we carefully abstain from injuring others by the 
measures we employ for this purpose. The great 
rule for our guidance in all such cases is found in 
the immutable principles of moral rectitude ; the test 
of our conduct in regard to individual instances is, 
that it be such as, were our own interest concerned, 
we should think fair and honourable in other men. 

(2.) Justice requires us not to interfere with the 
freedom of action of others. This constitutes per- 
sonal liberty ; but in all civil communities the right 
is liable to certain restrictions : as when a man 
uses his freedom of action to the danger or injury 
of other men. The principles of justice may also 
recognise a man's surrendering, to a certain extent, 
his personal liberty, by mutual and voluntary com- 
pact, as in the case of servants, apprentices, soldiers, 
&c. ; but they are opposed to slavery, in which the 
individual concerned is not a party to the arrange- 
ment. 

(3.) Justice enjoins a regard to the reputation of 
others. This consists in avoiding every thing that 
could be injurious to their good name, either by di- 
rect evil-speaking, or such insinuations as might give 



JUSTICE. 61 

rise to suspicion or prejudice against them. It must 
extend a/so to the counteracting of such insinuations 
when we hear them made by others, especially in cir- 
cumstances in which the individual injured has no 
opportunity of defending himself. It includes, further, 
that we do not deny to others, even to rivals, any 
praise or credit which is justly due to them. There 
is, however, one modification, equally consistent with 
justice, to which the former of these rules is liable ; 
namely, that, in certain cases, we may be required to 
make a statement prejudicial to an individual, when 
duty to a third party or to the public makes it incum- 
bent on us to do so. In such a case, a person guided 
by the rules of justice will go no farther than is actu- 
ally required by the circumstances ; and will at all 
times beware of propagating a report injurious to 
another, though he should know it to be strictly true, 
unless he is called upon by special duty to commu- 
nicate it- 

(4.) Justice requires us not only to avoid injuring 
an individual in the estimation of other men, but to 
exercise the same fairness in forming our own opinion 
of his character, without being misled or biased by 
passion or prejudice. This consists in estimating his 
conduct and motives with calmness and impartiality ; 
in regard to particular instances, making full allow- 
ance for the circumstances in which he was placed, 
and the feelings by which he was, or might be, at the 
time, naturally influenced. When an action admits 
of being referred to different motives, justice consists 
in taking the more favourable view, if we can do so 
F 



62 AFFECTIONS. 

with strict regard to truth, instead of harshly and 
hastily assigning a motive which is unworthy. Such 
justice in regard to character and motives we require 
to exercise with peculiar care, when the conduct re- 
ferred to has been in any way opposed to our own 
self-love. In these cases we must be especially on 
our guard against the influence of the selfish princi- 
ple, which might lead to partial and distorted views 
of actions and motives, less favourable to others, and 
more favourable to ourselves, than justice warrants. 
When viewed in this manner, we may often perceive, 
that conduct which gave rise to emotions of displea- 
sure, as injurious to us, was fully warranted by some 
conduct on our own part, or was required by some 
higher duty which the individual owed to another. 

(5.) Justice is to be exercised in judging of the 
opinions and statements of others. This constitutes 
Candour. It consists in giving a fair and deliberate 
hearing to their opinions, statements, and arguments, 
and weighing fairly and honestly their tendency. It 
is, therefore, opposed to prejudice, blind attachment 
to preconceived opinions, and that narrow disputa- 
tious spirit which delights in captious criticism, and 
will hear nothing with calmness that is opposed to its 
own views ; which distorts or misrepresents the sen- 
timents of its opponents, ascribing them to unworthy 
motives, or deducing from them conclusions which 
they do not warrant. Candour, accordingly, may be 
considered as a compound of justice and the love of 
truth. It leads us to give due attention to the opin- 
ions and statements of others, — in all cases to be 



JUSTICE. 63 

chiefly solicitous to discover truth, and in statements 
of a mixed character, containing perhaps much error 
and fallacy, anxiously to discover and separate what 
is true. It has accordingly been remarked, that a 
turn for acute disputation, and minute and rigid criti- 
cism, is often the characteristic of a contracted and 
prejudiced mind ; and that the most enlarged under- 
standings are always the most indulgent to the state- 
ments of others, — their leading object being to dis- 
cover truth. N 

(6.) Justice is due to the feelings of others ; and 
this applies to many circumstances which do not af- 
fect either their interest or their reputation. Without 
injuring them in any of these respects, or in our own 
good opinion, we may behave to them in such a man- 
ner as to wound their feelings. There are minds 
of an extreme delicacy, which, in this respect, are 
peculiarly sensitive; towards such, a person of cor- 
rect feelings strives to conduct himself with suitable 
tenderness. We may find, however, persons of 
honest and upright minds, who would shrink from the 
least approach to real injury, but yet neglect the ne- 
cessary attention to the feelings ; and may even con- 
fer a real benefit in such a manner as to wound the 
individual to whom they intended kindness. The 
lower degrees of this principle pertain to what is called 
mere good-breeding, which has been defined "be- 
nevolence in trifles ;" but the higher degrees may 
restrain from conduct which, without any real injury, 
inflicts permanent pain. To this head we may per- 
haps also refer a due regard to the estimate w 7 hich we 



64 AFFECTIONS. 

lead a man to form of himself. This is opposed to 
flattery on the one hand, and on the other to any un- 
necessary depreciation of his character. Flattery 
indeed is also to be considered as a violation ol 
veracity. 

(7.) While, upon the principles which have been 
referred to, we abstain from injuring the interests, the 
reputation, or the feelings of others, there is another 
class of injuries, of still higher magnitude, which the 
conscientious mind will avoid with peculiar anxiety, 
namely, injuries done to the moral principles of other 
men. These form a class of offences of which no 
human law takes any adequate cognizance ; but we 
know that they possess a character of the deepest 
malignity. Deep guilt attaches to the man who, by 
persuasion or ridicule, has unhinged the moral feel- 
ings of another, or has been the means of leading him 
astray from the paths of virtue. Of equal or even 
greater malignity is the aspect of the writer whose 
works have contributed to violate the principles of 
truth and rectitude, — to pollute the imagination, or 
corrupt the heart. Inferior offenders are promptly 
seized by public authority, and suffer the award of 
public justice ; but the destroyer of the moral being 
often walks securely through his own scene of moral 
discipline, as if no power could reach the measure 
of his guilt but the hand of the Eternal. 

To the same head we are to assign the extensive 
and important influence of example. There are few 
men who have not in this respect some power, but it 
belongs more particularly to persons in situations of 



COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 65 

rank and public eminence. It is matter of deep 
regret both to the friend of virtue and the friend of his 
country, when any of these are found manifesting 
disregard to sacred things, or giving an air of fashion 
to what is calculated to corrupt the moral principles 
of the unthinking classes of society. If they are 
restrained by no higher motive, the feelings of patriot- 
ism, and even of personal safety, ought to produce a 
solemn caution ; and it becomes them seriously to 
consider, whether they may not thus be sowing among 
the ignorant multitude the seeds of tumult, revolution, 
and anarchy. 

II. COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 

Great diversity exists in the condition of different 
individuals in the present state, — some being in cir- 
cumstances of ease, wealth, and comfort, — others of 
pain, deprivation, and sorrow. Such diversities we 
must consider as an arrangement established by the 
great Disposer of all things, and calculated to pro- 
mote important purposes in his moral government. 
Many of these purposes are entirely beyond the reach 
of our faculties ; but, as holding a prominent place 
among them, we may safely reckon the cultivation 
of our moral feelings, especially the affections of 
compassion and benevolence. The due exercise 
of these is, therefore, calculated to promote a double 
object, namely, the alleviation of distress in others, — 
and the cultivation in ourselves of a mental condition 
peculiarly adapted to a state of moral discipline. By 
bringing us into contact with individuals in various 
F2 



66 AFFECTIONS. 

forms and degrees of suffering, they tend continually 
to remind us that the present scene is but the infancy 
of our existence, — that the beings whom we thus con- 
template are the children of the same Almighty 
Father with ourselves, inheriting the same nature, 
possessed of the same feelings, and soon to enter 
upon another state of existence, when all the distinc- 
tions which are to be found in this world shall cease 
for ever. They tend thus to withdraw us from the 
power of self-love, and the deluding influence of 
present things ; and habitually to raise our views to 
that future life for which the present is intended to pre- 
pare us. The due cultivation of the benevolent af- 
fections, therefore, is not properly to be considered 
as a source of moral approbation, but rather as a pro- 
cess of moral culture. They may enable us in some 
degree to benefit others, but their chief benefit is to 
ourselves. By neglecting them, we both incur much 
guilt, and deprive ourselves of an important means of 
improvement. The diligent exercise of them, be- 
sides being a source of moral advantage, is accom- 
panied with a degree of mental enjoyment which 
carries with it its own reward. Such appears to be 
the correct view which we ought to take of the ar- 
rangement established by the Creator in this part of 
our constitution. It is calculated to correct a mis- 
conception of an important kind, which considers the 
exercise of the benevolent affections as possessing a 
character of merit. To this subject we shall have 
occasion to refer more particularly in the sequel. 

The exercise of the benevolent affections may be 
briefly treated of, under nearly the same heads as 



COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 67 

those referred to when considering the principle of 
justice ; keeping in mind that they lead to greater 
exertion for the benefit of others, and often demand 
a greater sacrifice of self-love than is included under 
the mere requirements of justice. On the other 
hand, benevolence is not to be exercised at the ex- 
pense of justice ; as would be the case if a man 
were found relieving distress by expedients which 
involve the necessity of withholding the payment of 
just debts, or imply the neglect or infringement of 
some duty which he owes to another. 

(1.) Compassion and benevolent exertion are 
due towards alleviating the distresses of others. 
This exercise of them, in many instances, calls for 
a decided sacrifice of personal interest, and, in 
others, for considerable personal exertion. We 
feel our way to the proper measure of these sacrifices, 
by the high principle of moral duty, along with that 
mental exercise which places us in the situation of 
others, and, by a kind of reflected self-love, judges 
of the conduct due by us to them in our respective 
circumstances. The details of this subject would 
lead us into a field too extensive for our present 
purpose. Pecuniary aid, by those who have the 
means, is the most easy form in which benevolence 
can be gratified, and that which often requires the 
least, if any, sacrifice of personal comfort or self- 
love. The same affection may be exercised in a 
degree much higher in itself, and often much more 
useful to others, by personal exertion and personal 
kindness. The former, compared with the means 



68 AFFECTIONS. 

of the individual, may present a mere mockery of 
mercy ; while the latter, even in the lowest walks 
of life, often exhibit the brightest displays of active 
usefulness that can adorn the human character. 
This high and pure benevolence not only is dis- 
pensed with willingness, when occasions present 
themselves ; but seeks out opportunities for itself, 
and feels in want of its natural and healthy exer- 
cise when deprived of an object on which it may be 
bestowed. 

(2.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the 
reputation of others. This consists, not only in 
avoiding any injury to their characters, but in exer- 
tions to protect them against the injustice of others,— 
to correct misrepresentations,— to check the course 
of slander, — and to obviate the efforts of those who 
would poison the confidence of friends, or disturb 
the harmony of society. To this department, there- 
fore, belongs the high character of the peace- 
maker, whose delight it is to allay angry feelings 
even when he is in no degree personally interested, 
and to bring together as friends and brethren those 
who have assumed the attitude of hatred and re- 
venge, 

(3.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the 
character and conduct of others ; especially when 
these have been in opposition to our personal interest 
or self-love. This consists in viewing their con- 
duct with indulgence and forbearance, assigning the 
most favourable motives, and making every allow- 



COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 69 

ance for their feelings, and the circumstances in 
which they were placed. It leads us also to avoid 
all suspicions and jealousies which are not clearly 
justified by fact ; and to abstain to the utmost from 
taking offence, by putting upon the conduct of 
others the best construction of which it will possibly 
admit. It extends still farther to the actual forgive- 
ness of injuries, and the repaying of evil with good, 
— a conduct represented in the sacred writings as 
one of the highest attainments the human character 
can reach, in so far as regards its relation to other 
men. 

(4.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the 
feelings of others ; and this applies to many situa- 
tions in which neither their interest nor their char- 
acter is concerned. It includes those exercises of 
the kindly affections which produce so powerful an 
influence in all the relations of life, but which it is 
impossible for any description to delineate. It com- 
prehends all our social and civil connexions, but 
seems peculiarly to belong to our intercourse with 
inferiors and dependants. Its must anxious exer- 
cise may often relate merely to trifles, but it extends 
to innumerable circumstances in which we may sur- 
render our own feelings to those of others, and our 
own convenience or gratification to theirs. It im- 
plies solicitude to avoid wounding the feelings by 
pride, selfishness, or fretfulness, — by suspicions, im- 
putations, and jealousies, — or by allowing insignifi- 
cant things to ruffle the temper, and derange the 
social comfort. Many, who are not deficient in what 



70 AFFECTIONS. 

we usually call deeds of benevolence, are too apt tG 
forget, that a most important exercise of true benevo» 
lence consists in the habitual cultivation of courtesy, 
gentleness, and kindness ; and that on these dispo- 
sitions often depends our influence upon the comfort 
and happiness of others, in a greater degree than on 
any deeds of actual beneficence. 

(5.) Benevolence is to be exercised in regard to 
the moral degradation of others, including their 
ignorance and vice. This prevents us from deriving 
satisfaction from moral evil, even though it should 
contribute to our advantage, as might often happen 
from the misconduct of rivals or enemies. It implies 
also that highest species of usefulness which aims at 
raising the moral condition of man, — by instructing 
the ignorant, rescuing the unwary, and reclaiming the 
vicious. This exalted benevolence will therefore 
also seek to extend the light of divine truth to nations 
that sit in moral darkness ; and looks anxiously for 
the period when the knowledge of Christianity shall 
dispel every false faith, and put an end to the horrors 
of superstition. 

III. VERACITY. 

In our own mental impressions relating to vera- 
city, we have a striking illustration of the manner in 
which we rely on this class of moral feelings, as in- 
stinctive in the constitution of the mind. On a cer- 
tain confidence in the veracity of mankind is founded 
Bo much of the knowledge on which we constantly 



VERACITY. 71 

depend, that, without it, the whole system of human 
things would go into confusion. It relates to all the 
intelligence which we derive from any other source 
than our own personal observation : for example, 
to all that we receive through the historian, the trav- 
eller, the naturalist, or the astronomer. Even in 
regard to the most common events of a single day, 
we often proceed on a confidence in the veracity of 
a great variety of individuals. There is, indeed, a 
natural tendency to truth in all men, unless when this 
principle is overcome by some strong selfish purpose 
to be answered by departing from it : and there is 
an equally strong tendency to rely on the veracity 
of others, until we have learned certain cautions by 
our actual experience of mankind. Hence, chil- 
dren and inexperienced persons are easily imposed 
upon by unfounded statements : and the most prac- 
tised liar confides in the credulity of those whom he 
attempts to deceive. When treating of the intel- 
lectual powers in another work, I considered the 
principles which regulate our confidence in human 
testimony ; and it is unnecessary to recur to them 
in this place. Our present object is briefly to ana- 
lyze the elements which are essential to veracity, 
when we view it as a moral emotion, or a branch of 
individual character. These appear to be three, — 
correctness in ascertaining facts, — accuracy in re- 
lating them, — and truth of purpose, or fidelity in the 
fulfilment of promises. 

(1.) An important element of veracity is correct- 
ness in ascertaining facts. This is essential to the 



72 AFFECTIONS. 

love of truth. It requires us to exercise the most 
anxious care respecting every statement which we 
receive as true ; and not to receive it as such, until 
we are satisfied that the authority on which it is 
asserted is of a nature on which we can fully rely, 
and that the statement contains all the facts to which 
our attention ought to be directed. It consequently 
guards us against those limited views by which 
party spirit or a love of favourite dogmas leads a man 
to receive the facts which favour a particular opinion, 
and neglect those which are opposed to it The 
sound exercise of judgment, which is connected 
with this love of truth, differs therefore from the art 
of ingenious disputation, and is often found directly 
at variance with it. The same principle is appli- 
cable to the truths which are derived as deductions 
from processes of reasoning. It is thus opposed to 
all sophistical arguments, and partial or distorted 
reasonings, by which disputants strive to establish 
particular systems, instead of engaging in an honest 
and simple inquiry after truth. The love of truth, 
therefore, is of equal importance in the reception of 
facts, and in the formation of opinions ; and it 
includes also a readiness to relinquish our own 
opinions, when new facts or arguments are pre- 
sented to us which are calculated to overturn them. 

In the reception of truth, especially on the evi- 
dence of testimony, we acquire by experience a 
degree of caution, arising from having been some- 
times deceived. In minds of a certain description, 
this may be allowed to produce a suspicion with 
regard to all evidence, — in other words, skepticism* 



VERACITY. 73 

The want of the necessary and proper caution, 
again, leads to credulity. It is the part of a well- 
regulated mind to avoid both these extremes, by 
attentively weighing the evidence and the character 
of the witnesses, and giving to each circumstance 
its due influence in the conclusion. 

(2.) Closely connected with the love of truth in 
receiving, is the exercise of veracity in the state- 
ment of facts, whether derived from our personal 
observation, or received by testimony from others. 
It consists, not only in the most scrupulous accuracy 
of relation, but also in giving it in such a manner as 
to convey a correct impression to the hearer. It is 
consequently opposed to all those methods by which 
either a false statement may be made to assume the 
appearance of truth, or one essentially true may be 
so related as to convey a false impression. 

Direct fallacy may consist in the alleged facts 
being absolutely false, or in some of them being so, 
— in facts being wanting or kept out of view which 
would give a different import to the whole state- 
ment, — or in some of the facts being disguised, 
distorted, or coloured, so as to alter materially the 
impression conveyed by them. But, besides such 
actual fallacy, there are various methods by which a 
statement literally true may be so related as to con- 
vey an erroneous impression. Facts may be con- 
nected together in such a manner as to give the 
appearance of a relation of cause and effect, when 
they are in truth entirely unconnected ; or an 
event may bo represented as common which has 
G 



74 AFFECTIONS. 

occurred only in one or two instances. The char- 
acter of an individual may be assumed from a single 
act, which, if the truth were known, might be seen 
to be opposed to his real disposition, and accounted 
for by the circumstances in which he happened at 
the time to be placed. Events may be connected 
together which were entirely disjoined, and con- 
clusions deduced from this fictitious connexion 
which are, of course, unfounded. Several of these 
sources of fallacy may be illustrated by a ludicrous 
example.— A traveller from the Continent has rep- 
resented the venality of the British House of Com- 
mons to be such, that, whenever the minister of the 
crown enters the house, there is a general cry for 
9 places." It may be true that a cry of " places" 
has gone round the house at certain times, when 
business was about to commence, or to be resumed 
after an interval, — meaning, of course, that members 
were to take their seats. It is very probable, that, 
on some occasion, this may have occurred at the 
moment when the minister entered, — so that the 
statement of the traveller might, in point of fact, be 
strictly true. The erroneous impression which he 
endeavours to convey by it arises from three sources 
of fallacy which the anecdote will serve to illustrate ; 
namely, the false meaning he gives to the word 
employed, — connecting it with the entrance of the 
minister as cause and effect, — and representing the 
connexion as uniform which happened to occur in 
that particular instance. In the same manner it 
will appear, that a false impression may be conveyed 
regp^cluig the conduct of an individual, — by assign- 



VERACITY. 75 

ing motives which are entirely imaginary, — by con- 
necting things together which have no relation, — by 
keeping out of view circumstances which would 
afford an explanation or palliation of his conduct, — 
or by attaching to his words a different meaning 
from that which he intended to convey by them. 
The common saying that there are two ways of 
telling a story does not therefore refer to what is 
strictly to be called fabrication or falsehood ; but 
to those distortions or colourings of circumstances 
which, however slight in themselves, have the effect 
of essentially changing the impression of the whole. 
To veracity, under this department, we are also 
to refer the rule — of giving to others an honest and 
fair impression of our views, motives, and intentions. 
This is sincerity. It is opposed to hypocrisy, that 
unworthy display of human character in which a 
man disguises his real sentiments, and, on the con- 
trary, professes principles which he neither feels nor 
values, merely for the purpose of promoting his 
selfish interests. Such a character exhibits a singu- 
lar combination of moral delinquencies. It is 
founded on the lowest selfishness, and includes a 
departure from veracity and honesty. But besides, 
it implies a knowledge of virtuous principles and of 
their proper tendencies, while there is a practical 
denial of their influence. Sincerity is also opposed 
to flattery, which tends to give a man a false im- 
pression of our opinion, and of our feelings towards 
him, and likewise leads him to form a false estimate 
of his own character. It is opposed also to insin- 
cerity or double-dealing, by which a man, for certain 



76 AFFECTIONS. 

purposes, professes sentiments towards another 
which he does not feel, or intentions which he does 
not entertain. 

(3.) The third element of veracity is Truth of 
Purpose, or fidelity in the fulfilment of promises. 
This is opposed to actual departure from what was 
distinctly promised ; likewise to all those evasions 
by which one may convey an impression, or excite 
the hope, of an intention which he does not mean to 
fulfil, — or avoid the performance of a real or implied 
engagement on any other ground than inability to 
perform it. By this straight-forward integrity of 
purpose, an individual gives a clear impression of 
what he honestly intends to perform ; and performs 
it, though circumstances may have occurred to 
make the fulfilment disagreeable or even injurious to 
himself: — "he sweareth to his own hurt," says a 
sacred writer, " and changeth not." 

IV. FRIENDSHIP, LOVE, AND GRATITUDE. 

These affections are so nearly allied, that, in this 
slight analysis, they may be taken together. They 
consist in a personal and peculiar attachment to an 
individual, founded either upon some qualities in 
himself, or some benefits he has conferred on us, 
or on some one in whom we are interested. The 
feelings and conduct to which they give rise corres- 
pond with those referred to under the preceding 
affections, with this difference, that, in many in- 
stances, they lead to a much greater sacrifice of 



PATRIOTISM. 77 

personal interest and comfort, than usually proceeds 
either from justice or simple benevolence. The 
exertions arising out of them are directed, according 
to the division formerly given, — to promoting the in- 
terest or comfort of the object of our regard, — pre- 
serving, defending, or advancing his reputation, — 
treating his feelings with peculiar tenderness, — and 
his failings with peculiar indulgence, — receiving his 
opinions with peculiar favour,— and anxiously en- 
deavouring to improve his intellectual and moral con- 
dition. This last consideration is justly reckoned 
the highest office of friendship : it is to be regretted 
that its operation is sometimes impeded by another 
feeling, which leads us to be blind to the failings 
and deficiencies of those whom we love. In ex- 
ercising simple love and friendship, we rejoice in the 
advantage and happiness of the object, — though they 
should be accomplished by others, — but, in exercising 
gratitude, we are not satisfied unless they be effected 
in some measure by ourselves. 

v. PATRIOTISM. 

Patriotism is, perhaps, not properly to be con- 
sidered as a distinct principle of our nature ; but 
rather as the result of a combination of the other 
affections. It leads us, by every means in our 
power, to promote the peace and the prosperity of 
our country, — and to discourage, to the utmost of 
our ability, whatever tends to the contrary. Every 
member of the community has something in his 
power in this respect. He may set an example, in 

G2 



78 AFFECTIONS. 

his own person, of dutiful and loyal respect to the 
first authority, of strict obedience to the laws and 
respectful submission to the institutions of his coun- 
try. He may oppose the attempts of factious indi- 
viduals to sow among the ignorant the seeds of dis- 
content, tumult, or discord. He may oppose and 
repress attempts to injure the revenue of the state ; 
may aid in the preservation of public tranquillity, 
and in the execution of public justice. Finally, he 
may zealously exert himself in increasing the know- 
ledge and improving the moral habits of the people, 
— two of the most important means by which the 
conscientious man, in any rank of life, may aid in 
conferring a high and permanent benefit on his 
country. 

VI. THE DOMESTIC AFFECTIONS. 

In this extensive and interesting class are included, 
conjugal affection, — the parental feelings — filial rev- 
erence, — and the ties of brothers and sisters. — 
These call forth, in a still higher degree, the feel- 
ings and exertions already referred to, and a still 
greater sacrifice of personal ease, advantage, and 
comfort, in the anxious and diligent discharge of the 
duties resulting from them. In the conjugal rela- 
tion, they lead us to the tenderness, the confidence, 
the mutual forbearance, the united exertions of those 
who have one hope, one interest, and one course of 
duty. The parental relation implies the highest pos- 
sible degree of that feeling which studies the advan- 
tage of the object of our care, — the promotion of his 



THE DOMESTIC AFFECTIONS. 79 

happiness, — the improvement of his mind, the cul- 
ture of his affections, — the formation of his habits ; 
in short, the anxious watching over the develop- 
ment of his character, both as an intellectual and 
a moral beirig. The filial relation requires, in an 
equal degree, respect, affection, submission, and 
confidence, — a deference to parental opinion and 
control ; and an impression that those parts of pa- 
rental management which may often be disagree- 
able are guided by a sincere desire to promote the 
highest interests of the object of this affectionate 
regard. 

Among the feelings of our nature " which have 
less of earth in them than heaven," are those which 
bind together the domestic circle in the various sym- 
pathies, affections, and duties which belong to this 
class of tender relations. It is beautiful also to ob- 
serve how these affections arise out of each other, 
and how the right exercise of them tends to their 
mutual cultivation. The father ought to consider 
the son as, of all earthly concerns, the highest object 
of his anxious care ; and should watch over the de- 
velopment of his intellectual character, and the cul- 
ture of his moral feelings. In the zealous prosecu- 
tion of this great purpose, he should study to convey 
a clear impression that he is influenced purely by a 
feeling of solemn responsibility, and an anxious de- 
sire to promote the highest interests. When parental 
watchfulness is thus mingled with confidence and 
kindness, the son will naturally learn to estimate alike 
the conduct itself and the principles from which it 
sprang, and will look to the faithful parent as his 



80 AFFECTIONS. * 

safest guide and counsellor, and most valued earthly 
friend. If we extend the same principles to the 
relation between the mother and the daughter, they 
apply with equal, or even greater force. In the 
arrangements of society, these are thrown more con- 
stantly into each other's company ; and that watch- 
ful superintendence may be still more habitually 
exercised, which, along with the great concern of 
cultivating the intellectual and moral being, neglects 
not those graces and delicacies which belong pecu- 
liarly to the female character. It is not by direct 
instruction alone that, in such a domestic circle, the 
highest principles and best feelings of our nature are 
cultivated in the minds of the young. It is by the 
actual exhibition of the principles themselves, and a 
uniform recognition of their supreme importance ; 
it is by a parental conduct, steadily manifesting the 
conviction, that, with every proper attention to their 
acquirements, accomplishments, and the comforts 
of life, the chief concern of moral beings relates to 
the life which is to come. A domestic society 
bound together by these principles can retire, as it 
were, from the haunts of men, and retreat within a 
sanctuary where the storms of the world cannot 
enter. When thus met together in the interchange 
of mutual affection and mutual confidence, they pre- 
sent the anticipation of that period when, after the 
tumults of life are over, they shall meet again, " no 
wanderer lost, a family in h ea ven." 



THE DEFENSIVE AFFECTIONS. 81 



THE DEFENSIVE AFFECTIONS. 

The feelings of jealousy, anger, and resentment 
are, not less than the other affections, to be con- 
sidered as part of our moral constitution ; and they 
are calculated to answer important purposes, pro- 
vided they are kept under the strict control of reason 
and the moral principle. Their proper object is 
primarily a sense of blameable conduct in others ; 
and they lead us to use proper measures for protect- 
ing ourselves against such conduct. While we thus 
disapprove of the character and conduct of man in 
certain circumstances, we are led, by our feelings 
of justice and benevolence, to take part with the 
injured and oppressed, against the oppressors, — or 
to protect those who are threatened with injuries, by 
measures for defeating the schemes of their enemies. 
A still more refined exercise of this class of feelings 
leads us to seek the reformation of the offender, and 
to convert him from an enemy into a friend. 

Resentment, in cases which concern the public 
peace, naturally leads to the infliction of punishment ; 
the object of which is to prevent similar conduct in 
others, not to gratify personal vengeance. Hence" 
it is required to be done in a public manner, — with 
proper deliberation and coolness, — and with an exact 
adaptation of the penalty to the offence, and to the 
object to be attained. The person injured is not 
likely to do this with the requisite impartiality and 



82 AFFECTIONS. 

candour : for we are apt to feel too deeply injuries 
offered to ourselves, and not to make the proper 
allowance for the feelings of others, and the circum- 
stances which led to the offence. The higher 
degrees, indeed, of these tendencies usually go 
together, — they v/ho are most susceptible of offences, 
and most irritable under them, being generally least 
inclined to make allowances for others. Hence, iu 
all cases, our disapprobation of personal vengeance, 
or of a man taking the law into his own hands ; and 
our perfect sympathy with the protectors of the public 
peace, when they dispassionately investigate a case 
of injury, and calmly adapt their measures to the real 
object to be attained by them, — the protection of the 
public. 

The defensive affections are exercised in an un- 
warranted manner when they are allowed to be 
excited by trifling causes ; when they are, in degree, 
disproportioned to the offence, or prolonged in a 
manner which it did not require ; and when they 
lead, in any measure, to Retaliation or revenge. The 
sound exercise of them, therefore, is opposed to that 
irascibility which takes fire on trivial occasions, or 
without due consideration of the intentions of the 
agent, or the circumstances in which he was placed, 
• — to a disposition to resentment on occasions which 
do not warrant it, — and, on all occasions, to har- 
bouring the feeling after the offence and all its con- 
sequences have passed over. 



INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. 83 

Before concluding the subject of the affections, 
there are three points respecting them which remain 
to be mentioned as briefly as possible, — the influ- 
ence of Attention, combined with a certain act of 
Imagination, — the influence of Habit, — and the esti- 
mate of the feeling of Moral Approbation which the 
exercise of the affections is calculated to produce. 

I. In every exercise of the affections, a most 
important influence is produced by Attention, aided 
by a certain act of imagination. This consists in 
directing the mind intensely and habitually to all the 
considerations which ought to guide us in the par- 
ticular Telation to which the affection refers. It leads 
us to place ourselves in the situation of others, and, 
with a kind of personal, almost selfish, interest, to 
enter into their wants, their anxieties and their feel- 
ings ; and thus, in their place, to judge of the emo- 
tions and the conduct which are due from us to them. 
Such is the exercise of one who wishes to follow the 
great rule of doing to others as he would that they 
should do to him. He is not ^tisfied with the 
merely decent discharge of the duties which arise 
from the affections, but studies intensely the require- 
ments which attach to his particular situation, — 
searches out the individuals towards v/hom they ought 
to be exercised, and enters into their condition and 
their feelings with minute and tender interest. Many 
who show no want of friendly and benevolent affec- 
tion, when an individual case is strongly brought 
before them, are deficient in the kind of exercise 
which would lead them, in this manner, to find their 



84 AFFECTIONS. 

way to that correct exercise of the affections which 
really belongs to a scene of moral discipline. Such 
an exercise is adapted to every situation in life, and 
tends to guard a man, in his various relations, against 
the hinderances which indolence, self-love, and pure 
inattention are apt to bring in the way of his peculiar 
duties, — and of his discharging them with due regard 
to the feelings of others. 

This mental exercise of extensive application to 
the benevolent affections constitutes what is usually 
called Sympathy. It is composed of an act of ima- 
gination and self-love, by which we transfer our- 
selves, as it were, into the situation of other men, 
and thereby regulate our conduct towards them. It 
is however to be kept in mind that the principle of 
self-love, thus brought into action, is the test, not 
the rule, of our conduct. This is a point on which 
there has been much vague and useless speculation ; 
and, from not attending to the distinction, some have 
referred our ideas of benevolence entirely to the 
principle of selfishness. Such discussions are equally 
unsound and unprofitable, and are to be placed on a 
footing with the speculations of the scholastic logic, 
which we now look back upon merely as matters of 
historical curiosity. The application of self-love in 
the manner which has been referred to is chiefly 
useful in enabling us fully to appreciate the facts of 
the individual case, as we would do if we were per- 
sonally interested. The rule of our conduct is quite 
distinct from this, and rests on those fundamental 
principles of justice and compassion which form a 
part of our moral constitution. In the practical 



INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. 85 

application of them, they are very much aided by tho 
moral principle or conscience. 

The man who acts habitually under the influence 
of these rules learns to question himself rigidly 
respecting the claims and duties which result from 
his moral relations ; and the feelings and circum- 
stances of those with whom they bring him into con- 
tact. What (he asks himself) is the line of action 
which belongs to me in regard to that individual, — 
what are his feelings in his present situation ; what 
are the feelings and conduct which he expects from 
me, — and what are those which I would expect from 
him were I in his circumstances and he in mine ? 
It is not a due regulation of the affections alone that 
arises from this wholesome state of mental disci- 
pline. It is a moral culture to the mind itself, 
which may often be fraught with the most important 
results. For the man who exercises it realizes to 
himself the feelings of poverty, — the agonies of be- 
reavement, — the impressions of the bed of death ; 
and thus, without the pain of suffering, he may reap 
a portion of those important moral benefits which 
suffering is calculated to yield. 

There is another view still to be taken of the 
advantages derived from that mental discipline which 
consists in attention to all the relations included 
under the affections. When habitually exercised, it 
may often bring before the mind important circum- 
stances in our moral relations, which are apt to make 
an inadequate impression amid the distractions of 
present things. When the parent, for example, 
looks around the objects of his-* tender affection, 
H 



86 AFFECTIONS. 

what a new impulse is communicated by the thought 
that the present life is but the infancy of their being ; 
and that his chief and highest concern is to train 
Ihem for immortality. A similar impulse must be 
given to the philanthropist, when he considers that 
the individuals who share his benevolent attentions 
are, like himself, passing through a scene of disci- 
pline, to a higher state of existence, where they will 
assume a place corresponding to their rank in the 
scale of moral beings. The refined philanthropy thus 
arising, while it neglects no proper attention to the 
distresses of the present life, will seek chiefly to 
contend with those greater evils which degrade the 
moral nature, and sever the immortal spirit from its 
God. He who judges upon this extended princi- 
ple will learn to form a new estimate of the condi- 
tion of man. Amid the pride of wealth and the 
splendour of power, he may mourn over a being lost 
to every feeling of his high destiny; and, by the 
death-bed of the peasant, amid discomfort and suf- 
fering, he may contemplate with interest a purified 
spirit rising to immortality. 

II. Next to the power of attention, we have to 
notice the influence produced upon the affections by 
Habit. This is founded upon a principle of our 
nature, by which a remarkable relation exists be- 
tween the affections and the actions which arise out 
of them. The tendency of all emotions is to be- 
come weaker by repetition, or to be less acutely felt 
the oftener they are experienced. The tendency 
of actions, again^as I have shown when treating of 



INFLUENCE OE ftABlT. 87 

the Intellectual Powers, is to become easier by repe- 
tition, — so that those which at first require close and 
continued attention come to be performed without 
effort, and almost without consciousness. Now an 
affection properly consists of an emotion leading to 
an action ; and the natural progress of the mind, in 
the proper exercise of the affection, is, that the emo- 
tion becomes less acutely felt as the action be- 
comes easier and more familiar. Thus, a scene of 
wretchedness, or a tale of sorrow, will produce in the 
inexperienced an intensity of emotion not felt by him 
whose life has been devoted to deeds of mercy ; 
and a superficial observer is apt to consider the 
condition of the latter as one of insensibility, pro- 
duced by familiarity with scenes of distress. It is, 
on the contrary, that healthy and natural progress 
of the mind, in which the emotion is gradually di- 
minished in force as it is followed by its proper 
actions, — that is, as the mere intensity of feeling is 
exchanged for the habit of active benevolence. 
But that this may take place in the sound and 
healthy manner, the emotion must be steadily fol- 
lowed by the action which belongs to it. If this be 
neglected, the harmony of the moral process is 
destroyed, and, as the emotion becomes weakened, 
it is succeeded by cold insensibility or barren selfish- 
ness. 

This is a subject of much importance, — and there 
are two conclusions which arise out of it respecting 
the cultivation of the benevolent affections. The 
one relates to the bad effects of fictitious scenes of 
sorrow, as represented on the stage, or in works of 



88 AFFECTIONS J 

fancy. The evil arising from these appears to ba 
that which has now been referred to ; the emotion 
is produced without the corresponding action, and 
the consequence is likely to be a cold and useless 
sentimentalism, instead of a sound cultivation of the 
benevolent affections. The second is, — that, in 
cultivating the benevolent affections in the young, 
we should be careful to observe the process so 
clearly pointed out by the philosophy of the moral 
feelings. They should be familiarized with actual 
scenes of suffering, but this ought to be accompa- 
nied by deeds of minute and active kindness, so as 
to produce a full and lively impression of the wants 
and feelings of the sufferer. On this ground, also, 
I think we should at first even abstain, in a great 
measure, from giving young persons the cautions 
they will afterward find so requisite respecting the 
characters of the objects of their benevolence, and 
the impositions so frequently practised by the poor. 
Suspicions of this kind might tend to interfere with 
the important moral process which ought to be our 
first object, — the necessary cautions will afterward 
be learned with little difficulty. 

The best mode of contending with the evils of 
pauperism, on the principles of political economy, is 
a problem on which I presume not to enter. But, 
on the principles of moral science, a consideration 
of the utmost importance should never be forgotten, 
— the great end to be answered by the varieties of 
human condition in the cultivation of the benevolent 
affections. Political science passes its proper bound- 
ary when it is permitted in any degree to interfere 



MORAL APPROBATION DUE TO THEM. 89 

with this high principle ; and, on the other hand, it 
is not to be denied that this important purpose is in 
a great measure frustrated by many of those institu- 
tions, which cut off the direct intercourse of the 
prosperous and the wealthy with those whom Pro- 
vidence has committed to them, in this scene of 
moral discipline, as the objects of their benevolent 
care. | 

III. The third point which remains to be briefly 
mentioned is the feeling of moral approbation, or 
rather the impression of merit, which is frequently 
attached to the exercise of the affections. This 
important subject has been already referred to. When 
the mother, with total disregard to her health and com- 
fort, devotes herself to watching over her child, she 
is not influenced by any sense of duty, nor do we 
attach to her conduct the feeling of moral approba- 
tion. She acts simply upon an impuhe within, 
which she perceives to be a part of her constitution, 
and which carries her forward with unshrinking firm- 
ness in a particular course of laborious and anxious 
service. She may, indeed, be sensible that the vio- 
lation of these feelings would expose her to the 
reprobation of her kind ; but she does not imagine 
that the zealous fulfilment of them entitles her to 
any special praise. The same principle applies to 
all the affections. They are a part of our moral 
constitution, intended to bind men together by cer- 
tain offices of justice, friendship, and compassion ; 
and have been well named by a distinguished writer, 
u the voice of God within us." They serve a pur- 
H 2 



90 AFFECTIONS : 

pose in our moral economy analogous to that which 
the appetites answer in our physical system. The 
appetite of hunger, for example, ensures a regular 
supply of nourishment, in a manner which could 
never have been provided for by any process of rea- 
soning ; though an exercise of reason is still appli- 
cable to preserving over it a certain regulation and 
control. In the same manner, the various feelings 
of our moral nature have each a defined purpose to 
answer, both in respect to our mental economy and 
our relations to our fellow-men ; and in the due 
exercise of them they ought to be controlled and 
regulated by the moral principle. The violation of 
these feelings, therefore, places man below the level 
of a moral being ; but the performance of them does 
not entitle him to assume the claim of merit. He 
is merely bearing his part in a certain arrangement, 
from which he is himself to derive benefit, as a being 
holding a place in that system of things which these 
feelings are intended to keep together in harmony 
and order. In regard to th* great principles of 
veracity and justice, every <xie perceives this to be 
true ; but it applies equally to the affections more 
strictly benevolent. The man who lives in the ha- 
bitual exercise of a cold and barren selfishness, 
which seeks only his own gratification or interest, 
has indeed, in some sense, his punishment in the 
contempt and aversion with which he is viewed by 
his fellow-men. Much more than this, however, 
attaches to such a character ; he has violated the 
principles given him for his guidance in the social 
order ; he has fallen from his sound condition as a 



MORAL APPROBATION DUE TO THEM. 91 

moral being ; and incurs actual guilt in the eye of a 
righteous Governor, whose will the order of this 
lower world is intended to obey. But it by no 
means follows, that the man who performs in a cer- 
tain manner the relations of justice, friendship, and 
compassion is thereby entitled to claim merit in the 
view of the Almighty Governor of the universe. He 
merely acts his part in the present system of moral 
economy, for which he has been adapted. Ho is 
so constituted as to derive satisfaction from the ex- 
ercise of these affections ; and, on the other hand, 
he receives an appropriate reward in the reciprocal 
exercise of similar affections by other men, and in 
the general harmony of society which results from 
them. An extensive culture of the affections, there- 
fore, may go on without the recognition of the moral 
principle, or that state of mind which habitually feels 
the presence of the Deity, and desires to have the 
whole character in subjection to his will. We are 
not entitled to acknowledge the operation of that 
great principle, unless when the affections are exer- 
cised in circumstances which imply a strong and 
decided sacrifice of self-love to the authority of God. 
This appears to correspond with the distinction so 
strikingly stated in the sacred writings — " If ye love 
them which love you, what reward have ye ? do not 
even the publicans the same 1" "I say unto you, 
love your enemies ; bless them that curse you, do 
good to them that hate you, pray for them which 
d^spitefully use you and persecute you." 

On this branch of the subject it is also to be ob- 
seived, that there is a kind of compensating power 



92 affections: 

among the affections themselves, by which, in the 
intercourse of men, they act as checks upon each 
other. Thus resentment acts as a check upon injus- 
tice ; and the dread of exciting anger in others has 
probably an influence, in preserving the peace and 
harmonies of society, which we often ascribe to a 
higher principle. In regard to the affections more 
strictly benevolent, these are also influenced, in a 
similar manner, by the feeling of disapprobation 
which attends any remarkable departure from their 
requirements. When we keep in mind, along with 
this consideration, the manner in which all men are 
influenced, in one degree or another, by the love of 
approbation or regard to character, we perceive in 
the moral system a beautiful principle of compensa- 
tion, tending to promote in it a certain degree of 
harmony. This is remarkably illustrated, for ex- 
ample, in the general feeling of disapprobation which 
is attached to ingratitude, and to violation of filial 
affection or parental duty, and even to any marked 
neglect of the common calls of humanity. On the 
other hand, we are to keep in mind, that a man is 
universally considered as in the lowest state of human 
nature who, in these respects, has become regard- 
less of character, — that is, of the estimation with 
which his conduct is viewed by his fellow-men. 

In regard to both the affections and the desires, 
we are further to remember the deep and extensive 
influence upon tlie happiness of the individual him- 
self, which results from a due regulation of these 
feelings ; the pure mental enjoyment of him whose 
affections are under sound regulation, and whose 



DUE REGULATION OF THEM. 93 

desires are habitually directed to those objects which 
are in the highest degree worthy of being sought 
after. This mental tranquillity is also represented 
to us, in a very striking manner, by the influence of 
those dispositions which we usually refer to the head 
of Temper. What a constant source of pure enjoy- 
ment is a meek and placid spirit, the desires of which 
are moderate, and under due regulation, — which puts 
upon every thing the best construction it will admit 
of, — is slow to take offence, — seeks no distinction, — 
but views itself with humility, and others with can- 
dour, benevolence, and indulgence. Such a dispo- 
sition makes the man happy in himself, and a source 
of happiness and peace to all around him. On the 
other hand, what an unceasing source of mental dis- 
quiet and turbulence is the opposite disposition, — 
jealous, envious, and censorious, — ready to take 
offence at trifles, and often to construe incidental 
occurrences into intended and premeditated insults, 
■ — prone to put unfavourable constructions upon the 
conduct of others, and thus continually to surround 
itself with imaginary enemies, and imaginary neglects 
and injuries. Such a temper is a continual torment 
to the individual himself, and the cause of disputes 
and jealousies among those with whom he is con- 
nected. We cannot fail, also, to perceive that the 
man of ill-regulated passions injures his own true 
interest and happiness, as much as he violates his 
duty to others ; and that his course of life is often 
productive of degradation, disease, and wretched- 
ness. In all this we see a beautiful example of the 
wise arrangements of the Creator, who, in the struo 



#4 AFFECTIONS : 

ture of our moral nature, has connected our own 
peace and happiness with a state of feeling calculated 
to promote the happiness and peace of all around 
us. We cannot be at a loss to conclude what a 
different scene the world would present if such feel- 
ings were universally cultivated ; and, on the other 
hand, we must observe how much cf the actual 
misery that exists in the world an«es firm derange- 
ment of moral feeling, and the various consequences 
that result from it both to individuals and communi- 
ties. We find also, by innumerable examples, the 
remarkable influence produced, by a due cultivation 
of these feelings, in alleviating, both in ourselves 
and others, the physical evils which are inseparable 
from the present state. It is further to be remarked, 
as a fact worthy of the deepest attention, that the 
only distinct information conveyed to us in Scripture 
respecting the happiness of the righteous in a future 
state is, that it will consist chiefly in a perfect 
knowledge of the Divine character, and a conformity 
of the soul to the moral perfections of the Deity. 
" It doth not yet appear," says the sacred writer, 
" what we shall be ; but we know that when he shall 
appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him 
as he is." 

In concluding the whole subject of the affections, 
I have only further to remark, that the regulated 
state of the moral feelings, which has been the sub- 
ject of the preceding observations, seems tc corres- 
pond with the quality so emphatically described in 
the sacred writings under the name of Charity. It 



DtJE REGULATION OF THEM. 95 

is there uniformly represented as the great test of 
the moral condition ; and we find exposed in the 
most striking manner the worthlessness of all en- 
dowments which are not accompanied by this regu- 
lation of the whole character. We cannot, there- 
fore, conclude this subject in a more appropriate 
manner than by a passage in which, by a few most 
powerful expressions, a code of ethical science is 
laid before us with a clearness and a force which 
put to naught all human composition : " Though I 
speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and 
have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, 
or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift 
of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all 
knowledge ; and though I have all faith, so that I 
could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am 
nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to 
feed the poor, and though I give my body to be 
burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. 
Charity sufferelh long, and is kind ; charity envieth 
not ; charity vaunleth not itself, is not puffed up, doth 
not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is 
not easily provoked, thinketh no evil : rejoiceth not in 
iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth ; beareth all things, 
beiieveth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all 
things. Charity never faileth : but whether there 
be prophecies, they shall fail ; whether there be 
tongues, they shall cease ; whether there be know- 
ledge, it shall vanish away. For we know in part, 
and we prophesy in part. But when that which is 
perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be 
done away. When I was a child, I spake as a 



96 SELF-LOVE. 

child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child : 
but when I became a man I put away childish 
things. For now we see through a glass, darkly ; 
but then face to face : now I know in part ; but then 
shall I know even as also I am known. And now 
abideth faith, hope, charity, these three, — but the 
greatest of these is charity." 



SECTION III. 



SELF-LOVE. 



There has been some dispute respecting the 
term Self-love, both as to its general propriety, and 
as to the mental feelings which ought to be referred 
to it. There can be no doubt that there is, in our 
constitution, a principle or propensity which leads us 
to study our own interest, gratification, and com- 
fort ; and that, in many instances, it becomes the 
ruling principle of the character. It is in this sense 
that I use the term self-love, without entering into 
any discussion regarding the strict logical propriety 
of it. Like the other mental feelings, it is to be 
considered as part of our moral constitution, and cal- 
culated to answer important purposes, provided it be 
kept in its proper place, and do not encroach upon 
the duties and affections which we owe to other 
men. When thus regulated, it constitutes prudence, 



SELF-LOVE. 97 

or a just regard to our own interest, safety, and 
happiness ; when it becomes morbid in its exercise, 
it degenerates into selfishness. 

A sound and rational self-love ought to lead us to 
seek our own true happiness, and should prove a 
check upon those appetites and passions which inter- 
fere with this ; for many of them, it must be allowed, 
may be not less adverse to our own real interest and 
comfort than they are to our duty to other men. It 
should lead us, therefore, to avoid every thing, not 
only that is opposed to our interest, but that is cal- 
culated to impair our peace of mind, and that har- 
mony of the moral feelings without which there can 
be no real happiness. This includes a due regula- 
tion of the desires, and a due exercise of the affec- 
tions, as a moral condition which promotes our own 
happiness and comfort. Self-love, viewed in this 
manner, appears to be placed as a regulating prin- 
ciple among the other powers, — much inferior indeed 
to the great principle of conscience, so far as regards 
the moral condition of the individual,- — but calculated 
to answer important purposes in promoting the har- 
monies of society. The impression on which its 
influence rests appears to be simply the comfort and 
satisfaction which arise to ourselves from a certain 
regulation of the desires, and a certain exercise of 
the affections, and the feelings of an opposite kind 
which follow a different conduct. These sources 
of satisfaction are manifold. We may reckon among 
them the pleasure attached to the exercise of the 
affections themselves, a feature of our moral consti 
I 



98 SELF-LOVE. 

tution of the most interesting kind, — the true mental 
peace and enjoyment which spring from benevo- 
lence, friendship, meekness, forgiveness, and the 
whole train of the kindly feelings, — the gratitude of 
those who have experienced the effects of our kind- 
ness, — the respect and approbation of those whose 
esteem we feel to be valuable, — and the return of 
similar affections and good offices from other men. 
On the other hand, we have to keep in mind the 
mental agony and distraction which arise from jea- 
lousy, envy, hatred, and resentment, — the sense of 
shame and disgrace which follow a certain line of 
conduct, — and the distress which often arises purely 
from the contempt and disapprobation of our fellow- 
men. " Disgrace," says Butler, " is as much 
avoided as bodily pain,"-— we may safely say that it 
is much more avoided, and that it inflicts a suffering 
of a much more severe and permanent nature. It 
must likewise accord witn the observation of every 
one, that among the circumstances which most fre- 
quently injure our peace and impair our comfort are 
those which ruffle the mind by mortifying our self- 
love. There is also a feeling of dissatisfaction and 
self-reproach which follows any neglect of a due ex- 
ercise of the affections, and which, in a well-regu- 
lated mind, disturbs the mental tranquillity fully as 
much as the disapprobation of other men. It is fur- 
ther evident, that the man of ungoverned passions 
and ill-regulated affections impairs his own peace 
and happiness as much as he violates his duties to 
others, — for his course of life is productive, not 



SELF-LOVE. 99 

only of degradation in the eyes of his fellow-men, 
but often of mental anguish, misery, disease, and 
premature death. To run the risk of such con- 
sequences for the gratification of a present appetite 
or passion, is clearly opposed to the dictates of a 
sound self-love, as has been distinctly shown by 
Bishop Butler ; and when, in such a case, self-love 
prevails over an appetite or passion, we perceive it 
operating as a regulating principle in the moral sys- 
tem. It does so, indeed, merely by the impression, 
that a certain regulation of the moral feelings is con- 
ducive to our own true and present happiness ; and 
thus shows a wonderful power of compensation 
among these feelings, referable entirely to this 
source. But it is quite distinct from the great prin- 
ciple of conscience, which directs us to a certain 
line of conduct on the pure and high principle of 
moral duty, apart from all considerations of a per- 
sonal nature — which leads a man to act upon nobler 
motives than those which result from the most re- 
fined self-love, and calls for the mortification of all 
personal feelings, when these interfere, in the smallest 
degree, with the requirements of duty. This dis- 
tinction I conceive to be of the utmost practical im- 
portance ; as it shows a principle of regulation 
among the moral feelings themselves, by which a 
certain exercise of the affections is carried on in a 
manner which contributes in a high degree to the 
harmonies of society, but which does not convey 
any impression of moral approbation or merit that 
can be applied to the agent 



100 SELF-LOVE. 

Self-love, then, leads us to consult our own feel- 
ings, and to seek directly our own interest and hap- 
piness. The affections lead us to allow for the 
feelings, and consider the advantage and comfort of 
other men ; and a certain balance between these 
principles is essential to the healthy state of the 
moral being. It is seldom that the affections are 
likely to acquire an undue influence, but there is 
great danger of self-love degenerating into selfish- 
ness, which interferes with the duties we owe to 
others. We have formerly alluded to the means, 
referable to the due exercise of the affections, and 
even to a sound and rational self-love, by which this 
should be in part prevented. When these are not 
sufficient, the appeal is to conscience ; or a distinct 
reference of individual cases is made to the great 
principle of moral rectitude. We find, accordingly, 
this principle called into action when a man has 
become sensible of important defects in his moral 
habits. Thus, we may see a man, who has long 
given way to a peevish or irascible disposition, that 
is, to selfish acting upon his own feelings, without 
due regard to the feelings of others, setting himself 
to contend with this propensity upon the score of 
moral duty ; while another, of a placid disposition, 
has no need of bringing the principle into action for 
such a purpose. In the same manner, a person 
who has indulged a cold contracted selfishness may, 
under the influence of the same great principle, per- 
form deeds of benevolence and kindness. Thus we 
perceive that the moral principle or sense of duty, 



SELF-LOVE. 101 

when it is made the regulating motive of action, is 
calculated to control self-love, aud preserve the 
proper harmony between it and the exercise of the 
affections. 

When the principle of self-love becomes deranged 
in its exercise and objects, it leads to those habit3 
by which a man seeks his own gratification in a way 
which interferes with his duties to other men. This 
he may do by an undue pursuit of any of the desires, 
— whether avarice, ambition, love of eminence, or 
love of fame ; and the desire of knowledge itself 
may be so indulged as to assume the same charac- 
ter. Even deeds of benevolence and kindness may 
be performed on this principle, — as when a man, by 
such actions, seeks only the applause of the public, 
or the approbation of certain individuals, from whom, 
it may be, he expects to derive advantage. Hence 
the value we attach, in the exercise of all the affec- 
tions, to what we call disinterested conduct, — to him 
who does good by stealth, or who performs acts of 
exalted justice, generosity, or forbearance, under 
circumstances which exclude every idea of a selfish 
motive, — or when self-interest and personal feeling 
are strongly and obviously opposed to them. Such 
conduct commands the cordial approbation of all 
classes of men ; and it is striking to remark how, in 
the highest conception of such a character that fancy 
can delineate, we are met by the sublime morality 
of the sacred writings, impressed upon us by the 
purest of all motives, the imitation of him who is the 
Giver of all ^ood ; " love your enemies, — bless 
12 



102 SELF-LOVE. 

them that curse you ; — do good to them that hate 
vou, — and pray for them which despitefully use you 
and persecute you ; that ye may be the children of 
your Father which is in heaven ; for he maketh his 
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth 
rain on the just and on the unjust." " If any man 
will be my disciple," says the same great Author 
of Christianity, * let him deny himself*" 



PART II. 



OF THE WILL. 



Will, or Simple Volition, is that state of mind 
which immediately precedes action : we will a cer- 
tain act ; and the act follows, unless it be prevented 
either by external restraint or by physical inability 
to perform it. 

The actions thus produced arise out of the mental 
emotions formerly treated of, — the desires and the 
affections. We desire an object, or we experience 
one of the affections : the next mental act, accord- 
ing to the regular course of a reflecting mind, is 
proposing to ourselves the question, — shall we gra- 
tify the desire, — shall we exercise the affection? 
Then follows the process of considering or deliber- 
ating. We perceive, perhaps, a variety of motives, 
considerations, or inducements, — some of which are 
in favour of gratifying the desire or exercising the 
affection, others opposed to it. We therefore pro- 
ceed to weigh the relative force of these opposing 



104 THE WILL. 

motives, with the view of determining which of them 
we shall allow to regulate our decision. We at 
length make up our mind on this, and resolve, we 
shall suppose, to do the act ; this is followed by the 
mental condition of willing or simple volition. 

In the chain of mental operations which, in such 
a case, intervene between the desire and the voli- 
tion, a class of agents is brought into view which 
act upon the mind as moral causes of its volitions ; 
these are usually called motives, or principles of 
action. When treating of this subject as a branch 
of the philosophy of the intellectual powers, I en- 
deavoured to show the grounds on which we believe 
that there are facts, truths, motives, or moral causes 
which have a tendency thus to influence the deter- 
minations of the mind, with a uniformity similar to 
that which we observe in the operation of physical 
causes. For the due operation of moral causes, 
indeed, certain circumstances are required in the 
individual on whom they are expected to operate, 
and without these they may fail in their operation. 
It is necessary that he should be fully informed in 
regard to them as truths addressed to his under- 
standing, — that he direct his attention to them with 
suitable intensity, and exercise his reasoning powers 
upon their tendencies, — and that he be himself in a 
certain healthy state of moral feeling. In all our 
intercourse with mankind, accordingly, we proceed 
upon an absolute confidence in the uniformity of the 
operation of these causes, provided we are ac- 
quainted with the moral condition of the individual. 
We can foretel, for example, the respective effects 



UNIFORMITY OF MORAL CAUSES. 105 

which a tale of distress will have upon a cold- 
hearted miser, and a man of active benevolence, 
with the same confidence with which we can predict 
the different actions of an acid upon an alkali and 
upon a metal ; and there are individuals in regard 
to whose integrity and veracity, in any situation in 
which they can be placed, we have a confidence 
similar to that with which we rely on the course of 
nature. In this manner we gradually acquire, by 
experience, a knowledge of mankind ; precisely as. 
by observation or experiment, we acquire a know- 
ledge of the operation of physical agents. We 
come to know, for example, that one man is abso 
lutely to be relied on in regard to a particular lin< 
of conduct in given circumstances ; and that anothe 
is not to be relied on, if any thing should come ii 
the way affecting his own pleasure or interest. L 
endeavouring to excite various individuals to tb< 
same conduct in a particular case, we learn, that i? 
one we have to appeal only to his sense of duty : 
in another to his love of approbation ; while on 
third nothing will make any impression except wh 
bears upon his interest or his pleasure. Agar 
when we find that, in a particular individual, certa 
motives or truths fail of the effects which we ha\ 
observed them to produce in others, we endeavour t 
impress them upon his mind, and to rouse his atten 
tion to their bearings and tendencies ; and this w< 
do from the conviction, that these truths have i 
certain uniform tendency to influence the volition 
of a moral being, provided he can be induced 
seriously to attend to them, and provided he is in 



106 THE will: 

that moral condition which is required for their 
efficiency. 

In all such cases, which are familiar to every 
one, we recognise, therefore, a uniform relation 
between certain moral causes or motives, and the 
determinations of the human mind in willing certain 
acts. It is no objection to this that men act in 
very different ways with the same motives before 
them ; for this depends upon their own moral con- 
dition. When treating of the intellectual powers, I 
alluded to the metaphysical controversies connected 
with this subject, and I do not mean to recur to 
them here. Our present object is entirely of a 
practical nature, — namely, to investigate the circum- 
stances which are required for the due operation of 
motives or moral causes, and the manner in which 
the moral feelings may be so deranged that these 
fail of producing their natural or proper effects. 

Let us, then, suppose an individual deliberating 
in regard to the line of conduct he shall pursue in a 
particular case ; the circumstances or impressions 
which are calculated to act upon him as moral 
causes in determining his volition, — that is, in 
deciding his conduct, — are chiefly the following. 
(1.) Self-love, which prompts him to seek his own 
ease, interest, or gratification. (2.) Certain affec- 
tions which lead him to take into view duties which 
he owes to other men ; such as justice, benevo- 
lence, &c. (3.) The impression of moral rectitude 
or moral responsibility. This is derived from the 
great principle of conscience, aided by the truths of 



PRINCIPLES WHICH REGULATE IT. 107 

Teligious belief. (4.) We ought to add reason or 
judgment, which leads him to perceive certain tend- 
encies of actions, apart from their moral aspect. 
Now, m deciding on his conduct in any particular 
instance, one man makes every thing bend to his 
own interest or pleasure, with little regard to the 
interests of others ; unless in so far as the absolute 
requirements of justice are concerned, the infringe- 
ment of which might expose him to loss of repu- 
tation, or even to punishment. Another surrenders 
a certain portion of his personal gratification to the 
advantage or comfort of others, purely as an exer- 
cise of feeling from which he experiences satisfac- 
tion ; influenced also, probably, in some measure, 
by a regard to character, or the love of approbation. 
In such a man, it becomes, in individual instances, 
a matter of calculation, what degree of the sacrifice 
of personal ease, interest, or feeling is to be made 
to this principle of action. A third contemplates 
the case purely as one of duty or moral responsi- 
bility, and acts upon this principle, though it may 
involve a degree of personal exertion, or a sacrifice 
of personal feeling, in itself disagreeable or even 
injurious to him ; that is, though the strongest per- 
sonal motives would lead to a different conduct. 
Let the case, again, refer to one of the desires, 
bearing no immediate relation to the interests of 
other men. One man goes directly into the grati- 
fication of it, without any consideration. Another, 
who feels the same desire, considers the influence 
which the indulgence would be likely to have on his 
health, interest, or reputation. This may be con- 



108 THE WILL. 

sidered as simply an exercise of judgment, com- 
bined with a certain operation of self-love. A third 
views the aspect of the deed purely as a question of 
moral responsibility, — and, if he sees cause, decides 
against it on this ground alone : though he should 
perceive that it might be gratified without any dan- 
ger to his health, interest, or reputation, or even 
that it might contribute to his advantage. 

We have thus presented to us three characters ; 
one who acts upon the high and pure ground of 
moral principle ; one who acts from motives of a 
more contracted and personal nature, though, in 
certain instances, his conduct may be the same ; 
and one who goes straight forward to the gratifica- 
tion of a ruling desire or governing propensity, 
without attending to motives of either class. The 
first is a uniform character, on whose conduct we 
depend in any given circumstances, with a con- 
fidence similar to that with which we rely on the 
operation of physical agents. For we know the 
uniform tendencies of the motives or moral causes 
by which he is habitually influenced, and we know 
his moral temperament. We have nearly the same 
kind of knowledge respecting him which we have 
of the tendencies of chymical agents towards each 
other, and which enables us with perfect confidence 
to foretel 4heir actions. The third has also a uni- 
formity of conduct, though of a very different Kind. 
We know, likewise, his moral condition, arid, to 
predict his conduct, we require only to learn the 
particular inducements or temptations to which he is 
exposed in a given instance. The second we can- 



INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 109 

not rely or calculate upon ; for we have not the 
means of tracing the conflicting views by which he 
may be influenced in a particular case, or the prin- 
ciple on which he may ultimately decide between 
them. They involve the strength of the inclina- 
tion, and the degree of power exerted over it by 
the class of personal or selfish motives by which he 
is influenced. In regard to various instances of 
ill-regulated desire, we must add his hope of evading 
detection, as on this depends in a great measure 
the kind of evils dreaded by him in reference to the 
indulgence. These taken together imply a com- 
plicated process of moral calculation, of which it is 
impossible for another man to trace the result. 

There cannot be an inquiry of more intense in- 
terest than to investigate the causes in which ori- 
ginate the differences among these three characters ; 
or, in other words, the principles on which we can 
explain the fact, that the will of individuals may be 
influenced so differently with the same motives 
before them. These appear to be referable to 
three heads, — Knowledge, — Attention, — and Moral 
Habits. 

I. A primary and essential element, in the due 
regulation of the will is a correct knowledge of the 
truths and motives which tend to influence its deter- 
minations. The highest class of these comprehends 
the truths of religious belief, — a series of moral 
causes, the tendencies of which are of the most im- 
portant kind, and calculated to exert a uniform influ- 
ence upon every man who surrenders himself to 
K 



I1Q . THE WILL. 

their guidance. For this purpose, a correct know- 
ledge of them is required ; and to all who have this 
knowledge within their reach the careful acquisition 
involves a point of the deepest moral responsibility. 
The sacred writers speak in the strongest terms of 
the guilt attached to voluntary ignorance : and this 
must be obvious to every one who considers the 
clearness with which the highest truths are disclosed, 
and the incontrovertible evidence by which they are 
supported. This applies equally to the principles 
both of natural and of revealed religion. The im- 
portant truths of natural religion are partly matters 
of the most simple induction from the phenomena 
of nature which are continually before us, and 
partly impressed upon our own moral constitution 
in the clearest and most forcible manner. From 
the planet revolving in its appointed orbit, to the 
economy of the insect on which we tread, all nature 
demonstrates, with a power which we cannot put 
away from us, the great incomprehensible One, a 
being of boundless perfections and infinite wisdom. 
In regard to his moral attributes, also, he has not 
left himself without a witness ; for a sense of these 
he has impressed upon us in the clearest manner 
in that wondrous part of our constitution — the 
moral principle or conscience. From these two 
sources may be derived a knowledge of the char- 
acter of the Deity; and of our relation to him as 
moral beings ; and the man is left entirely without 
excuse who fails to direct to them his most earnest 
attention, and to make the impressions derived from 
them the habitual rule of his volitions, and the guide. 



INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. Ill 

of his whole character. " He hath the rule of right 
within," says an eminent writer, " all that is wanting 
is, that he honestly attend to it." 

Similar observations apply- with equal or greater 
force to the truths of revealed religion. These ar& 
supported by a weight of miraculous evidence, and 
are transmitted to us by a chain of testimony, car- 
rying absolute conviction to the mind of every 
candid inquirer. They are further confirmed by a 
probability, and a force of internal evidence, whicjl 
fix themselves upon the moral feelings of every 
sound understanding with a pow r er which is irresisti- 
ble. The whole is addressed to us as rational 
beings ; it is pressed upon our attention as creatures 
destined for- another state of existence ; and the duty 
is imposed upon every individual seriousl^:.tb ex» 
amine and to consider. Every man is in the: 
highest degree responsible for the care, with which 
he has informed himself of these evidences, and for 
the attention with which he has given to every part 
of them its due weight in the solemn inquiry. HeS 
is further responsible for the influence of any pre-: 
viously formed prejudice, or any degree of that 
vitiated state of his moral feelings, which prevehts 
him from approaching the subject with the simplicity: 
of an uncontaminated mind. From the' want of 
these essential elements of character; it: may very, 
often happen that a man may fancy he has formed 
his opinions after much examination, while the result 
of his prejudiced or frivolous inquiry has been 'only 
to fix him in delusion and falsehood. Among thei 
lingular sophistries, indeed, by which some men 



312 THE WILL. 

shut their minds against inquiries of the highest im- 
port, is a kind of impression, not perhaps distinctly 
avowed in words, but clearly recognised in practice, 
that these subjects of belief are in a great measure 
matters of opinion, — instead of being felt to rest 
upon the basis of immutable and eternal truth. Can 
any thing be more striking than the manner in which 
a late distinguished poet expresses himself on the 
subject of a future life ; as if this truth were a mere 
opinion which could be taken up or laid down at 
pleasure, to suit the taste of the individual inquirer. 
u Of the two, I should think the long sleep better 
than the agonized vigil. But men, miserable as 
they are, cling so to any thing like life, that they 
probably would prefer damnation to quiet. Besides, 
they think themselves so important in the creation, 
that nothing less can satisfy their pride, — the in- 
sects !"* Such is the frivolous sophistry by which 
one who holds a high rank in the literature of his 
country could put away from him the most momen- 
tous inquiry that can engage the attention of a 
rational being. 

II. Next to the acquisition of knowledge, and 
the formation of opinions, calculated to act upon us 
as moral beings, is the important rule of habitually 
attending to them, so as to bring their influence to 
bear upon our volitions. He who honestly attends 
to what is passing within will perceive that this is 
a voluntary exercise of his thinking and reasoning 
faculties. When a particular desire is present to 
• Byron's Letters, Moore's Life, vol ii. p. 581. 



INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. ±118 

his mind, he has the power to act upon the first m¥- 
pulse, or upon a very partial Jand limited, perhaps a 
distorted, view of the considerations and motives by 
which he ought to be influenced ; and he has the 
power to suspend acting, and direct his attention 
deliberately arid fully to the facts and principles 
which are calculated to guide his determination;. 
This is.; the first great step in that remarkable chain 
of sequences which belong to the regulation of the 
will. It is what every one is conscious of; ancl, 
putting aside all those metaphysical subtleties in 
which the subject has been involved, this- constitutes 
man a free and responsible agent. In 4his import- 
ant process; the first mental state- is a certain move- 
ment of one of the desires or one of the affections ; 
to prevent circumlocution, we may use the term 
Inclination, as including- both. The second is a 
reference of the inclination to the moral causes or 
motives which more peculiarly apply to it, — espe- 
cially the indications of conscience and the prin- 
ciples of moral rectitude. If these be found to har- 
monize with -the inclination, volition and action fol- 
low, with the full concurrence of every moral feel- 
ing. If the inclination be condemned by these, it 
is, in a well-regulated mind, instantly -dismissed* 
and the healthy condition of the moral being is pre* 
served. But this voluntary and most important 
mental process may be neglected-; the inclination 
may be suffered to .engross the mind and occupy 
fully the attention : the power may not be exercised 
of directing it to moral causes and motives, and of 
comparing with them the inclination which is r>resTentJt 
K2 



114 THE WILL. 

The consequence may be, that the man runs heed- 
lessly into volition and action, from which the due 
exercise of this process of the mind might have pre- 
served him. 

But a third condition may take place, which pre- 
sents a subject of the highest interest. The moral 
causes may be so far attended to as to prevent the 
inclination from being followed by action; while 
the inclination is still cherished, and the mind is 
allowed to dwell, with a certain feeling of regret, on 
the object which it had been obliged to deny itself. 
Though the actual deed be thus prevented, the har- 
mony of the moral feelings is destroyed ; and that 
mental condition is lost which is strictly to be called 
purity of heart. For this consists in the desires and 
affections, as well as the conduct, being in strict 
subjection to the indications of conscience and the 
principles of moral rectitude. The inclination, thus 
cherished, gradually acquires greater ascendency 
over the moral feelings ; at each succeeding con- 
test, it more and more occupies the mind ; the atten- 
tion is less and less directed to the moral truths and 
motives which are opposed to it ; the inclination at 
length acquires the predominance, and is followed 
by volition. This is what we mean by a man being 
carried away by passion, in opposition to his moral 
conviction ; for passion consists in a desire or an 
affection which has been allowed to engross the 
mind, until it gradually overpowers the moral causes 
which are calculated to counteract its influence. 
Now in the whole of this course each single move- 
ment of the mind is felt to be entirely voluntary. 



INFLUENCE OP ATTENTION. 115 

From that step, which constitutes the first departure 
from moral purity, the process consists in a desire 
being cherished which the moral feelings condemn ; 
while, at each succeeding step, the influence of 
these feelings is gradually weakened, and finally 
destroyed. Such is the economy of the human 
heart, and such the chain of sequences to be traced 
in the moral history of every man, who, with a con- 
viction upon his mind of what is right, has followed 
the downward course which gradually led him 
astray from virtue. When we trace such a process 
backwards in a philosophical point of view, the 
question still recurs, — what was the first step, or 
that by which the mind was led into the course 
which thus terminated in favour of vice. In the 
wonderful chain of sequences which has been estab- 
lished in the mental constitution, it would appear, 
that a very slight movement only is required for 
deranging the delicate harmony which ought to exist 
among the moral feelings ; but this each individual 
feels to be entirely voluntary. It may consist in a 
desire being cherished which the moral feelings dis- 
approve ; and, though the effect at first may be 
small, a morbid influence has arisen, which gains 
strength by continuance, and at last acquires the 
power of a moral habit. The more the desire is 
cherished, the less is the attention directed to the 
considerations or moral causes by which it might be 
counteracted. According to the mental economy, 
these causes, in this manner, gradually lose their 
power over the volitions or determinations of the 
mind ; and, at a certain period of this progress, the 



116 THE WILL. 

judgment itself comes to be changed respecting the 
moral aspect of the deed. 

There is still another mental condition to be 
mentioned in connexion with this subject ; in which 
the harmony of the moral feelings may be destroyed, 
without the action following. This takes place 
when the inclination is cherished, as in the former 
case, in opposition to the indications of conscience ; 
while the action is opposed by some inferior motives, 
— as a regard to reputation or interest. The deed 
may thus be prevented, and the interests of society 
may benefit by the difference ; but, so far as regards 
the individual himself, the disruption of moral har- 
mony is the same ; and his. moral aspect must be 
similar in the eye of the: Almighty One, who regards 
not the outward appearance alone, but who looketh 
into the heart. In this manner it may very often 
happen, that strong inducements to vice are resisted 
from motives referring merely to health, or to char- 
acter. But this is not to overcome temptation, — 
it is only to balance one selfish feeling against 
another. 

III. From the state of mind which has now been 
referred to, there gradually results a Moral Habit, 
This is a mental condition, in which a desire or an 
affection, repeatedly acted upon, is, after each repe- 
tition, acted upon with less and less effort ; and, on 
the other hand, a truth or moral principle, which has 
been repeatedly passed over without adequate atten- 
tion, after every such act makes less and less im- 
pression, until at length it ceases to exert any influx 



INFLUENCE OF HABIT. 117 

ence over the moral feelings or the conduct. I had 
occasion to illustrate this remarkable principle in 
another point of view, when treating of the connexion 
between the emotions of sympathy and benevolence, 
and the conduct which naturally arises out of them. 
This conduct at first may require a certain effort, 
and is accompanied by a strong feeling of the enio* 
tion which leads to it. But, after each repetition 
the acts go on with less feeling of the emotion, and 
less reference to the principle from which they spring; 
while there is progressively forming the habit of 
active benevolence. It is precisely the same with 
habits of vice. At first a deed requires an effort, — 
and a powerful contest with moral principles ; and 
it is speedily follqjwl by that feeling of regret to 
which superficial oB&rvers give the name of repent- 
ance. This is they voice of conscience ; but its 
power is more and more diminished after each repe- 
tition of the deed ; even the judgment becomes 
perverted respecting the first great principles of 
moral rectitude ; and acts which at first occasioned 
a violent conflict are gone into without remorse, or 
almost without perception of their moral aspect. A 
man in this situation may still retain the knowledge 
of truths and principles which at one time exerted 
an influence over his conduct ; but they are now 
matters of memory alone. Their power as moral 
causes is gone, and even the judgment is altered re- 
specting their moral relations. He views them now 
perhaps as the superstitions of the vulgar, or the 
prejudices of a contracted education ; and rejoices, 
it may he, in his emancipation from their authority 



118 THE WILL. 

He knows not, — for he has not the moral perceptior 
now to know, that he has been pursuing a downward 
course, and that the issue, on which he congratulates 
himself, consists in bis last degradation as a moral 
being. Even in this state of moral destitution, in- 
deed, the same warning principle may still raise its 
voice, — unheeded, but not subdued, — repelled as an 
enemy, not admitted as a friendly monitor and guide. 
" I have not the smallest influence over Lord Byron, 
in this particular," writes one of the chosen friends 
of that distinguished individual : " if I had, I cer- 
tainly should employ it to eradicate from his great 
mind the delusions of Christianity, which, in spite of 
his reason, seem perpetually to recur, and to lie in 
ambush for the hours of sickness and distress." It 
would be interesting to know what the particular 
impressions were from which this sympathizing 
friend was anxious to rescue the poet. They were 
probably the suggestions of a power within, which, 
in certain seasons of reflection, compelled his atten- 
tion in spite of his attempts to reason against it, — 
pleading with authority for a present Deity and a life 
to come. I 

The principle of Habit, therefore, holds a most 
important place in the moral condition of every man ;» 
and it applies equally to any species of conduct, or 
any train of mental operations, which, by frequent 
repetition, have become so familiar as riot to be ac- 
companied by a recognition of the principles from 
which they originally sprang. In this manner good 
habits are continued without any immediate sense of 
the right principles by which they were formed ; but 



INFLUENCE OF HABIT. 119 

they arose from a frequent and uniform acting upon 
these principles, and on this is founded the moral 
approbation which we attach to habits of this descrip- 
tion. In the same manner habits of vice, and habits 
of inattention to any class of duties, are perpetuated 
without a sense of the principles and affections which 
they violate ; but this arose from a frequent viola- 
tion of these principles, and a frequent repulsion of 
these affections, until they gradually lost their power 
over the conduct ; and in this consists the guilt of 
habits. Thus, one person acquires habits of benevo- 
lence, veracity, and kindness, — of minute attention 
to his various duties, — of correct mental discipline, 
and active direction of his thoughts to all those ob- 
jects of attention which ought to engage a well 
regulated mind : another sinks into habits of list- 
less vacuity or frivolity of mind, — of vicious indul- 
gence and contracted selfishness, — of neglect of im- 
portant duties, disregard to the feelings of others, and 
total indifference to all those considerations and pur- 
suits which claim the highest regard of every responsi- 
ble being ; and the striking fact is, that, after a certain 
period, all this may go on without a feeling that 
aught is wrong either in the moral condition or the 
state of mental discipline : such is the power of a 
moral habit. 

The important truth, therefore, is deserving of the 
deepest and most habitual attention, that character 
consists in a great measure in habits, — and that 
habits arise out of individual actions and individual 
operations of the mind. Hence the importance of 
carefully weighing every action of our lives, and 



120 THE WILL. 

every train of thought that we encourage in our 
minds ; for we never can determine the effect of a 
single act, or a single mental process, in giving that 
influence to the character, or to the moral condition, 
the result of which shall be decisive and permanent. 
In the whole history of habits, indeed, we see a won- 
drous display of that remarkable order of sequences 
which has been established in our mental constitu- 
tion, and by which every man becomes, in an import- 
ant sense, the master of his own moral destiny. For 
each act of virtue tends to make him more virtuous ; 
— and each act of vice gives new strength to an in- 
fluence within, which will certainly render him more 
and more vicious. 

These considerations have a practical tendency of 
the utmost interest. In subduing habits of an inju- 
rious character, the laws of mental sequences, which 
have now been referred to, must be carefully acted 
upon. When the judgment, influenced by the indi- 
cations of conscience, is convinced of the injurious 
nature of the habit, the attention must be steadily and 
habitually directed to this impression. There will 
thus arise desire to be delivered from the habit,— or, 
in other words, to cultivate the course of action that 
is opposed to it. This desire, being cherished in the 
mind, is then made to bear upon every individual 
case in which a propensity is felt towards particular 
actions, or particular mental processes, referable to 
the habit. The new inclination is at first acted upon 
with an effort, but, after every instance of success, 
less effort is required, until at length the new course 
of action is confirmed, and overpowers the habit to 



INFLUENCE OF HABIT. 121 

which it was opposed. But that this result may 
take place, it is necessary that the mental process be 
followed in the manner distinctly indicated by the 
philosophy of the moral feelings : for, if this is not 
attended to, the expected effect may not follow, even 
under circumstances which appear, at first sight, most 
likely to produce it. On this principle we are to ex- 
plain the fact, that bad habits may be long suspended 
by some powerful extrinsic influence, while they are 
in no degree broken. Thus, a person addicted to 
intemperance will bind himself by an oath to abstain, 
for a certain time, from intoxicating liquors. In an 
instance which has been related to me, an individual 
under this process observed the most rigid sobriety 
for five years, — but was found in a state of intoxica- 
tion the very day after the period of abstinence 
expired. In such a case the habit is suspended by 
the mere influence of the oath ; but the desire con- 
tinues unsubdued, and resumes all its former power 
whenever this artificial restraint is withdrawn. The 
effect is the same as if the man had been in con- 
finement during the period, or had been kept 
from his favourite indulgence by some other restraint 
entirely of an external kind : the gratification was 
prevented, but his moral nature continued un- 
changed. 

These principles may be confidently stated as 
facts in the moral constitution of man, challenging 
the assent of every candid observer of human nature. 
Several conclusions seem to arise out of them, of 
the utmost practical importance. We perceive, in 
L 



122 THE Will. 

the first place, a state which the mind may attain* in 
which there is such a disruption of its moral harmony 
that no power appears in the mind itself capable of 
restoring it to a healthy condition. This important 
fact in the philosophy of human nature has been clearly 
recognised, from the earliest ages, on the mere prin- 
ciples of human science. It is distinctly stated by 
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, where he draws 
a striking comparison between a man who, being first 
misled by sophistical reasonings, has gone into a life 
of voluptuousness under an impression that he was 
doing no wrong, — and one who has followed the 
same course in opposition to his own moral convic- 
tions. The former, he contends, might be reclaimed 
by argument ; but the latter he considers as incura- 
ble. In such a state of mind, therefore, it follows.; 
by an induction which cannot be controverted, either 
that the evil is irremediable and hopeless, or that we 
must look for a power from without the mind which 
may afford an adequate remedy. We are thus led 
to perceive the adaptation and the probability of the 
provisions of Christianity, where an influence is in- 
deed disclosed to us, capable of restoring the har- 
mony which has been lost, and raising man anew to 
his place as a moral being. We cannot hesitate to 
believe that the Power who framed the wondrous 
fabric may thus hold intercourse with it, and redeem 
it from disorder and ruin. On the contrary, it accords 
with the highest conceptions we can form of the 
benevolence of the Deity, that he should thus look 
upon his creatures in their hour of need ; and the 
system disclosing such communication appears, upon 



INFLUENCE OF HABIT. 123 

every principle of sound philosophy, to be one of 
harmony, consistency, and truth. The subject, there- 
fore, leads our attention to that inward change, so 
often the scoff of the profane, but to which so promi- 
nent a place is assigned in the sacred writings, in 
which a man is said to be created anew by a power 
from heaven, and elevated in his whole views and 
feelings as a moral being. Sound philosophy teaches 
us, that there is a state in which nothing less than 
such a complete transformation can restore the man 
to a healthy moral condition, — and that, for producing 
it, nothing will avail but an influence from without 
the mind, — a might and a power from the same 
Almighty One who originally framed it. Philosophy 
teaches, in the clearest manner, that a portion of 
mankind require such a transformation ; Christianity 
informs us that it is required by all. When the in- 
ductions of science and the dictates of revelation 
harmonize to this extent, who shall dare to assert 
that the latter are not truth ? Who, that places him- 
self in the presence of a Being of infinite purity, will 
say he requires not such a change ; or that, for 
the production of it, he needs no agency beyond the 
resources of his own mind. If none be found who 
is entitled to believe he forms the exception, we are 
forced into the acknowledgment of the truth so power- 
fully impressed upon us in the sacred writings, that, 
in the eye of the Almighty One, no man in himself 
is righteous • and that his own power avails not for 
restoring him to a state of moral purity. 

From the whole of this inquiry we see the deep 



124 the will: 

influence of habits ; and the fearful power which 
they may acquire over the whole moral system ; 
considerations of the highest practical interest to 
those who would prevent the formation of habits of 
an injurious nature, or who, feeling their influence, 
strive to be delivered from them. There is indeed 
a point in this downward course, where the habit has 
acquired undisputed power, and the whole moral 
feelings yield to it unresisting submission. Peace 
may then be within, but that peace is the stillness of 
death ; and, unless a voice from heaven shall wake 
the dead, the moral being is lost. But, in the pro- 
gress towards this fearful issue, there may be a 
tumult, and a contest, and a strife ; and the voice of 
conscience may still command a certain attention tc 
its warnings. While there are these indications of 
life, there is yet hope of the man ; but, on each mo- 
ment is now suspended his moral existence. Let 
him retire from the influence of external things ; 
and listen to that voice within, which, though often 
unheeded, still pleads for God. Let him call to aid 
those high truths which relate to the presence and 
inspection of this Being of infinite purity, and the 
solemnities of a life which is to come. Above all* 
let him look up in humble supplication to that pure 
and holy One, who is the witness of this warfare, — 
who will regard it with compassion, and impart his 
powerful aid. But let him not presumptuously rely 
on this aid, as if the victory were already secured. 
The contest is but begun ; and there must be a con- 
tinued effort and an unceasing watchfulness, — an hab- 
itual direction of the attention to those truths which f 



MEANS OF REGULATING IT. 125 

as moral causes, are calculated to act upon the mind, 
— and a constant reliance upon the power from on 
high which is felt to be real and indispensable. With 
all this provision, his progress may be slow ; for the 
opposing principle, and the influence of established 
moral habits, may be felt contending for their former 
dominion : but, by each advantage that is achieved 
over them, their power will be broken and finally 
destroyed. Now in all this contest towards the 
purity of the moral being, each step is no less a pro- 
cess of the mind itself than the downward course by 
which it was preceded. It consists in a surrender 
of the will to the suggestions of conscience, and an 
habitual direction of the attention to those truths 
which are calculated to act upon the moral volitions. 
In this course, the man feels that he is authorized to 
look for a might and an influence not his own. This 
is no imaginary or mysterious impression, which one 
may fancy that he feels, and then pass on contented 
with the vision; but a power which acts through 
the healthy operations of his own mind ; it is in his 
own earnest exertions, as a rational being, to regu- 
late these operations, that he is warranted to expect 
its communication ; and it is in feeling these assum- 
ing the characters of moral health that he has the 
proof of its actual presence. 

And where is the improbability that the pure and 
holy One who framed the wondrous moral being 
may thus hold intercourse with it, and impart an 
influence in its hour of deepest need. According to 
the utmost of our conceptions, it is the highest of 
his works, — for he has endowed it with powers of 
L2 



126 the will: 

rising to the contemplation of himself, and with the 
capacity of aspiring to the imitation of his own moral 
perfections. We cannot, for a moment, doubt, that 
his eye must reach its inmost movements, and that 
all its emotions, and desires, and volitions are ex- 
posed to his view. We must believe that he looks 
with displeasure when he perceives them wandering 
from himself; and contemplates with approbation the 
contest, when the spirit strives to throw off its moral 
bondage, and to fight its way upwards to a con- 
formity to his will. Upon every principle of sound 
philosophy, all this must be open to his inspection ; 
and we can perceive nothing opposed to the sound- 
est inductions of reason in the belief, that he should 
impart an influence to the feeble being in this high 
design, and conduct him to its accomplishment. In 
all this, in fact, there is so little improbability, that 
we find it impossible to suppose it could be other- 
wise. We find it impossible to believe that such a 
mental process could go on without the knowledge 
of him whose presence is in every place, — or that, 
looking upon it, he should want either the power or 
the willingness to impart his effectual aid. 

But, independently of our conviction of an actual 
communication from the Deity, there is a power in 
the mind itself, which is calculated to draw down 
upon it an influence of the most efficient kind. This 
is produced by the mental process which we call 
Faith ; and it may be illustrated by an impression 
tvhich many must have experienced. Let us sup- 
Dose that we have a friend of exalted intelligence 
and virtue, who has often exercised over us a com- 



MEANS OF REGULATING IT. 127 

manding influence, — restraining us from pursuits to 
which we felt an inclination, — exciting us to virtuous 
conduct, — and elevating, by his intercourse with us, 
our impressions of a character on which we wished 
to form our own. Let us suppose that we are re- 
moved to a distance from this friend, and that cir- 
cumstances of difficulty or danger occur, in which 
we feel the want of a guide and counsellor. In the 
reflections which the situation naturally gives rise to, 
the image of our friend is brought before us ; an 
influence is conveyed analogous to that which was 
often produced by his presence and his counsel ; and 
we feel as if he were actually present, to render his 
advice and watch our conduct. How much would 
this impression be increased, could we further enter 
tain the thought, that this absent friend was able, in 
some way, to communicate with us, so far as to be 
aware of our present circumstances, and to perceive 
our efforts to recall the influence of his character 
upon our own. Such is the intercourse of the soul 
with God. Every movement of the mind is known 
to him ; his eye is present with it, when, in any situa- 
tion of duty, distress, or mental discipline, the man, 
under this exercise of faith, realizes the presence 
and character of the Deity, and solemnly inquires 
how. in the particular instance, his moral feelings 
and his conduct will appear in the eye of Him who 
secth in secret. This is no vision of the imagina- 
tion, but a fact supported by every principle of sound 
reason, — an influence which a man brings down 
upon himself, when, by an effort of his own mind, 
he thus place3 himself in the immediate presence of 



128 THE WILL. 

the Almighty. The man who does so in every de- 
cision of life is he who lives by faith ; and, whether 
we regard the inductions of reason, or the dictates 
of sacred truth, such a man is taught to expect an 
influence greater and more effectual still. This is a 
power immediately from God, which shall be to him 
direction in every doubt,— light in every darkness, — - 
strength in his utmost weakness, — and comfort in 
all distress ; a power which shall bear upon all the 
principles of his moral nature, when he carries on 
the mighty conflict of bringing every desire and every 
volition under a conformity to the Divine will. We 
again hazard with confidence the assertion, that in 
all this there is no improbability ; but that, on the 
contrary, the improbability is entirely on the other 
side, — in supposing that any such mental process 
could take place without the knowledge and the in- 
terposition of that incomprehensible One, whose eye 
is upon all his works. 



PART III. 



OF THE MORAL PRINCIPLE, OR CONSCIENCE. 



There has been much dispute respecting the 
nature and even the existence of the moral principle, 
as a distinct element of our mental constitution ; but 
this controversy has now probably passed away, along 
with other speculations of a metaphysical nature, in 
regard to which a kind of evidence was sought of 
which the subjects are not susceptible. Without ar- 
guing respecting the propriety of speaking of a sepa- 
rate power or principle, we simply contend for the 
fact, that there is a mental exercise by which we feel 
certain actions to be right, and certain others wrong. 
It is an element or a movement of our moral nature 
which admits of no analysis, and no explanation, 
and is referable to no other principle than a simple 
recognition of the fact, which forces itself upon the 
conviction of every man who looks into the processes 
of his own mind. Of the existence and the nature 
of this most important principle, therefore, the evi- 



130 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

dence is entirely within. We appeal to the con- 
sciousness of every man, that he perceives a power 
which, in particular cases, warns him of the conduct 
which he ought to pursue, and administers a solemn 
admonition when he has departed from it. For while 
his judgment conveys to him a certain impression, 
both of the qualities and the tendencies of actions, 
he has, besides this, a feeling by which he views the 
actions with approbation or disapprobation, in refer- 
ence purely to their moral aspect, and without any 
regard to their consequences. When we refer to 
the sacred writings, we find the principle of con- 
science represented as a power of such import- 
ance, that, without any acquired knowledge, or any 
actual precepts, it is sufficient to establish, in every 
man, such an impression of his duty as leaves him 
without excuse in the neglect of it. " For when 
the gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature 
the things contained in the law, these, having not 
the law, are a law unto themselves : Which show the 
work of the law written in their hearts, their con- 
science also bearing witness, and their thoughts the 
meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." 
We even find a power assigned to the decisions of 
conscience, differing in extent only, but not in kind, 
from the judgment of the Almighty — "If our heart 
condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and 
knoweth all things." 

The province of conscience then appears to be, 
to convey to man a certain conviction of what is 
morally right and wrong, in regard to conduct in 
individual cases, — -and the general exercise of the 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 131 

desires or affections. This it does independently 
of any acquired knowledge, and without reference 
to any other standard of duty. It does so, by a rule 
of right which it carries within itself, — and by apply- 
ing this to the primary moral feelings, that is, the 
desires and affections, so as to preserve among them 
a just and healthy balance towards each other. It 
seems therefore to hold a place among the moral 
powers, analogous to that which reason holds among 
the intellectual ; and, when we view it in this rela- 
tion, there appears a beautiful harmony pervading 
the whole economy of the mind. 

By his intellectual operations man acquires the 
knowledge of a certain series of facts ; he remem- 
bers them, — he separates and classifies them, — and 
forms them into new combinations. But with the 
most active exercise of all these operations, his mind 
might present an accumulation of facts, without 
order, harmony, or utility ; without any principle of 
combination, — or combined only in those fantastic 
and extravagant forms which appear in the concep- 
tions of the maniac. It is reason that reduces the 
whole into order and harmony, — by comparing, dis- 
tinguishing, and tracing their true analogies and re- 
lations, — and then by deducing truths as conclusions 
from the whole. It is in this manner particularly 
that man acquires a knowledge of the uniform actions 
of bodies on each other, — and, confiding in the uni- 
formity of these actions, learns to direct his means 
to the ends which he has in view. He knows also 
his own relations to other sentient beings, — and 
adapts his conduct to them, according to the circum- 



132 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

stances in which he is placed, — the persons with 
whom he is connected, — and the objects which ho 
wishes to accomplish. He learns to accommodate 
his measures to new circumstances as they arise,— 
and thus is guided and directed through his physical 
relations. When reason is suspended, all this har- 
mony is destroyed. The visions of the mind are 
acted upon as facts ; things are combined into fan- 
tastic forms, entirely apart from their true relations ; 
conduct is widely at variance with what circum- 
stances require ; ends are attempted by means 
which have no relation to them ; and the ends them* 
selves are equally at variance with those which are 
suitable to the circumstances of the individual. Such 
is the maniac, whom accordingly we shut up, to pre* 
vent him from being dangerous to the public ; for 
he has been known to mistake so remarkably the 
relations of things, and the conduct adapted to his 
circumstances, as to murder his most valuable friend, 
or his own helpless infant. 

In all this process there is a striking analogy to 
certain conditions of the moral feelings, and to the 
control which is exercised over them by the princi- 
ple of conscience. By self-love a man is led to 
seek his own gratification or advantage ; and the 
desires direct him to certain objects by which these 
propensities may be gratified. But the affections 
carry forth his views to other men with whom he is 
connected by various relations, and to the offices of 
justice, veracity, and benevolence, which arise out 
of them. Conscience is the regulating power, 
whichj acting upon liie desires and affections, as 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 133 

reason does upon a series of facts, preserves among 
them harmony and order. It does so by repressing 
the propensity of selfishness, and reminding the man 
of the true relation between regard to his own inter- 
est and the duties he owes to other men. It regu- 
lates his desires and pursuits, by carrying his views 
beyond present feelings and present gratifications, 
to future times and future consequences,— and by 
raising his attention to his relation to the great moral 
Governor of the universe. He thus learns to adapt 
his conduct and pursuits, not to present and tran- 
sient feelings, but to an extended view of his great 
and true interests as a moral being. Such is con- 
science, — still, like reason, pointing out the moral 
ends a man ought to pursue, — and guiding him in 
the means by which he ought to pursue them ; and 
the man does not act in conformity with the consti- 
tution of his nature who does not yield to conscience 
the supremacy and direction over all his other feel- 
ings and principles of action. But the analogy does 
not stop here ; for we can also trace a condition in 
which this controlling influence of conscience is sus- 
pended or lost. I formerly endeavoured to trace 
the manner in which this derangement arises, and 
have now only to allude to its influence on the har- 
mony of the moral feelings. Self-love degenerates 
into low selfish gratification : the desires are indulged 
without any other restraint than that which arises 
from a mere selfish principle, — as a regard to health, 
perhaps in some degree to reputation : the affections 
are exercised only in so far as similar principles 
impose a certain degree of attention to them : pres- 
M 



134 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

ent and momentary impulses are acted upon with- 
out any regard to future results : conduct is adapted 
to present gratification, without the perception either 
of its moral aspect, or its consequences to the man 
himself as a responsible being ; and without regard to 
the means by which these feelings are gratified. 
In all this violation of moral harmony, there is no 
derangement of the ordinary exercise of judgment. 
In the most remarkable example that can be furnished 
by the history of human depravity, the man may be as 
acute as ever in the details of business or the pur^ 
suits of science. There is no diminution of his 
sound estimate of physical relations, — for this is the 
province of reason. But there is a total derange- 
ment of his sense and approbation of moral relations, 
— for this is conscience. Such a condition of mind, 
then, appears to be, in reference to the moral feel- 
ings, what insanity is in regard to the intellectual. 
The intellectual maniac fancies himself a king, sur- 
rounded by every form of earthly splendour, — and 
this hallucination is not corrected even by the sight 
of his bed of straw and all the horrors of his cell. 
The moral maniac pursues his way, and thinks him- 
self a wise and a happy man ; but feels not that he 
is treading a downward course, and is lost as a 
moral being. 

In the preceding observations respecting the moral 
principle or conscience, I have alluded chiefly to its 
influence in preserving a certain harmony among the 
other feelings, — in regulating the desires by the in- 
dications of moral purity, — and preventing self-love 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 135 

from interfering with the duties and affections which 
we owe to other men. But there is another and a 
most important purpose which is answered by this 
faculty, and that is to make us acquainted with the 
moral attributes of the Deity. In strict philosophi- 
cal language we ought perhaps to say, that this high 
purpose is accomplished by a combined operation of 
conscience and reason : but, however this may be, 
the process appears clear and intelligible in its 
nature, and fully adapted to the end now assigned 
to it. From a simple exercise of mind, directed to 
the great phenomena of nature, we acquire the know- 
ledge of a First Cause, — a Being of infinite power 
and infinite wisdom ; and this conclusion is im- 
pressed upon us in a peculiar manner, when, from 
our own bodily and mental endowments, we infer 
the attributes of Him who framed us : "he that 
planted the ear," says a sacred writer, " shall he 
not hear ; he that formed the eye, shall he not see ; 
he that teacheth men knowledge, shall not he know V 9 
When we trace backwards a series of finite yet in- 
telligent beings, we must arrive at one of two con- 
clusions : we must either trace the series through 
an infinite and eternal succession of finite beings, 
each the cause of the one which succeeded it ; or 
we must refer the commencement of the series to 
one great intelligent Being, himself uncaused, infi- 
nite, and eternal. To trace the series to one being, 
finite, yet uncaused, is totally inadmissible ; and not 
less so is the conception of finite beings in an in- 
finite and eternal series. The belief of one infinite 
Being, self-existent and eternal, is, therefore, the only 



136 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

conclusion at which we can arrive, as presenting 
any characters of credibility or truth. The super- 
intending care, the goodness and benevolence of the 
Deity, we learn, with a feeling of equal certainty, 
from the ample provision he has made for supplying 
the wants and ministering to the comfort of all the 
creatures whom he has made. This part of the ar- 
gument, also, is in the clearest manner insisted upon 
in the sacred writings ; when the apostle Paul, in 
calling upon the people of Lystra to worship the true 
God, who made heaven and earth, adds, as a source 
of knowledge from which they ought to learn his 
character ; " he left not himself without a witness, 
in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven 
and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and 
gladness." 

A being thus endowed with infinite power, wis- 
dom, and goodness we cannot conceive to exist 
without moral feelings ; and, by a process equally 
obvious, we arrive at a distinct knowledge of these, 
when, from the moral perceptions of our own minds, 
we infer the moral attributes of him who thus formed 
us. We have certain impressions of justice, vera- 
city, compassion, and moral purity, in regard to our 
own conduct, — we have a distinct approbation of 
these qualities in others, — and we attach a feeling 
of disapprobation to the infringement of them. By 
a simple step of reasoning, which conveys an im- 
pression of absolute conviction, we conclude, that 
He who formed us with these feelings possesses, in 
his own character, corresponding moral attributes, 
which, though they resemble in kind, must infinitely 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 137 

exceed in degree, those qualities in the wisest and 
the best of men. In our actual observation of man- 
kind, we perceive these attributes impaired in their 
exercise by human weakness, distorted by human 
passion, — and impeded in their operation by per- 
sonal wants, personal feelings, and selfish interests. 
But, apart from such deteriorating causes, we have 
a certain abstract idea of the full and perfect exercise 
of those qualities ; and it is in this pure and perfect 
form that we ascribe them to the Almighty. In 
him, they can be impeded by no weakness, dis- 
torted by no passion, and impaired in their operation 
by no personal interest. We therefore conclude 
him to be perfect in the exercise of all these moral 
attributes, and to take the most rigid estimate of any 
infringement of them by man ; this is what we call 
the holiness of God. Even the man who has him- 
self departed from moral rectitude still feels a power 
within, which points with irresistible force to what is 
purity, and fixes upon him a conviction that God is 
pure. 

When we view such a being apart from any infe- 
rior creature, all seems harmony and consistency ; 
we have only to contemplate him as high and holy, 
and enjoying perfect happiness in his own spotless 
attributes. But, when we view him in relation to 
man in a state of moral discipline, and, in that state, 
tainted deeply with moral evil, a difficulty arises of an 
appalling magnitude. There is ample scope now, 
we perceive, for the exercise of his holiness, veracity, 
and justice ; and he appears in sublime and terrible 
majesty in his exalted character as a moral governor 
M2 



138 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

But, amid such a display, there is an obvious inter- 
ruption to the exercise of compassion, — especially 
in that essential department of it — mercy or forgive- 
ness. This attribute may be exercised without re- 
straint by an individual, where his own interests alone 
are concerned ; because in him it involves only a 
sacrifice of self-love. But forgiveness in a moral 
governor either implies an actual change of purpose, 
or supposes his decision to have been made without 
sufficient knowledge of, or due attention to, all the 
facts by which he ought to have been influenced : 
it denotes either undue rigour in the law, or igno- 
rance or inattention in him who administers it ; and 
it may very often interfere with the essential requisites 
of justice. But, in a moral governor of infinite per- 
fection, there can be neither ignorance of facts nor 
change of purpose ; the requirements of his justice 
must stand unshaken, — and his law, written on the 
nearts of all his rational creatures, must be upheld, 
in the face of the universe, as holy, and just, and good. 
Is, then, the exercise of mercy to be excluded from 
our conception of the Divine character, — -and is there 
no forgiveness with God ? The soundest inductions 
of philosophy, applied to the actual state of man, 
bring us to this momentous question ; but the high- 
est efforts of human science fail to answer it. It is 
in this our utmost need, that we are met by the dic- 
tates of revelation, and are called to humble the pride 
of our reason before that display of the harmony and 
integrity of the Divine character. We there learn the 
truths, far beyond the utmost inductions of humarj 
science,and the utmost conceptions of human thought 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 139 

—that an atonement is made, a sacrifice offered ; — and 
that the exercise of forgiveness is consistent with the 
perfections of the Deity. Thus, by a process of the 
mind itself, which seems to present every element of 
fair and logical reasoning, we arrive at a full convic- 
tion of the necessity, and the moral probability, of 
that truth which forms the great peculiarity of the Chris- 
tian revelation. More than any other, in the whole 
circle of religious belief, it rises above the induc- 
tions of science, while reason, in its soundest conclu- 
sions, recognises its probability, and receives its truth; 
and it stands forth alone, simply proposed to our be- 
lief, and offered to our acceptance, on that high but 
peculiar evidence by which is supported the testimony 
of God. 

The truth of these considerations is impressed 
upon us in the strongest manner, when we turn our 
attention to the actual moral condition of mankind. 
When we contemplate man, as he is displayed to us 
by the soundest induction of philosophy, — his capacity 
for distinguishing truth from falsehood, and evil from 
good ; the feelings and affections which bind him to 
his fellow-men, and the powers which enable him to 
rise to intercourse with God : — when we consider 
the power, which sits among his other principles and 
feelings, as a faithful monitor and g aide, carrying in 
itself a rule of rectitude without any < ther knowledge, 
and a right to govern without reference to any other 
authority, — we behold a fabric complete and har- 
monious in all its parts, and eminently worthy of its 
Almighty Maker ; we behold an ample provision 



140 THE MOIUX PRINCIPLE. 

for peace, and order, and harmony, in the whole moral 
world. But when we compare with these inductions 
the actual state of man, as displayed to us in the page 
of history, and in our own daily observation, the con- 
viction is forced upon us that some mighty change 
has taken place in this beauteous system, some mar- 
vellous disruption of its moral harmony. The man- 
ner in which this condition arose, — or the origin of 
moral evil under the government of God, is a ques- 
tion entirely beyond the reach of the human faculties. 
It is one of those, however, on which it is simply our 
duty to keep in mind, that our business is, not with 
the explanation, but with the facts ; for, even by 
the conclusions of philosophy, we are compelled to 
believe that man has fallen from his high estate, 
and that a pestilence has gone abroad over the face 
of the moral creation. 

In arriving at this conclusion, it is not with the in- 
ductions of moral science alone that we compare or 
contrast the actual state of man. For one bright 
example has appeared in our world, in whom was 
exhibited human nature in its highest state of order 
and harmony. In regard to the mighty purposes 
which He came to accomplish, indeed, philosophy 
fails us, and we are called to submit the inductions 
of our reason to the testimony of God. But, when 
we contemplate his whole character purely as a mat- 
ter of historical truth, the conviction is forced upon 
us that this was the highest state of man ; and the 
inductions of true science harmonize with the im- 
pression of the Roman centurion, when on wit- 



THE MORAL PUINCIPLE. 141 

nessmg the conclusion of the earthly sufferings of 
the Messiah, he exclaimed " Truly, this was the Son 
of God." 

When we endeavour to trace the manner in which 
mankind have departed so widely from this high pat- 
tern we arrive at moral phenomena of which we 
can offer no explanation. But an inquiry of much 
greater importance is to mark the process by which, 
in individual instances, conscience ceases to be the 
regulating principle of the character ; and this is 
a simple and legitimate object of philosophical obser- 
vation. There cannot, indeed, be an inquiry of more 
intense and solemn interest, than to trace the chain 
of sequences which has been established in the mind 
of man as a moral being. We can view it only as 
a matter of fact, without being able to refer it to any 
other principle than the will of Him who framed us ; 
but the facts which are before us claim the serious 
attention of every man who would cultivate that most 
important of all pursuits — the knowledge of his own 
moral condition. The fact to which I chiefly allude 
is, a certain relation, formerly referred to, between 
the truths which are calculated to act upon us as mo- 
ral causes, and the mental emotions which ought to 
result from them ; and between these emotions and 
a certain conduct which they tend to produce. If 
the due harmony between these be carefully cultivated, 
the result is a sound moral condition ; but, by every 
instance in which this harmony is violated, a morbid 
influence has been introduced, which gains strength 
in each succeeding volition, and carries disorder 



142 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

through the moral economy. We have formerly 
illustrated this important moral process, by the. rela- 
tion between the emotion of compassion, and the 
conduct which ought to arise from it. If this tend- 
ency of the emotion be diligently cultivated, the 
result is the habit of active benevolence ; but, if the 
emotion be violated, its influence is progressively 
diminished, and a character is produced of cold and 
barren selfishness. 

A similar chain of sequences is to be observed 
respecting the operation of those great truths, which, 
under the regulating power of conscience, are calcu- 
lated to act as moral causes in our mental economy : 
we may take, for example, the truths relating to 
the character and perfections of the Deity, and the 
influence which these ought to produce upon every 
rational being. We have seen the knowledge which 
we derive from the light of nature respecting the 
attributes of God, when, from his works around us, 
we discover him as a being of infinite power, wis- 
dom, and goodness ; and when, from the moral im- 
pressions of our own minds, we infer his perfections 
as a moral Governor of infinite holiness, justice, and 
truth. By a proper direction of the mind to the 
truths which are thus conveyed to us respecting the 
Deity, there would naturally arise a corresponding 
chain of emotions of which he is the object. These 
are, a sense of veneration towards him, as infinitely 
great, wise, and powerful, — of love and thankfulness, 
as infinitely good, — and of habitual regard to his 
authority and will, as a moral governor of purity and 
justice, and as requiring a corresponding character in 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 143 

all his creatures. A close and constant relation 
ought to be preserved between these truths and these 
emotions, and on this depends the moral harmony of 
the mind. The preservation of this harmony, again, 
is intimately connected with a mental process which 
every man feels to be voluntary, — or in his power to 
perform, if he wills. It consists in a careful direc- 
tion of the mind to such truths, so as to enable them 
to act as moral causes in the mental economy: by 
the established order of moral sequences, the emo- 
tions naturally follow : these are then to be cherished 
with satisfaction and reverence ; and a correspond- 
ing influence upon the character and conduct is the 
further consequence. But the first step in this im- 
portant process may be neglected : the mind may 
not be directed with due care to the truths which 
thus claim its highest regard, — and the natural result 
is a corresponding deficiency in the emotions and 
conduct which ought to flow from them. This will 
be the case in a still higher degree, if there has been 
formed any actual derangement of the moral condi- 
tion, — if deeds have been committed, or even desires 
cherished, by which the indications of conscience have 
been violated. The moral harmony of the mind is 
then lost, and, however slight may be the first im- 
pression, a morbid influence has begun to operate in 
the mental economy, which tends gradually to gain 
strength, until it becomes a ruling principle in the 
whole character. The truths connected with the 
divine perfections are now neither invited nor cher- 
ished ; but are felt to be intruders which disturb the 
mental tranquillity. The attention ceases to be directed 



144 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

to them, and the corresponding emotions vanish from 
the mind. Such appears to be the moral history 
of those who, in the striking language of the sacred 
writings " do hot like to retain God in their know 
ledge." 

When the moral harmony of the mind has been 
impaired to this extent, another mental condition 
arises, according to the wondrous system of moral 
sequences. This consists in a distortion of the 
understanding itself, regarding the first great prin- 
ciples of moral truth. For, a fearless contempla- 
tion of the truth, respecting the divine perfections, 
having become inconsistent with the moral condition 
of the mind, there next arises a desire to discover a 
view of them more in accordance with its own feel- 
ings. This is followed, in due course, by a cor- 
responding train of its own speculations ; and these, 
by a mind so prepared, are received as truth. The 
inventions of the mind itself thus become the regu- 
lating principles of its emotions, and this mental 
process, advancing from step to step, terminates in 
moral degradation and anarchy. 

Nothing can be more striking than the -manner 
hi which these great principles of ethical science are 
laid down in the sacred writings ; " the invisible 
things of him from the creation of the world are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that 
are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so 
that they are without excuse : Because that, when 
they knew God, they glorified him not as God, 
neither were thankful ; «but became vain in their 
imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 145 

Professing themselves to be wise, they became 
fools ; and changed the glory of the uncorruptible 
God into an image made like to corruptible man, 
and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping 
things." — " And even as they did not like to retain 
God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a 
reprobate mind, to do those things which are no 
convenient." The various steps in this course of 
moral degradation are here represented as a judicial 
infliction by the Deity. But this solemn view of 
the subject is in no degree inconsistent with the 
principle that it takes place according to a chain of 
sequences existing in the mind itself. For the 
Almighty One, who is said to inflict as a judgment 
this state of moral ruin, is the same who established 
it as the result of a uniform process in the mental 
economy, to be traced in the history of every man 
who has followed the downward course which led 
him astray from virtue. 

To the principles which have now been stated 
we are also to refer a point in the philosophy of 
human nature which presents a subject of most in- 
teresting reflection. I allude to the fact, that the 
great truths of religious belief are so often rejected, 
by men who have acquired a reputation for exalted 
powers of understanding, in other departments of 
intellectual inquiry. The fact is one of intense in- 
terest ; and we can scarcely wonder that superficial 
observers should have deduced from it an impres- 
sion that it implies something defective in the evi- 
dence by which these truths are proposed to our 
reception. But the conclusion is entirely unwar- 
N 



146 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

ranted ; and the important principle cannot be too 
often repeated, that the attainment of truth in moral 
inquiries is essentially connected with the moral 
condition of the inquirer. On this depends the 
anxious care with which he has directed his mind to 
the high pursuit under a deep and solemn feeling 
of its supreme importance. On this depends the 
sincere and humble and candid love of truth with 
which he has conducted it, apart alike from preju- 
dice and frivolity. For without these essential ele- 
ments of character, the most exalted intellect may 
fail of reaching the truth, — the most acute under- 
standing may only wander into delusion and false- 
hood. 

Before concluding this subject, there is another 
point which deserves to be alluded to ; namely, 
the influence produced upon all our moral decisions 
by Attention. This important process of the mind 
we have had occasion to mention in various parts 
of our inquiry. It consists, as we have seen, in 
directing the thoughts, calmly and deliberately, to 
all the facts and considerations by which we ought 
to be influenced in the particular case which is under 
our view; and it should be accompanied by an 
anxious and sincere desire to be guided, both in our 
opinions and conduct, by the true and relative tend- 
ency of each of them. It is a voluntary process 
of the mind which every man has the power to per- 
form ; and, on the degree in which it is habitually 
exercised depend some of the great differences 
between one man and another in their moral con- 
dition. We have repeatedly had occasion to mcn^ 



THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 147 

tion that morbid state of the mind in which moral 
causes seem to have lost their proper influence; 
both on the volitions of the will and even on the 
decisions of the judgment * but it is a truth which 
cannot be too often referred' to, how much this con- 
dition is influenced by the mental process which we 
are now considering. It originates, indeed, in some 
degree of that distortion of moral feeling, in conse- 
quence of which the inclinations wander from the 
strict path of rectitude ; but the primary effect of 
this loss of mental harmony, and that by which it is 
perpetuated, appears to be chiefly an habitual mis- 
direction of the attention, — or a total want of con- 
sideration of the truths and motives by which the 
moral judgments and decisions ought to be influ- 
enced. Apart from this condition of the mind, 
indeed, there is reason to believe that the actual 
differences in moral judgment are in different men 
less than we are apt to imagine. " Let any honest 
man," says Butler, "before he engages in any 
course of action, ask himself, — is this I am going to 
do right, or is it wrong, — is it good, or is it evil ? 
I do not in the least doubt but that these questions 
would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by 
almost any fair man in almost any circumstances." 
It is in a great measure from the want of this simple 
exercise of attention, or of what in common lan- 
guage we call calm reflection, that men are led 
away, by passion, prejudice, and distorted moral 
habits, into courses of action which their own sober 
judgment would condemn ; and, when a man who 
has thus separated from rectitude begins to retrace 



148 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

his way, the first great point is that where he pauses 
in his downward career, and seriously proposes to 
himself the question, whether the course he has fol- 
lowed be worthy of a moral being. I allude not 
here to the means by which a man is led to take 
this momentous step in his moral history, but only 
to the mental process of which it consists. It is 
primarily nothing more than an exercise of attention, 
calmly and deliberately directed to the truths and 
considerations by which his moral decisions ought 
to be influenced ; but, when a man has once been 
brought into this attitude of deep and serious 
thought, conscience comes to bear its part in the 
solemn process ; and the inquirer is likely to arrive 
at just conclusions on those great questions of which 
he feels the importance to his moral condition. 



Before leaving the subject of the Moral Principle, 
there are two points closely connected with it which 
remain to be noticed. The one relates to the origin 
and immutability of moral distinctions, — and, in 
connexion with this, a class of speculations which 
hold a conspicuous place in the history of Ethical 
.science, under the name of Theories of Morals. 
The other refers to a certain harmony or principle 
of arrangement, which the different moral feelings 
ought to preserve towards each other in a well 
regulated mind. 



THEORIES OF MORALS. 149 



$ L— OF THE ORIGIN AND IMMUTABILITY OF MO 
RAL DISTINCTIONS AND THEORIES OF MORALS. 

In treating of the moral powers, I have considered 
various feelings as distinct parts of our constitution, 
each intended to answer a specific purpose in the 
present scene of moral discipline. I am aware of 
an objection that may be urged against this mode 
of viewing the subject, — namely, that it is an unne- 
cessary multiplication of original principles. I am 
not inclined to dispute respecting the term original 
principles. I only contend for the fact, that there 
are certain feelings or propensities which are found 
to operate in the whole of mankind ; and, with 
regard to these, I consider our object to be simply 
to view man as he is. In his physical relations, we ' 
find him endowed with a variety of senses, and a 
great variety of bodily functions, — each adapted to 
its proper purpose, and all distinct from each other ; 
and the physiologist is content to view them simply 
as they are. Were he to exercise his ingenuity 
upon them, he might contend, with much plausibility, 
that it is highly incorrect to speak of five distinct 
and separate senses ; for that they are all merely 
modifications of sensation, differing only in the vari- 
ous kinds of the external impression. Thus, what 
is vulgarly called sight is the simple sensation of 
light, — and hearing is merely the sensation of sound. 
This would be all very true,— but it does not appear 



150 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

to elucidate the subject ; nor, by any ingenuity of 
such speculation, could we be enabled to know 
more concerning these senses than when we called 
them sight and hearing. In the same manner, it 
would appear, that the course of inquiry respecting 
our moral feelings is simply to observe what these 
feelings really are ; and what are their obvious tend- 
encies in an uncontaminated mind. When we have 
done so on adequate foundation, I conceive we have 
every reason for considering them as principles im- 
planted in us by the Creator, for our guidance in 
our present relations ; and, like the functions of our 
bodies, so the powers and feelings of our minds 
show a wonderful adaptation and design, worthy of 
their Omnipotent cause. But, we can know nothing 
of them beyond the facts, — and nothing is to be 
gained by any attempt, however ingenious, to sim- 
plify or explain them. We have formerly had occa- 
sion to allude to various speculations, of a similar 
character, respecting the powers of perception and 
simple intellect, — all of which have now given way 
Defore the general admission of the truth, that, on the 
questions to which they refer, no human sagacity 
can carry us one step beyond the simple knowledge 
of the facts. 

It will probably be admitted, that there have been 
many similar unprofitable speculations in the phi- 
/osophy of the moral feelings ; and that these specula- 
tions, instead of throwing any light upon the subject 
fiave tended rather to withdraw the attention of 
inquirers from the questions of deep and serious 
importance connected with the investigation. Among 



THEORIES OF MORALS. 151 

these, perhaps, we may reckon some of the doc- 
trines which hold a prominent place in the history of 
this branch of science, under the name of Theories 
of Morals. These doctrines agree in admitting the 
fact, that there are among mankind certain notions 
respecting right and wrong, — moral and immoral 
actions ; and they then profess to account for these 
impressions, or to explain how men come to think 
one action right and another wrong, A brief view of 
these theories may properly belong to an outline of 
this department of science. 

In contemplating the conduct of men as placed 
in certain relations towards each other, we perceive 
some actions which we pronounce to be right, and 
others which we pronounce to be wrong. In form- 
ing our opinion of them in this manner, we refer to 
the intentions of the actor, and, if we are satisfied 
that he really intended what we see to be the effect 
or the tendency of his conduct, or even that he pur- 
posed something which he was prevented from ac- 
complishing, we view him with feelings of moral 
approbation or disapprobation, — or, in other words, 
apply to him the award of praise or blame. Such 
is our simple idea of virtue or vice, as applied either 
to the act or the agent. We have a conviction that 
there is a line of conduct to which ourselves and 
others are bound by a certain kind of obligation : 
a departure from this constitutes moral demerit 
or vice ; a correct observance of it constitutes 
virtue. 

This appears to be the simple view of our primary 



152 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

impression of vice and virtue. The next question 
is, what is the origin of the impression, or on what 
ground is it that we conclude certain actions to be 
right, and others wrong ? Is it merely from a view 
of their consequences to ourselves or others 1 or do 
we proceed upon an absolute conviction of certain 
conduct being right, and certain other wrong, with- 
out carrying the mind further than the simple act, or 
the simple intention of the actor, — without any con- 
sideration of the effects or the tendencies of the 
action 1 This is the question which has been so 
keenly agitated in the speculations of Ethical science, 
namely, respecting the origin and nature of moral 
distinctions. (Tn the one hand, it is contended, 
that these moral impressions are in themselves im- 
mutable, and that an absolute conviction of their 
immutability is fixed upon us, in that part of our con- 
stitution which we call conscience ; in other words, 
there is a certain conduct to which we are bound by 
a feeling of obligation, apart from all other considera- 
tions whatever ; and we have an impression that i 
departure from this in ourselves or others constitutes 
vice. On the other hand, it is maintained, that these 
distinctions are entirely arbitrary, or arise out of cir- 
cumstances, so that what is vice in one case may be 
virtue in another. Those who have adopted the 
latter hypothesis have next to explain, what the cir- 
cumstances are which give rise, in this manner, to 
our impressions of vice and virtue, moral approba- 
tion or disapprobation. The various modes of ex- 
plaining this impression have led to the Theories of 
JWorafo. 



THEORIES OF MORALS. 153 

The system of Mandeville ascribes our impres- 
sions of moral rectitude entirely to the enactments 
of legislators. Man, he says, naturally seeks only 
his own gratification, without any regard to the hap- 
piness of other men. But legislators found that it 
would be necessary to induce him, in some way, to 
surrender a portion of his personal gratification for 
the good of others, and so to promote the peace and 
harmony of society. To accomplish this with such 
a selfish being, it was necessary to give him some 
equivalent for the sacrifice he thus made ; and the 
principle of his nature which they fixed upon for this 
purpose was his love of praise. They made certain 
laws for the general good, and then flattered mankind 
into the belief that it was praiseworthy to observe 
them, and noble to sacrifice a certain degree of their 
own gratification for the good of others. What we 
call virtue thus resolves itself into the love of praise. 
In regard to such a system as this, it has been 
thought sufficient to point out the distinction, between 
the immutable principles of morality and those ar- 
rangements which are dependent upon mere enact- 
ment. Such are many of the regulations and re- 
strictions of commerce. They are intended for the 
public good, and, while they are in force, it is the 
duty of every good citizen to obey them. A change 
of the law, however, changes their character, for 
they possess in themselves none of the qualities of 
merit or demerit. But no laws can alter, and no 
statutes modify, those great principles of moral con- 
duct which are graved indelibly on the conscience 



154 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE 

of all classes of men. Kings, it has been said, may 
make laws, but cannot create a virtue. 

By another modification of this system, our im- 
pressions of virtue and vice are said to be derived 
entirely from mutual compact. Men, finding that 
there was a certain course of action which would 
contribute to their mutual advantage, and vice versa, 
entered into an agreement to observe certain con- 
duct, and abstain from certain other. The violation 
of this compact constituted vice, the observance of 
it virtue. 

By a theory, supported by some eminent men, as 
Clarke and Wollaston, virtue was considered to 
depend on a conformity of the conduct to a certain 
sense of the fitness of things, — or the truth of things. 
The meaning of this, it must be confessed, is rather 
obscure. It however evidently refers the essence 
of virtue to a relation perceived by a process of 
reason ; and therefore may be held as at variance 
with the belief of the impression being universal. 

According to the Theory of Utility, as warmly 
supported by Mr. Hume, we estimate the virtue of 
an action and an agent entirely by their usefulness. 
lie seems to refer all our mental impressions to two 
principles, reason and taste. Reason gives us simply 
the knowledge of truth or falsehood, and is no motive 
of action. Taste gives an impression of pleasure or 
pain, and so constitutes happiness or misery, and 
becomes a motive of action. To this he refers our 
impressions of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. 



THEORIES OF MORALS. 155 

He has, accordingly, distinctly asserted that the 
words right and wrong signify nothing more than 
sweet or sour, pleasant or painful, being only effects 
upon the mind of the spectator produced by the con- 
templation of certain conduct, — and this, as we have 
already seen, resolves itself into the impression of 
its usefulness. An obvious objection to the system 
of utility was, that it might be applied to the effects 
of inanimate matter as correctly as to the deeds of a 
voluntary agent. A printing-press or a steam-engine 
might be as meritorious as a man of extensive virtue. 
To obviate this, Mr. Hume was driven to a distinc- 
tion, which in fact amounted to giving up the doc- 
trine, namely, that the sense of utility must be com- 
bined with a feeling of approbation. This leads us 
back to the previous question, on what this feeling of 
approbation is founded, and at once recognises a 
principle, distinct from the mere perception of utility. 
Virtuous conduct may indeed always contribute to 
general utility, or general happiness ; but this is an 
effect only, not the cause or the principle which con- 
stitutes it virtuous. This important distinction has 
been well stated by Professor Mills of Oxford. He 
defines morality to be, — " an obedience to the law 
and constitution of man's nature, assigned him by 
the Deity in conformity to his own essential and 
unchangeable attributes, the effect of which is the 
general happiness of his creatures."* 

We come now to the Selfish System of morals, 

# Lecture on the Theory of Moral Obligation. Oxford. 183a 



156 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE, 

according to which the fundamental principle of the 
conduct of mankind is a desire to promote their own 
gratification or interest. This theory has appeared 
in various forms, from a very early period in the his- 
tory of Ethical science ; but the most remarkable 
promoter of it in more modern times was Mr. 
Hobbes. According to him, man is influenced 
entirely by what seems calculated, more immediately, 
or more remotely, to promote his own interest; 
whatever does so he considers as right, — the oppo- 
site as wrong. He is driven to society by neces- 
sity, and then, whatever promotes the general good 
he considers as ultimately calculated to promote his 
own. This system is founded upon a fallacy simi- 
lar to that referred to under the former head. Vir- 
tuous conduct does impart gratification, and that of 
the highest kind ; and, in the strictest sense of the 
word, it promotes the true interest of the agent : but 
this tendency is the effect, not the cause ; and never 
can be considered as the principle which imparts to 
conduct its character of virtue ; nor do we perform 
it merely because it affords us gratification, or pro- 
motes our interest. The hypothesis, indeed, may 
be considered as distinctly contradicted by facts, — 
for, even in our own experience, it is clear, that the 
pleasure attending an act of generosity or virtue in 
ourselves, as well as our approbation of it in others, 
is diminished or destroyed by the impression that 
there was a selfish purpose to answer by it. 

There is a modification of the selfish system which 
attempts to get rid of its more offensive aspect by a 



THEORIES OF MORALS. 157 

singular and circuitous chain of moral emotions. 
We have experienced, it is said, that a certain atten- 
tion to the comfort or advantage of others contrib- 
utes to our own. A kind of habit is thus formed, 
by which we come at last to seek the happiness 
of others for their own sake ; so that, by this pro- 
cess, actions which at first were considered only as 
inexpedient, from being opposed to self-love, at 
length and insensibly come to be considered as im- 
moral. This can be considered as nothing more 
than an ingenious play upon words, and deserves 
only to be mentioned as an historical fact, in a view 
of those speculations by which this important subject 
has been obscured and bewildered. 

Another modification of the theories of morals 
remains to be mentioned ; namely, that of the dis- 
tinguished Paley. This eminent writer is decidedly 
opposed to the doctrine of a moral sense or moral 
principle ; but the system which he proposes to sub- 
stitute in its place must be acknowledged to be liable 
to considerable objections. He commences with 
the proposition that virtue is doing good to mankind, 
in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of 
everlasting happiness. The good of mankind, 
therefore, is the subject — the will of God, the rule 
— and everlasting happiness, the motive of human 
virtue. The will of God, he subsequently goes on 
to show, is made known to us partly by revelation, 
and partly by what we discover of his designs and 
dispositions from his works, or, as we usually call it, 
the light of nature. From this last source he thinks 
O 



158 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE* 

it is clearly to be inferred, that God wills and wishes 
the happiness of his creatures ; consequently actions 
which promote that will and wish must be agreeable 
to him, and the contrary. The method of ascer- 
taining the will of God concerning any action, by 
the light of nature, therefore, is, to inquire into the 
tendency of the action to promote or diminish gene- 
ral happiness. Proceeding on these grounds, he 
then arrives at the conclusion, that whatever is ex- 
pedient is right ; and that it is the utility of any 
moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of 
it. In his further elucidation of this theory, Dr. 
Paley admits, that an action may be useful in an 
individual case which is not right. To constitute 
it right, it is necessary that it shall be " expedient 
upon the whole, — at the long run, in all its effects, 
collateral and remote as well as those which are 
immediate and direct." 

Without entering on the various peculiarities of 
this system, there are two considerations which 
appear to be serious objections to it as a doctrine to 
be applied to practical purposes. (1.) If we sup- 
pose a man deliberating respecting an action, which 
he perceives would be eminently expedient and use- 
ful in an individual case, and which he feels to be 
highly desirable in its immediate reference to that 
case ; we may naturally ask whether he is in a 
likely condition to find his way to a sound conclu- 
sion respecting the consequences of the action " upon 
the whole, at the long run, in all its consequences, 
remote and collateral." It may certainly be doubted, 
whether, in any case, there is not great danger of 



THEORIES OF MORALS. 159 

differences of opinion arising respecting this ex- 
tended and ultimate expediency of an action ; and, 
in particular, whether in the man now referred to, 
the very circumstances of his perception of great and 
immediate utility, and the state of desire connected 
with it, do not constitute a moral condition which 
might interfere, in a very material degree, with his 
calculation as to its ultimate expediency. (2.) In- 
dependently of this consideration, we may be allowed 
to doubt, whether any human being can arrive at 
such an extensive knowledge, as this theory seems 
to render necessary, of all the consequences of an 
action, remote and collateral. This would appear 
to constitute a kind and a degree of knowledge to 
be found only in the omniscience of the Deity. 

If these observations are well founded, I think we 
cannot hesitate to maintain, that, on such a nice cal- 
culation of consequences, it is impossible to found a 
rule of morals in any degree adapted to the neces- 
sities of man. The same objection applies to every 
doctrine which does not recognise the supreme 
authority of conscience as an original part of our 
moral constitution, warning us of certain conduct 
as immutably right, and certain other conduct as 
immutably wrong, without any regard either to our 
own advantage or to our judgment of the tendency 
of the deeds. Whenever we depart from this great 
principle, we reduce every moral decision to what 
must primarily be a process of reasoning, and in 
which, consequently, there may be differences of 
opinion respecting the tendency of actions, instead 
of that absolute conviction which the deep import- 



160 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

ance of the subject renders indispensable. It may, 
further, be confidently stated as a matter of fact, that 
a conscientious man, in considering an action which 
involves a point of moral duty, does not enter upon 
any such calculation of its consequences. He 
simply asks himself, is it right ? and so decides, 
according to an impulse within which he feels tc be 
a part of his moral constitution, susceptible of no 
explanation, and not admitting of being referred to 
any other principle. 

The foundation of all these Theories of Morals, 
then, seems to be the impression, that there is 
nothing right or wrong, just or unjust in itself; but 
that our ideas of right and wrong, justice and in- 
justice arise either from actual law or mutual com- 
pact,— -or from our view of the tendencies of actions. 
There is another modification of these theories, but 
liable to similar objection, which ascribes the origin 
of right and wrong directly to the will of the Deity, 
and holds that there is nothing wrong which might 
not have been right, if he had so ordained it. By 
the immutability of moral distinctions, as opposed 
to all these theories, we mean — that there are cer- 
tain actions which are immutably right, and which 
we are bound in duty to perform, and certain actions 
which are immutably wrong, apart from any other 
consideration whatever ; and that an absolute con- 
viction of this is fixed upon us, in the moral princi- 
ple or conscience, independently of knowledge de- 
rived • from any other source respecting the will or 
laws of the Almighty. By this system, therefore, 



THEORIES OF MORALS. 161 

which refers our moral impressions to the supreme 
authority of conscience, a principle is disclosed, 
which, independently even of revelation, not only 
establishes an absolute conviction of the laws of 
moral rectitude, but leads us to the impression of 
moral responsibility and a moral Governor, and, 
as immediately flowing from this, a state of future 
retribution. We have already shown this to accord 
with the declarations of the sacred writings, and it is 
evidently the only system on which we can account 
for that uniformity of moral sentiment which is abso- 
lutely required for the harmonies of society. For 
it is, in fact, on a conviction of the immutability of 
this feeling in ourselves, — and of the existence of a 
similar and universal principle in others, — that is 
founded all the mutual confidence which keeps man- 
kind together. It is this reciprocity of moral feeling 
that proves a constant check upon the conduct of 
men in the daily transactions of life ; but, to answer 
this purpose, there is evidently required an impres- 
sion of its uniformity,-— or a conviction that the 
actions which we disapprove in others will be con- 
demned in us by the unanimous decision of other 
men. It is equally clear that we have no such im- 
pression of a uniformity of sentiment on any other 
subject, except on those referable to the class of 
first truths ; and this immediately indicates a marked 
distinction between our moral impressions, and any 
of those conclusions at which we arrive by a process 
of the understanding. It is clear, also, that this 
uniformity can arise from no system which either 
refers us directly to the will of God, or is liable to 
02 



162 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

be affected by the differences which may exist in 
the judgment, the moral taste, the personal feel- 
ings, or the interests of different individuals. It 
must be, in itself, fixed and immutable, conveying an 
absolute conviction, which admits of no doubt and 
no difference of opinion. Such is the great princi- 
ple of conscience. However its warnings may be 
neglected, and its influence obscured by passion and 
moral degradation, it still asserts its right to govern 
the whole man. " Had it strength," says Butler, 
" as it had right, — had it power, as it had manifest 
authority, it would absolutely govern the world." 

It remains only that we briefly notice the system 
of Dr. Adam Smith, commonly called the theory of 
Sympathy. According to this ingenious writer, it is 
required for our moral sentiments respecting an 
action, that we enter into the feelings both of the 
agent and of him to whom the action relates. If 
we sympathize with the feelings and intentions of the 
agent, we approve of his conduct as right, — if not, 
we consider it as wrong. If, in the individual to 
whom the action refers, we sympathize with a feel- 
ing of gratitude, we regard the agent as worthy of 
praise, — if with a feeling of resentment, the contrary. 
We thus observe our feelings respecting the conduct 
of others, in cases in which we are not personally 
concerned, — then apply these rules to ourselves ; and 
thus judge of our own conduct. This very obvious 
statement, however, of what every man feels, does 
not supply the place of a fundamental rule of right 
and wrong ; and indeed Dr. Smith does not appear 



OFFICE OF REASOK. 163 

to contend that it does so. It applies only to the ap- 
plication of a principle, not to the origin of it. Our 
sympathy can never be supposed to constitute an 
action right or wrong ; but it enables us to apply to 
individual cases a principle of right and wrong 
derived from another source ; and to clear our judg- 
ment in doing so, from the blinding influence of 
those selfish feelings by which we are so apt to be 
misled when we apply it directly to ourselves. In 
estimating our own conduct, we then apply to it 
those conclusions which we have made with regard 
to the conduct of others, — or we imagine others 
applying the same process in regard to us, and con- 
sider how our conduct would appear to an impartial 
observer. 

In regard to the whole of this subject, an im- 
portant distinction is to be made between the fun- 
damental principle, from which actions derive their 
character of right and wrong, — and the application 
of reason in judging of their tendencies. Before 
•concluding this part of the subject, therefore, we 
have to add a veiy few observations on the influence 
exerted on our moral decisions by reason, — always, 
however, in subserviency to the great principle of 
conscience. The office of reason appears to be, 
in the first place, to judge of the expediency, pro- 
priety, and consequences of actions, which do not 
involve any feeling of moral duty. In regard to the 
affections, again, a process of reason is often neces- 
sary, not only respecting the best mode of exercising 
them, but also, in many cases, in deciding whether 



164 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

we shall exercise them at all. Thus, we may feel 
compassion in a particular instance, but perceive the 
individual to be so unworthy that what we could do 
would be of no benefit to him. In such a case we 
may feel it to be a matter not only of prudence, but 
of duty, to resist the affection, and to reserve the aid 
we have to bestow for persons more deserving. 

In cases in which an impression of moral duty is 
concerned, an exercise of reason is still, in many 
instances, necessary for enabling us to adapt oui 
means to the end which we desire to accomplish. 
We may feel an anxious wish to promote the interest 
or relieve the distress of another, or to perform some 
high and important duty, — but call reason to oai 
aid respecting the most effectual and the most judi- 
cious means of doing so. Conscience, in such 
cases, produces the intention, — reason suggests the 
means : and it is familiar to every one that these do 
not always harmonize. Thus, a man may be sound 
in his intentions, who errs in judgment respecting 
the means for carrying them into effect. In such 
cases, we attach our feeling of moral approbation to 
the intention only ; we say the man meant well, but 
erred in judgment ; and to this error we affix no 
feeling of moral disapprobation, — unless, perhaps, 
in some cases, we may blame him for acting pre- 
cipitately on his own judgment, instead of taking 
the advice of those qualified to direct him. We 
expect such a man to acquire wisdom from experi- 
ence, by observing the deficiency of his judgment 
in reference to his intentions ; and, in future in- 
stances* to learn to take advice. There are other 



OFFICE OF REASON. 165 

circumstances in which an exercise of reason is 
frequently brought into action in regard to moral 
decisions ; as in some cases in which one duty- 
appears to interfere with another ; likewise in judg- 
ing whether, in particular instances, any rule of duty 
is concerned, or whether we are at liberty to take up 
the case simply as one of expediency or utility. In 
making their decisions in doubtful cases, we observe 
great differences in the habits of judging in different 
individuals. One shows the most minute and scru- 
pulous anxiety to discover whether the case involves 
any principle of duty, — and a similar anxiety in 
acting suitably when he has discovered it. This is 
what we call a strictly conscientious man. Another, 
who shows no want of a proper sense of duty when 
the line is clearly drawn, has less anxiety in such 
cases as these, and may sacrifice minute or doubt- 
ful points to some other feeling, — as self-interest, or 
even friendship, — where the former individual might 
have discovered a principle of duty. 

Reason is also concerned in judging of a de- 
scription of cases in which a modification of moral 
feeling arises from the complexity of actions, — or, 
in other words, from the circumstances in which the 
individual is placed. This may be illustrated by the 
difference of moral sentiment which we attach to the 
act of taking away the life of another, — when this is 
done by an individual under the impulse of revenge, 
— by the same individual in self-defence, — or by a 
judge in the discharge of his public duty. 

There is still another office frequently assigned 



166 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

to reason in moral decisions, — as when we speak of 
a man acting upon reason as opposed to passion. 
This however is, correctly speaking, only a different 
use of the term ; and it means that he acts upon a 
calm consideration of the motives by which he 
ought to be influenced, instead of being hurried away 
by a desire or an affection which has been allowed 
to usurp undue influence. 

The important distinction, therefore, which these 
observations have been intended to illustrate may 
be briefly recapitulated in the following manner. The 
aspect of actions, as right or wrong, is founded upon 
a principle in the human mind entirely distinct from 
a simple exercise of reason, — and the standard of 
moral rectitude derived from this source is, in its 
own nature, fixed and immutable. But there are 
many cases in which an exercise of reason may be 
employed in referring particular actions to this stand- 
ard, or trying them, as it were, by means of it. Any 
such mental process, however, is only to be con- 
sidered as a kind of test applied to individual 
instances, and must not be confounded with the 
standard to which it is the office of this test to refer 
them. Right or virtuous conduct does, in point of 
fact, contribute to general utility, as well as to the 
advantage of the individual, in the true and extended 
sense of that term, and these tendencies are per- 
ceived by reason. But it is neither of these that 
constitutes it right. This is founded entirely on a 
different principle, — the immutable rule of moral 
rectitude ; it is perceived by a different part of out 



HARMONY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 167 

constitution, — -the moral principle, or conscience ; 
and, by the operation of this principle, we pronounce 
it right, without any reference to its consequences 
either to ourselves or others. 



$ II. OF THE HARMONY OF THE MORAL 
FEELINGS. 

On whatever system we may consider the moral 
feelings, we perceive that there are various classes 
of them, — each answering a special purpose in our 
various relations as accountable beings. Some of 
them, we have seen, relate to objects of desire, the 
attainment of which appears likely to bring satisfac- 
tion. Others lead us to those relations which we 
bear to our fellow-men. A third class, which re- 
mains to be considered, calls our attention to the 
relation in which we stand to the moral Governor of 
the universe, and to a certain regulation of the moral T 
feelings arising out of this relation. But there is 
still another inquiry of the deepest interest connected 
with this subject, namely, regarding the harmony, or 
principle of arrangement, which these various classes 
of moral emotions ought to bear towards each other. 
They all form parts of our constitution, and deserve 
a certain degree of attention, which must be care- 
fully adapted to the relative importance of each ; and 
the correct adjustment of this harmony is one of the 



168 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

objects to be answered by the moral principle* com- 
bined with a sound exercise of judgment The 
rules which apply to it may be stated in the follow- 
ing manner. 

When we consider man as an immortal being, 
passing through a course of discipline to another 
state of existence, it is obvious that his highest con- 
sideration is his own moral condition, and the aspect 
in which he stands towards the Deity. In imme- 
diate connexion with this first of all concerns are the 
great and general principles of justice and veracity, 
as referring to our connexion with all mankind, and 
a class of private responsibilities which peculiarly 
regard each individual in his domestic relations ; 
such as the duties of children to their parents, and 
parents to their children ; the latter, particularly, 
presenting a class of the most solemn kind, as it 
embraces the concerns of the present life, and of 
that which is to come. Then follow the duties of 
benevolence, friendship, and patriotism ; after these, 
the ordinary avocations of life, as the acquisition of 
knowledge and the pursuits of business ; and, finally, 
those personal recreations and enjoyments, which, 
when kept in their proper place, are legitimate and 
necessary to every human being. These are all 
proper and laudable, provided they are kept in a 
proper subserviency to each other. But the import- 
ant consideration is, that a man may be acting un- 
worthily of his moral nature, when he devotes him- 
self to any one of them in a manner which encroaches 
upon the harmony of the whole. 

To begin with the lowest of them, it is unnece«- 



HARMONY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 169 

sary to state how this remark applies to the man 
whose life is devoted to pursuits which rank no 
higher than recreation or amusement. It must be 
obvious to every one of the smallest degree of 
reflection, that such a man is living only for the 
present life. What cannot be denied of mere 
amusement must also be admitted respecting a life 
of business, however important in themselves the 
concerns may be which engross the mind. They 
still r^fer only to present things, and carry not the 
thoughts beyond the moment which bounds the 
period of moral discipline. Even the engagements 
of benevolence and public usefulness, estimable as 
they are, may be allowed to usurp an improper place ; 
and they do so if they withdraw the attention from 
responsibilities and duties which belong more par- 
ticularly to ourselves as individuals — such as the 
duties of parents and of children, — and the other 
claims which arise out of the relations of domestic 
life. Finally, it is ever to be kept in mind, that no 
engagements of any description must be allowed to 
interfere with obligations of the highest interest to 
every man, — those which relate to his own moral 
condition, in the sight of Him who is now his wit- 
ness, and will soon be his Judge. From want of 
due attention to this consideration, year after year 
glides over us, and life hastens to its close, amid 
cares and toils and anxieties which relate only to 
the present world. Thus fame may be acquired, 
or wealth accumulated ; or, after a laborious ascent, 
a man may have gained the height of ambition, — 
when the truth bursts upon him that life is nearly 
P 



170 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

over, while its great business is yet to begin, — the 
preparation of the moral being for an eternal exist- 
ence. 

It is scarcely necessary to add, on the other hand, 
that attention to this first of all concerns must not 
be allowed to estrange the mind from the various 
duties and responsibilities of active life. It is only, 
indeed, when the conduct is regulated by partial and 
unsound motives, that some of these objects of 
attention are allowed to usurp the place of others. 
He who acts, not from the high principles of moral 
duty, but from a desire of notoriety, or the applause 
of man, may devote himself to much benevolence 
and usefulness of a public and ostensible kind ; 
while he neglects duties of a higher, though more 
private nature, — and overlooks entirely, it may be, 
his own moral condition. The ascetic, on the other 
hand, shuts himself up in his cell, and imagines that 
he pleases God by meditation and voluntary austeri- 
ties. But this is not the part of him who truly feels 
his varied relations, and correctly estimates his true 
responsibilities. It is striking, also, to remark, how 
the highest principles lead to a character of harmony 
and consistency, which all inferior motives fail en- 
tirely in producing. The man who estimates most 
deeply and correctly his own moral relations to an 
ever-present and presiding Deity will also feel his 
way through the various duties of life, with a degree 
of attention adapted to each of them. In the retire- 
ments of domestic life, he is found in the anxious 
discharge of the high responsibilities which arise out 
of its relations. He is found in the path of private 



ifARMONY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 171 

benevolence and public usefulness, manifesting the 
kind and brotherly interest of one who acts on the 
purest of all motives, — the love of God, and a prin- 
ciple of devotedness to his service. Whether ex- 
posed to the view of his fellow-men, or seen only by 
Him who seeth in secret, his conduct is the same, — 
for the principles on which he acts have in both 
situations equal influence. In the ordinary con- 
cerns of life, the power of these principles is equally 
obvious. Whether he engage in its business or 
partake of its enjoyments ; whether he encounter its 
difficulties, or meet its pains, disappointments, and 
sorrows, — he walks through the whole with the calm 
dignity of one who views all the events of the pres- 
ent life in their immediate reference to a life which 
is to come. 

The high consistency of character which results 
from this regulated condition of the moral feelings 
tends thus to promote a due attention to the various 
responsibilities connected with the situation in which 
the individual is placed. It does so by leading him, 
with anxious consideration, to feel his way through 
these requirements, and to recognise the supreme 
authority of conscience over his whole moral sys- 
tem. It does so, especially, by habitually raising 
his views to the eternal One, who is the witness of 
all his conduct, and to whom he is responsible for 
his actions in each relation of life. It thus tends to 
preserve him from all those partial and inconsistent 
courses into which men are led by the mere desire 
of approbation, or love of distinction, or by any 



172 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

other of those inferior motives which are really 
resolvable into self-love. 

Such uniformity of moral feeling is equally op- 
posed to another distortion of character, not less at 
variance with a sound condition of the mind. This 
is what may be called religious pretension, showing 
itself by much zeal for particular opinions and cer- 
tain external observances, while there is no corres- 
ponding influence upon the moral feelings and the 
character. The truths which form the great object 
of religious belief are of so momentous a kind, that, 
when they are really believed, they cannot fail to 
produce effects of the most decided and most ex- 
tensive nature ; and, where this influence is not 
steadily exhibited, there is a fatal error in the moral 
economy, — there is either self-deception, or an in- 
tention to deceive others. From such inconsistency 
of character arises an evil, which has a most inju- 
rious influence upon two descriptions of persons. 
Those of one class are led to assign an undue im- 
portance to the profession of a peculiar creed and 
the mere externals of religion, — to certain observ- 
ances which are considered as characteristic of a 
particular party, and to abstinence from certain in- 
dulgences or pursuits which that party disapprove. 
Those of the other class, finding, in many instances, 
much zeal for these peculiarities, without a state of 
moral feeling adapted to the truths which are pro- 
fessed, are apt to consider the whole as eitner pre- 
tence or delusion. 

In their mutual error there is to both matter of im- 
portant warning. It becomes the latter to beware, 



HARMONY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 173 

lest, misled by the failings of weak or inconsistent 
men, they withdraw their attention from truths of 
solemn import to themselves as moral beings. 
There may be much pretension where there is no 
real feeling ; but are they from this entitled to infer 
that there is not a reality in that which these pretend- 
ers counterfeit? By a slight gilding, articles of 
trifling value are made to assume the appearance of 
gold ; but would it be reasonable to contend, that there 
are no articles of intrinsic worth which these are made 
to imitate ] The fair induction is, in both instances, 
the opposite. Were there no such articles of pure 
gold, this ingenuity would not be employed in fabri- 
cating base imitations ; and the hypocrite would not 
assume qualities he does not possess, were they not 
real virtues, from a resemblance to which he hopes 
to procure for his character that ostensible value 
which may enable it to deceive. But let those who 
have detected this deception beware of founding upon 
it conclusions which it does not warrant. They 
have not found the reality here, but there is not the 
less a pure and high standard which claims their ut- 
most regard. If they search for it either among in- 
consistent or among designing men, they seek the 
living among the dead. Let them contemplate it 
especially as it is displayed in the character of the 
Messiah ; in him it was exhibited in a manner which 
demands the imitation of every rational man, while it 
challenges the cordial assent of the most acute under- 
standing, that this is the perfection of a moral being. 
On the other hand, let those who profess to be in- 
fluenced by the highest of all motives study to exhibit 
P3 



174 THE MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

their habitual influence in a consistent uniformity of 
the whole character. It is easy to acquire a pecu- 
liar phraseology, to show much zeal for peculiar 
opinions, and rigid attention to peculiar observances ; 
and, among a party, it is not difficult to procure a 
name, by condemning certain other compliances 
which by them are technically styled the manners of 
the world. But all this, it is evident, may be assumed ; 
it may be, and probably often is, no better than, a 
name ; it often amounts to nothing more than sub- 
stituting one kind of excitement for another, while 
the moral being continues unchanged. True reli- 
gion is seated in the heart, and sends out from thence 
a purifying influence of the whole character. In its 
essential nature it is a contest within, open only to the 
eye of Him who seeth in secret. It seeks not, there- 
fore, the applause of men : and it shrinks from that 
spurious religionism whose prominent characters are 
talk, and pretension, and external observance, often 
accompanied by uncharitable censure. Like its 
divine pattern, it is meek and lowly, — " it is pure and 
peaceable, gentle and easy to be entreated, full of 
mercy and of good fruits, without partiality, and with- 
out hypocrisy." It aims not at an ostentatious dis- 
play of principles, but a steady exhibition of fruits. 
Qualities which it cultivates with especial care are 
humility, and charity, and mercy, — the mortification 
of every selfish passion, and the denial of every sel- 
fish indulgence. When thus exhibited in its true and 
genuine characters, it commands the respect of every 
sound understanding, and challenges the assent of all 
to its reality and its truth, as the highest principle that 
can regu'ate the conduct of a moral being. 



PART IV. 



OF THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN TOWARDS 
THE DEITY. 



The healthy state of a moral being is strikingly 
referred, in the sacred writings, to three great heads : 
— justice, benevolence, and a conformity of the 
moral feelings to a reverential sense of the presence 
and perfections of the Deity ; "to do justly, — to 
love mercy, — and to walk humbly with thy God." 
The two former of these topics lead us to the duties 
which a man owes to his fellow-men ; the latter 
calls our attention to that homage of the mind and of 
the heart which he owes peculiarly to God. For the 
duties of the former class we are equally responsible 
to Him as the moral governor of the universe, but 
their immediate reference is to our connexions with 
other men ; those of the latter class respect our re- 
lation to the Deity himself, and consequently consist, 
in a great measure, in the purity and devotedness of 
the mind. In human systems of ethics, attention has 
been chiefly directed to the obligations of social and 
relative morality ; but the two classes are closely 



176 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

associated in the sacred writings ; and the sound con 
dition of the moral feelings is pointed out as that 
acquirement which, along with a corresponding in- 
tegrity of character, qualifies man, in an especial man- 
ner, for intercourse with the Deity. " Who shall 
ascend into the hill of the Lord, or who shall stand 
in his holy place 1 He that hath clean hands and a 
pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, 
nor sworn deceitfully." — "Blessed are the pure in 
heart, for they shall see God." 

Such declarations challenge the assent and abso- 
lute conviction of every sound understanding. Are 
we, as responsible creatures, placed in immediate 
relation to a great moral Governor, a being of infinite 
purity and boundless perfections ? — Is the structure 
of our bodies, and the still more wonderful fabric of 
our minds, alike the work of his hand ? Then it is 
impossible to put away from us the impression, that 
each movement of these minds must be fully exposed 
to his inspection. It is equally impossible to repel 
from us the solemn truth,- — that it is by the desires, 
the feelings, and the motives of action which exist 
there, that our condition is to be estimated in his 
sight ; and that a man, whose conduct to his fellow- 
men does not violate propriety and justice, may be 
in a state of moral degradation in the eyes of him 
who seeth in secret ; " for," says the sacred writer, 
" man looketh on the outward appearance, but the 
Lord looketh on the heart." 

There cannot, therefore, be an inquiry of more 
intense interest, than what is that condition of the 
heart and of the mind which every man ought to 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 177 

seek after, when he considers himself as exposed to 
the continual inspection of the Almighty. It may, 
perhaps, be briefly referred to the following heads. 

I. An habitual effort to cultivate a sense of the 
divine presence, and an habitual desire to have the 
whcle moral condition regulated by this impression. 
It implies, therefore, sacred respect to the character 
of the Deity, and is opposed to every kind of profane- 
ness, or aught by which one might weaken in himself, 
or others, the reverential feeling due towards the 
character, and even the name, of the Almighty. This 
must be extended, not to the outward conduct alone, 
but to the desires and affections of the heart. There 
is a state of mind, formerly referred to, in which a 
desire, which the moral feelings disapprove, may not 
be followed by volition ; while the desire is still in- 
dulged, and the mind is allowed to cherish it with 
some feeling of regret, or even to luxuriate with a 
sense of pleasure in the imaginary gratification. In 
the same manner, a malevolent affection to our fel- 
low-men may be checked from producing injurious 
conduct, while the feeling still rankles in the heart, 
in the form of envy or hatred. These mental con- 
ditions, while they are widely at variance with the 
healthy state of a rational and responsible being, 
must be regarded by the Deity as constituting moral 
guilt and moral degradation. Nor is it only on the 
mind which cherishes malevolent passions and im- 
pure desires and imaginations, that the Holy One 
must look with a feeling of condemnation. There 
maybe another mental condition in which the thoughts 



178 THE MORAL RELATION OP MAN 

and desires are directed to transient and frivolous 
objects, and thus run to waste amid the trifles of the 
passing hour, without any feeling of the truths and 
motives which demand the attention of moral beings. 
The pursuits of such a man may have nothing in them 
that is referable either to impure desire or malevolent 
affection. They may be the acquisition of wealth, 
— the grasp after power, — the love of distinction, — 
or a devotedness to merely trivial occupations ; 
while there is a total neglect of those great concerns 
which really demand our chief and highest regard. 
Amid the legitimate and even the laudable pursuits 
of ordinary life, we are too apt to lose sight of those 
duties and responsibilities which attend a state of 
moral discipline, and that culture of the soul required 
as a preparation for the future state of existence to 
which we are hastening. But we cannot doubt that 
these considerations bear an important aspect in the 
eye of the Deity ; and that the mind in which they 
hold not an habitual influence is contemplated by him 
as in a state of moral destitution. 

There are, accordingly, two classes of characters 
clearly pointed out in the sacred writings, — namely, 
one in whom the conduct indicates the depravity 
within, — and another, in whom the external character 
preserves a respectable aspect in the estimation of 
men, while the moral feelings are in a corrupted con- 
dition in the sight of the Deity. We have formerly 
endeavoured to trace the laws to which this fact is 
to be referred, on the principles of the philosophy of 
the human mind : — they are chiefly two. (1.) We 
have seen that there are original principles in our 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 179 

nature which lead to a certain exercise of justice, 
veracity, and benevolence, independently of any 
recognition of divine authority. They are a part of 
our moral constitution, and calculated to promote 
important purposes in the harmony of human so- 
ciety ; and they carry along with them a certain 
principle of reciprocal compensation which is entirely 
distinct from any impression of their moral aspeat. 
The man who is deficient in them, indeed, incurs 
guilt ; but a certain discharge of them may arise 
from mere natural, or even selfish feeling, uncon- 
nected with any sense of responsibility ; and this 
consequently conveys no impression of moral ap- 
probation. In the very exercise of them a man 
receives his reward, partly by a feeling of satisfac- 
tion, which, from the constitution of his nature, they 
are calculated to yield, and partly as a member of 
that community where they promote peace, and 
order, and harmony ; and he is not entitled to 
look farther, or to claim from them any feeling of 
merit in the sight of the Deity. (2.) A second 
principle, which bears an important relation to this 
subject, is the manner in which a man's character is 
influenced by the particular motive or pursuit to 
which he has resigned the guidance of his conduct 
One surrenders himself to the animal propensities, 
and becomes a selfish profligate, insensible to every 
right principle of action, while his depraved condition 
is obvious to all around him. A second devotes 
himself to ambition ; and a third to avarice : these 
ruling passions, it may be, are found to be adverse 
to the selfish indulgence and open profligacy of the 



180 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

former ; and a character may arise out of them dis- 
tinguished by much that is decent and respectable, 
and worthy of approbation in the eye of man. In a 
fourth, the ruling motive may be the desire of esteem 
and approbation ; and this may, and often does, be- 
come a principle of such influence as to overpower, 
in a great measure, the selfish propensities, and to 
produce a character estimable not onlv for justice 
and veracity, but a higher degree of acwve benevo- 
lence. Such a man sacrifices to his ruling passion 
much that might be turned to the purposes of ambi- 
tion, avarice, or selfish indulgence, by those who are 
guided by these propensities ; and in doing so, he 
has his reward. He finds it in the gratification of 
that principle w T hich in him has become predominant ; 
and, rather than hazard the loss of esteem by those 
whose approbation he values, he will submit to much 
personal exertion, and sacrifice much selfish ad- 
vantage, which others might deem highly worthy of 
attainment. But all this may go on without any re- 
cognition of divine authority ; and may all exist in a 
man in whom there is much impurity of desire, and 
much deficiency of moral feeling. It is all referable 
to a motive of a personal nature, and in the gratifi- 
cation of this his ruling principle is satisfied. 

The state of mind which is under the influence 
of an habitual sense of the divine presence may, 
therefore, be considered under two relations, — the 
one referring more immediately to the Deity, the 
other to our fellow-men. The former seems chiefly 
to include an effort to have every desire, thought, 
and imagination of the heart, regulated by a sense 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 181 

of the presence and the purity of God, and in con- 
formity to his will. Amid much feeling of deficiency 
in these respects, it leads our attention to that inter- 
esting mental condition in which there is a contest 
and a warfare within, — and a prevailing opposition 
to every thing that is at variance with the purity of 
a moral being. The second division includes the 
cultivation of feelings of kindness and benevolence 
towards all men ; the love of justice, — the love of 
truth, — the love of peace, — the forgiveness of inju- 
ries, — the mortification of selfishness ; in a word, 
the earnest and habitual desire to promote the com- 
fort and alleviate the distresses of others. From 
these two mental conditions must spring a charac- 
ter, distinguished alike by piety towards God, and 
by high integrity, benevolence, and active usefulness 
towards man. He who earnestly cultivates this 
purity within feels that he requires continual watch- 
fulness, and a constant direction of the mind to those 
truths and moral causes which are calculated to in- 
fluence his volitions. He feels further that he is in 
need of a might not his own in this high design ; but 
for this he knows also he can look, with humble con- 
fidence and hope, when, under a sense of moral 
weakness, he asks its powerful aid. 

II. An humble and dutiful submission to the ap- 
pointments of Providence, — as part of a great system 
which is regulated by infinite wisdom. The man 
w T ho bears upon his mind this sublime impression 
has learned to contemplate the Almighty One as 
disposing of the events of the lower world, and 

Q 



182 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

assigning to each of his rational creatures the place 
which he occupies. That place, whatever it may 
be, he perceives has attached to it special duties and 
responsibilities, and calls for the cultivation of 
moral qualities peculiarly adapted to it. Is it one 
of comfort, wealth, or influence, — solemn obligations 
arise out of the means of usefulness which these 
command. Is it one of humble life, privation, or 
actual suffering, — each of these also has its peculiar 
duties, and each is to be contemplated as belonging 
to a great system of moral discipline, in which no 
part can be wanting in consistency with the harmony 
of the whole. Such a submission of the soul to the 
appointments of God does not preclude the use of 
all legitimate means for bettering our condition, — or 
for preventing or removing sources of distress. But 
when, under the proper use of such means, these are 
not removed, it leads us habitually to that higher 
power, to whose will all such attempts must be sub- 
servient ; and while it elevates our thoughts above 
present events and second causes, it reminds us of 
that great scheme of discipline through which we 
are passing, and the purposes which these events 
are calculated to promote in our own moral improve- 
ment. Viewed under such feelings, the ills of life 
lose that aspect in which we are too apt to contem- 
plate them ; and will be considered with new and 
peculiar interest, as essential to that system, the 
great object of which is to prepare and purify us for 
a higher state of being. 

III. A sense of moral imperfection and guilt,— 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 183 

and that humility and devout self-abasement which 
arise out of it. This must be a prominent feeling 
in every one who views his own conduct, and his 
mental emotions in reference to the purity of God. 
It naturally leads to supplication for his mercy and 
forgiveness ; and, in the wondrous display of his 
character, given in the sacred writings, a provision 
is disclosed, in virtue of which the exercise of mercy 
is made consistent with the truth and justice of a 
moral governor. This dispensation of peace we 
find habitually represented as adapted to man in a 
state of spiritual destitution ; and no mental condi- 
tion is more frequently referred to, as acceptable 
with the Deity, than that which consists of contrition 
and lowliness of mind. " Thus sayeth the high and 
jfofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is 
Holy ; I dwell in the high and holy place, with him 
also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, — to revive 
the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of 
the contrite ones." With this state of mind is very 
naturally associated a sense of moral weakness, — 
and a constant reliance on divine aid, both for di- 
rection through life, and for the culture of the moral 
being. 

IV. It is only necessary to add, — a profound 
sense of gratitude and love towards the Deity as the 
Giver of all good, as our daily Preserver and Bene- 
factor. These feelings will have a special refer- 
ence to the display which he has given of his char- 
acter as merciful, gracious, and slow to anger ; and 
to the provision which he has made for the recovery 



184 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

and restoration of his fallen creatures, through " God 
manifest in the flesh." Of this divine Person, and 
the work which he came to accomplish, philosophy 
presumes not to speculate ; but we have seen the 
light afforded by the inductions of moral science 
respecting the probability of this revelation, and its 
adaptation to the actual state of man in his relation 
to the Deity. We have seen the impression con- 
veyed by the character of the Messiah, considered 
merely as matter of historical truth, — exhibiting such 
a pattern as never appeared in our world, except in 
him, of a pure and perfect moral being. We have 
seen, further, the incontrovertible nature of that evi- 
dence, transmitted by testimony, and confirmed, as 
it is, in a very peculiar manner, by periodical observ- 
ances, on which the whole revelation is supported ; 
and the inductions of sound philosophy harmonize 
with the impressions of the man, who, feeling his 
own moral necessities, yields his cordial assent to 
this mystery of God, and seeks in its provisions his 
peace in the life that now is, and his hope for the life 
that is to come. 

From the whole mental condition, thus slightly 
delineated, there will naturally arise a character and 
conduct adapted to the feelings and principles which 
rule within. This implies, as we have seen, a due 
regulation of the desires, and an habitual direction of 
them to objects of real and adequate importance, — 
a diligent cultivation and exercise of all the affections, 
— and a conduct distinguished, in the highest degree, 
by purity, integrity, veracity, and active benevolence 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 185 

It implies a profound submission to the will of the 
Almighty, which puts to silence every murmuring or 
repining thought under any dispensation of his provi 
dence. It comprehends the habitual suppression of 
every selfish principle, and the constant aspiration 
after a state of moral feeling, which proposes to 
itself no lower standard than that which will bear the 
inspection of a being of infinite purity. This charac- 
ter seems to correspond with that high tone of morals 
enjoined in the sacred writings. Its elements are 
defined and clear : would we seek to estimate its 
sublimity and its truth, we have only to compare it 
with those distorted and temporizing systems which 
have resulted from the inventions of men. A feeling 
of dissatisfaction, the same in kind, though it may 
differ in degree, will attach to them all ; and there is 
none in which we can confidently rest, until we rise 
o the sublime morality of the gospel. That great 
system of ethical purity comes to us under the sanc- 
tion of divine revelation, and established by the mi- 
raculous evidence by which the proof of this is con- 
veyed ; but it is independent of any other support 
than that which it carries in itself, — consistency 
with the character of God, — and harmony with the 
best feelings of man. In yielding an absolute con- 
sent to its supreme authority, we require no external 
evidence. We have only to look at the record in its 
own majestic simplicity, tried by the highest inductions 
of the philosophy of the moral powers, to enable us 
to point to the morality of the gospel, and say, with 
unshrinking confidence, — this is truth. 

If we would seek for that, which must be of all 
Q2 



186 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

conceivable things of the highest moment both for the 
peace and the improvement of the moral being, it is 
to be found in the habit of mind, in which there is 
the uniform contemplation of the divine character, 
with a constant reliance on the guidance of the Al- 
mighty in every action of life. " One thing," says 
an inspired writer, " have I desired of the Lord, that 
will I seek after ; that I may dwell in the house of 
the Lord t all the days of my life, to behold the beauty 
of the Lord, and to inquire in his temple." The 
man who thus cultivates the habitual impression of 
the divine presence lives in an atmosphere peculiarly 
his own. The storms which agitate the lower world 
may blow around or beneath, but they touch not 
him ; as the traveller has seen from the mountain's 
top the war of elements below, while he stood in un- 
clouded sunshine. In the works, and ways, and 
perfections of the Eternal One he finds a subject of 
exalted contemplation, in comparison with which the 
highest inquiries of human science sink into insignifi- 
cance. It is an exercise, also, which tends at once 
to elevate and to purify the mind. It raises us from 
the minor concerns and transient interests which are 
so apt to occupy us, to that wondrous field in which 
" worlds and worlds compose one universe," — and 
to that mind which bade them move in their appointed 
orbits, and maintains them all in undeviating har- 
mony. While it thus teaches us to bend in humble 
adoration before a wisdom which we cannot fathom, 
and a power which w 7 e cannot comprehend, it directs 
our attention to a display of moral attributes which 
at once challenge our reverence and demand our 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 187 

imitation. By thus leading us to compare ourselves 
with the supreme excellence, it tends to produce 
profound humility, and, at the same time, that habitual 
aspiration after moral improvement which constitutes 
the highest state of man. " The proud," says an 
eloquent writer, " look down upon the earth, and see 
nothing that creeps upon its surface more noble than 
themselves; the humble look upwards to their God." 
This disposition of mind, so far from being opposed 
to the acquirements of philosophy, sits with peculiar 
grace upon the man who, through the most zealous 
cultivation of human science, ascends to the eternal 
Cause. The farther he advances in the winders of 
nature, the higher he rises in his adoration of the 
pow r er and the wisdom which guide the whole ; — 
"Where others see a sun, he sees a Deity." And 
then, in every step of life, whether of danger, distress, 
or difficulty, the man who cultivates this intercourse 
with the incomprehensible One " inquires in his tem- 
ple." He inquires for the guidance of divine wisdom, 
and the strength of divine aid, in his progress through 
the state of moral discipline ; he inquires, in a pe- 
culiar manner, for this aid in the culture of his moral 
being, when he views this mighty undertaking in its 
important reference to the life which is to come ; 
he inquires for a discernment of the ways of Divine 
Providence, as he either feels it in his own concerns, 
or views it in the chain of events which are going on 
in the world around him. He learns to trace the 
whole to the same unerring hand which guides the 
planet in its course ; and thus rests in the absolute 
conviction that the economy of Providence is one 



188 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

great and magnificent system of design, and order, 
and harmony. These, we repeat with confidence, 
are no visions of the imagination, but the sound in- 
ductions of a calm and rational philosophy. They 
are conclusions which compel the assent of every 
candid inquirer, when he follows out that investiga 
tion of mighty import, — what is God, — and what is 
that essence in man which he has endowed with the 
power of rising to himself. 

To enlarge upon these important subjects would 
lead us away from the proper design of a work which 
is intended chiefly to investigate the light we derive 
from the phenomena of the mind itself. The points 
which have been stated, as arising out of the impres- 
sions of every sound understanding, challenge the 
assent of all who believe in a present and presiding 
Deity, — a being of infinite power and wisdom, and 
of perfect purity. With him who calls in question 
this sublime truth we have no common feeling, and 
no mutual premises on which an argument can be 
founded. We must therefore leave him to sit in soli- 
tary pride, while he views the chaos which his fancy 
has framed, — and strives to reconcile the discordant 
elements of a system in which there are effects with- 
out a cause, and harmony without a regulating power ; 
and in which the mind can perceive no element of 
credibility, consistency, or truth. 

With this slight outline, therefore, we must quit a 
subject of the deepest interest, but which belongs ra- 
ther to the theologian than to the inquirer in mental 
science ; and proceed briefly to investigate the means 
by which the condition of the moral feelings, which 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 189 

has been the subject of the preceding observations, 
may be promoted and cultivated as the regulating 
principle of the whole character. Two views 
may be taken of this point, which, though they 
harmonize with each other in practice, are to be con- 
sidered, in their philosophical aspect, as distinct. 

The restoration of man from a state of estrange- 
ment, anarchy, or moral death we are taught in the 
sacred writings to refer to a power from without the 
mind, — an influence directly from God. We have 
seen the various considerations derived from the 
phenomena of the mind, and our impressions of the 
divine character, giving to this great doctrine a prob- 
ability which claims the assent of every correct un- 
derstanding. But, without in any degree losing sight 
of the truth and the importance of this principle, the 
immediate object of our attention, as a branch of men- 
tal science, is rather the process of the mind itself, 
by means of which an habitual influence is produced 
upon the whole character. . This is a compound 
operation, which may probably be analyzed in the 
following manner. It seems to be composed of 
reason, attention, and a modification of concep- 
tion. The province of Reason is to examine the 
truth of the statements or doctrines which are proposed 
to the mind as calculated to act upon its moral feel- 
ings ; and upon this being done in a correct manner 
must depend the validity of the subsequent parts of 
the mental process. This being premised, it is the 
office of Attention, aided by reason, to direct the 
mind assiduously to the truths, so as fully to perceive 
their relations and tendencies. By the farther pro 



190 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

cess, analogous to Conception, they are then placed 
before us in such a manner as to give them the effect 
of real and present existence. By these means, 
truths relating to things for which we have not the 
evidence of our senses, or referring to events which 
are future, but fully expected to happen, are kept 
before the mind, and influence the moral feelings and 
the character in the same manner as if the facts be- 
lieved were actually seen, or the events expected were 
taking place in our view. This mental operation is 
Faith ; and for the sound exercise of it the con- 
stituent elements now mentioned are essentially ne- 
cessary. The truth must be received by the judg- 
ment upon adequate evidence ; and, by the other 
parts of the process, it must be so kept before the 
mind, that it may exercise such a moral influence 
as might arise from the actual vision, or present 
existence, of the things believed. 

Attention to these considerations will probably 
enable us to discover some of the fallacies which 
have obscured and bewildered this important subject. 
When the impression which is thus allowed to influ- 
ence the mind is one which has not been received by 
the judgment, upon due examination, and adequate 
evidence of its truth, — this is enthusiasm, — not faith. 
Our present course of inquiry does not lead us to 
treat of the notions which have, in various individuals, 
been thus allowed to usurp the place of truth. To 
those who would preserve themselves from the in- 
fluence of such, the first great inquiry, respecting 
their own mental impressions, ought to be, — are 
they facts ? — and on what evidence do they rest which 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 191 

can satisfy a sound understanding that they are so ? 
On the other hand is to be avoided an error, not less 
dangerous than the wildest fancies of the enthusiast, 
and not less unworthy of a regulated mind. This 
consists in treating real and important truths as if they 
were visions of the imagination, and thus dismissing 
them, without examination, from the influence which 
they ought to produce upon the moral feelings. 1* 
is singular also to remark how these two modifica- 
tions of character may be traced to a condition of the 
reasoning powers essentially the same. The former 
receives a fiction of the imagination, and rests upon 
it as truth. The latter, acting upon some prejudice 
or mental impression which has probably no better 
foundation, puts away real and important truths with- 
out any examination of the evidence on which they 
are founded. The misapplication of the reasoning 
powers is the same in both. It consists in proceed- 
ing upon a mere impression, without exercising the 
judgment on the question of its evidence, or on 
the facts and considerations which are opposed to it. 
Two characters of a very opposite description thus 
meet in that mental condition, which draws them 
equally, though in different directions, astray from 
the truth. 

When a truth has fully received the sanction of 
the judgment, the second office of faith is, by atten- 
tion and conception, to keep it habitually before the 
mind, so that it may produce its proper influence 
upon the character. This is to live by faith ; and 
in this consists that operation of the great principle 
which effectually distinguishes it from all pretended 



192 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

feelings and impressions assuming its name. We 
speak, in common language, of a head-knowledge 
which does not affect the heart ; and of a man who 
is sound in his creed, while he shows little of its in- 
fluence upon his conduct. The mental condition of 
such a man presents a subject of intense interest. 
His alleged belief, it is probable, consists merely in 
words, or in arguing ingeniously on points to which 
he attaches no real value. These may have been 
impressed upon him by education ; they may con- 
stitute the creed of a party to which he has devoted 
himself; and he may argue in support of them with 
all the energy of party zeal. In the same manner, 
a man may contend warmly in favour of compassion 
whose conduct shows a cold and barren selfishness : 
but this is not benevolence ; and the other is not 
faith. Both are empty professions of a belief in 
certain truths, which have never fixed themselves in 
the mind so as to become regulating principles or 
moral causes in the mental constitution. We may 
indeed suppose another character, slightly removed 
from this, in which the truths have really received 
the approbation of the judgment, and yet fail to pro- 
duce their proper influence. This arises from dis- 
torted moral habits, and a vitiated state of the moral 
faculties, which have destroyed the healthy balance 
of the whole economy of the mind. The conse- 
quence is, that the man perceives and approves of 
truths, without feeling their tendencies, and without 
manifesting their power. 

Intimately connected with this subject, also, is a 
remarkable principle in our mental constitution, for- 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 193 

merly referred to, — namely, the relation between 
certain facts or truths, and certain moral emotions 
which naturally arise from them, according to the 
chain of sequences which has been established in 
the economy of the mind. A close connexion thus 
exists between our intellectual habits and our moral 
feelings, which leads to consequences of the utmost 
practical moment. Though we have little imme- 
diate voluntary power over our moral emotions, we 
have a power over the intellectual processes with 
which these are associated. We can direct the 
mind to truths, and we can cherish trains of thought, 
which are calculated to produce correct moral feel- 
ings ; and we can avoid or banish mental images or 
trains of thought which have an opposite tendency. 
This is the power over the succession of our 
thoughts, the due exercise of which forms so im- 
portant a feature of a well-regulated mind in regard 
to intellectual culture ; its influence upon us as 
moral beings is of still higher and more vital im- 
portance. 

The sound exercise of that mental condition 
which we call Faith consists, therefore, in the recep- 
tion of certain truths by the judgment, — the proper 
direction of the attention to their moral tendencies, 
— and the habitual influence of them upon the feel- 
ings and the conduct. When the sacred writers tell 
us that, without faith it is impossible to please God, 
— and when they speak of a man being saved by 
faith, — it is not to a mere admission of certain truths 
as a part of his creed that they ascribe consequences 
so important ; but to a state in which these truths 
P 



194 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

are uniformly followed out to certain results which* 
they are calculated to produce, according to the usual 
course of sequences in every sound mind. This 
principle is strikingly illustrated by one of these 
writers, by reference to a simple narrative. During 
the invasion of Canaan by the armies of Israel, two 
men were sent forward as spies to bring a report 
concerning the city of Jericho. The persons en- 
gaged in this mission were received in a friendly 
manner by a woman whose house was upon the 
wall of the city ; when their presence was dis- 
covered, she hid them from their pursuers ; and 
finally enabled them to escape by letting them down 
by a cord from a window. Before taking leave of 
them, she expressed her firm conviction that the 
army to which they belonged was soon to take pos- 
session of Jericho, and of the whole country ; and 
she made them swear to her, that, when this should 
take place, they would show mercy to her father's 
house. The engagement was faithfully fulfilled. 
When the city was taken, and the other inhabitants 
destroyed, the woman was preserved, with all her 
kindred. In this very simple occurrence, the woman 
is represented by the sacred Writer as having been 
saved by faith. The object of her faith was the 
event which she confidently expected, — that the city 
of Jericho was to be destroyed. The ground of 
her faith was the rapid manner in which the most 
powerful nations had already fallen before the armies 
of Israel, — led, as she believed, by a divine power. 
Acting upon this conviction, in the manner in which 
a belief so deeply affecting her personal safety was 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 195 

likely to influence any sound mind, she took means 
for her preservation by making friends of the spies. 
Her faith saved her, because without it she would 
not have made this provision ; but, unless she had 
followed out her belief to the measure which was 
calculated to effect this object, the mere belief of the 
event would have availed her nothing. When we 
therefore ascribe important results to faith, or to any 
other mental operation, we ascribe them, not to the 
operation itself, but to this followed out to the con- 
sequences which it naturally produces according to 
the constitution of the human mind. In the same 
manner, we may speak of one man in a certain state 
of danger or difficulty being saved by his wisdom, 
and another by his strength. In doing so, we ascribe 
such results, not to the mere possession of these 
qualities, but to the efforts which naturally arose 
from them in the circumstances in which the indi- 
vidual was placed. And when the inspired writer 
says, that without faith it is impossible to please 
God, he certainly refers to no mere mental im- 
pression, and to no barren system of opinions ; but 
to the reception of certain truths, which, in our pres- 
ent state of being, are entirely the objects of faith, 
and to all that influence upon the moral feelings and 
the character which these must produce upon every 
mind that really believes them. 

On this great subject much misconception appears 
to have arisen from not sufficiently attending to the 
condition in which, as moral beings, we are placed 



196 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

in the present state of existence, and the important 
part which must be performed by the mental exer- 
cise called faith. As physical and intellectual beings, 
we have certain relations to the objects by which we 
are surrounded, and with these we communicate by 
means of our bodily senses. But, as moral beings, 
our relations are entirely of a different nature ; and 
he facts and motives which are calculated to act 
upon us in these relations are chiefly the objects of 
faith ; that is, they are not cognizable by any of our 
senses, but are to be received by a different part of 
our constitution, and upon a separate kind of evi- 
dence. This, accordingly, is the simple but im- 
portant distinction referred to by the sacred writer, 
when, in allusion to our condition as moral beings, 
he says, — " we walk by faith, not by sight." The 
objects of sight, here intended to express all the 
objects of sense, exercise over us an habitual and 
powerful influence. They constantly obtrude them- 
selves upon our notice without any exertion of our 
own ; and it requires a peculiar exercise of mind to 
withdraw our attention from them, and to feel the 
power of events which are future, and of things 
which are not seen. This mental exercise is Faith. 
Its special province, as we have seen, is to receive 
truths which are presented directly to the mind, — to 
place them before us with all the vividness of actual 
and present existence, — and to make them exert 
upon us an agency analogous to that which is pro- 
duced by objects of sight. The next great point in 
our inquiry, therefore, is, what are the truths which 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 197 

are calculated thus to operate upon us as moral 
beings, and which it is the object of faith to bring 
habitually before us. 

When we withdraw our minds from the influence 
of sensible things, and send forth our attention to 
those truths which are the province of faith, the first 
great object which meets our view is the eternal 
incomprehensible One, the moral Governor of the 
universe, — a being of infinite perfections and infinite 
purity. From the stupendous works of nature, we 
trace his operation as the great First Cause, — and 
infer, with absolute certainty, his boundless power 
and wisdom, and his independent existence. The 
impress of his moral attributes he has fixed with in- 
delible certainty upon our moral perceptions, — 
where, in the light of conscience, co-operating with 
a simple process of reason, we perceive him to be a 
being of infinite holiness, and of unerring truth and 
justice. Our knowledge of these attributes is not 
the result of any process of reasoning which can 
admit of deliberation or doubt. They force them- 
selves upon our conviction by the most simple prin- 
ciples of induction, when, from our own mental and 
moral endowments, we infer the perfections of him 
who formed us. 

From every conception we can form of such a 
being, we have an equally insuperable conviction of 
his universal presence, — that he is the witness, not 
only of our conduct, but of the thoughts and imagina- 
tions of the heart ; and that from these, as indicating 
our real condition, and not from our conduct alone, 
R2 



198 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

our moral aspect is estimated by him, — the pure and 
holy One who see*h in secret. Each moment, as it 
passes rapidly over us, we know is bringing us nearer 
to that period when all our hopes and fears for this 
world shall lie with us in the grave. But we feel 
also that this is the entrance to another state of 
being,< — a state of moral retribution, where the eter- 
nal One is to be disclosed in all his attributes as a 
moral Governor. These considerations fix them- 
selves upon the mind,, with a feeling of yet new and 
more tremendous interest, when we further take into 
view that this future existence stretches out before 
us into endless duration. This is the truth so 
powerfully expressed by the sacred writer, in terms 
which by their brevity convey, in the most adequate 
manner, their overwhelming import, — " The things 
which are seen are temporal, but the things which 
are not seen are eternal." 

These truths are not the visions of enthusiasm ; 
neither are they the result of any process of reason- 
ing by which different men may arrive at different 
conclusions. They force themselves upon our con- 
viction with a power which we cannot put away 
from us, when we turn our attention to the solemn 
inquiry, what we are, and what is God. In the 
sacred writings they are detailed and illustrated, in a 
connected and harmonious manner ; and are im- 
pressed upon us with the force of a revelation from 
the Deity himself. But the principles there dis* 
closed meet with an impression in our moral consti- 
tution which pleads with authority for their truth. It 
is the province of faith to keep these habitually before 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 199 

the mind, and to cause them to influence the feelings 
and the conduct as if they were objects of sense, — 
as if the Deity in all the purity of his character were 
actually disclosed to our view, — or as if we were 
present at that dread hour which shall witness his 
righteous retribution. The man who thus feels their 
power, and exhibits their influence upon his charac- 
ter, is he who lives by faith. 

When, under this mental exercise, a man brings 
himself into the immediate presence of the Eternal 
One ; when he arraigns himself, as it were, before 
the bar of the omniscient Judge ; when he places 
before him that future state which stretches forth into 
endless existence, a train of feelings must arise in 
his mind, to which he was a stranger, so long as he 
placidly resigned himself to the influence of sensible 
things. He views this being of infinite purity as one 
who has been all his liffe the daily witness of his con- 
duct ; and feels that even the secrets of the heart 
have been at all times open to Divine inspection. 
Each day, as it passed unheeded over him, was a 
portion gone by of his period of moral discipline ; 
and each, as it glided amid the frivolities of life, or 
the active pursuit of temporal good, had its moral 
aspect assigned to it in the judgment of the Eternal 
mind. Along with these impressions, which no 
reflecting man can put away from him, a voice within 
forces upon him the conviction, that, were his whole 
history disclosed to his fellow-men, he would, even in 
their estimation, be found wanting. How much 
more deeply must this be fixed upon his inmost soul, 
when he feels that the whole is, at one glance, ex- 



200 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

posed to the eye of Omniscience ; and that an hour 
is rapidly approaching, when a strict account must 
be rendered, and a righteous sentence pronounced, 
the result of which will extend into eternal existence. 
With these truths upon his mind, what reflecting man 
can view without awe the moment which is to close 
his state of moral discipline, when, disencumbered 
from his earthly tenement, he shall find himself alone 
with God, and there shall burst upon his astonished 
faculties the blaze of an endless day. These are 
not the speculations of fancy, but eternal truth. 
The man who habitually acts under their influence 
knows that this faith rests upon a conviction which 
cannot be shaken, when he recognises in all his ways 
the presence and the inspection of the Deity, when 
he feels the obligation to have even the desires and 
affections under subjection to his will, and when he 
resigns himself to his guidance, and asks his power- 
ful aid, both for the conduct of this life, and the 
preparation for the life which is to come. 

Solemn is the hour when a man thus retires from 
the tumult of life, and seriously proposes to himself 
the question, what is his condition as a moral being ? 
what have been his leading pursuits in that life 
which is hastening to a close ? what is his aspect 
in the view of that incomprehensible One, who per- 
ceives at a single glance the whole details of his 
moral history. Is he safe to meet the full splendour 
of that eye? has he no apprehension, that, when 
called to account in the immediate presence of un- 
erring purity, he may not be able to answer. The 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 201 

nan lives not who can appeal to his own heart and 
say, after serious inquiry, that he can thus meet nV 
penetrating search of him, whose knowledge is per- 
fect as his purity is infinite : the man lives not, 
who can look back upon his whole life, without feel- 
ing that, in the sight of this unspotted One, he is 
polluted with guilt : and, if his heart condemn him, 
with all its partiality for his own views and feelings, 
and ail its forgetfulness of many points in his moral 
history, he must feel that God is greater than his 
heart, and knoweth all things. Under such an im- 
pression, to what refuge shall he betake himself I 
Does he appeal to an indefinite idea of the mercy 
of the Deity, — it must be evident that this conveys 
no distinct principle, and will not bear the confidence 
which is essential to hope and peace. For we can- 
not go to the extent of supposing a mercy so indis- 
criminate, that the Deity will depart from all the laws 
which he has made, and which he has impressed 
upon us as a part of our moral constitution. This 
would be ascribing to infinite wisdom an indecision 
and a change of purpose unworthy of the weakest 
human lawgiver. If, then, we do not boldly assume 
this position, how are we to draw the line where such 
mercy is to terminate ; and where the Almighty is 
to appear in his character of justice, as a righteous 
moral governor. If we find that each individual fixes 
a different standard, and that each extends it so as to 
favour his own condition, it is clear that the system 
presents no character of truth, and that it is incapa- 
ble of ministering to the consolation of him who 
feels his own necessities, and seriously contemplates 



202 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

the character of God. He must perceive that to 
apply such reasoning to human enactments would 
be to represent them as a mockery of justice ; and 
thai it is impossible thus to argue respecting the laws 
of him who is infinite in. holiness, and boundless in 
wisdom. He cannot but acknowledge that a uni- 
verse governed in such a manner would run into 
irremediable confusion and anarchy ; and will find 
it impossible, on any principle which human reason- 
ing can furnish, to arrive at any other decision than 
this, — that the Judge of all the earth must be 
unchanging in his purposes, and impartial in his 
justice. 

To this conclusion we are led by the clearest in- 
ductions of moral science ; but at this momentous 
point philosophy fails us. No human power can 
find a refuge to which the mind can betake itself 
under a sense of guilt ; no human wisdom can an- 
swer the inquiry of mighty import, can God be just, 
and yet justify the ungodly ? But here we are met 
by a light from heaven which has burst upon the 
scene of doubt and of darkness ; and are called to 
bring down the pride of our reason in humble sub- 
mission to the testimony of God. It comes supported 
by a weight of evidence which challenges the cor- 
dial assent of the most acute understanding, and the 
power of which will be best appreciated by those who, 
with sincere desire for truth, have made the highest 
attainments in the laws of rigid inquiry. It discloses 
an atonement made for sin, and an influence from 
heaven calculated to restore the moral being to the 
purky in which it was formed. It thus meets alike 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 203 

the necessities of man, as in a state of actual guilt* 
and a state of moral degradation. For the one, it 
displays a scheme of mercy in which the integrity of 
the Divine character is vindicated, while pardon is 
extended to transgressors. To the other it offers 
power from heaven, which will correct the disorders 
of the moral constitution, and raise the man anew to 
the likeness of God. It thus forms an harmonious 
whole, uniform and consistent in itself; worthy of 
the character of God, and adapted to the condition 
of man ; and to every one who feels his own moral 
necessities, and estimates the purity of the Deity, it 
brings an absolute conviction of its truth. 

A participation in the benefits of this revelation of 
divine mercy is said, in the sacred writings, to be 
received by Faith ; and this expression has given 
rise to controversies and contending systems, which 
tiave involved the subject in much perplexity. While 
some have restricted the operation of faith to the 
mere belief of a certain system of opinions, others 
have referred to it a series of mysterious impressions 
and enthusiastic feelings at variance with every dic- 
tate of sound reasoning. The principle of faith, 
however, holds so prominent a place in the scheme 
of Christian truth, that some clear notions respecting 
its nature must be felt to be of the highest interest. 
It holds also, as we have formerly seen, a most im- 
portant position in the philosophy of the moral feel- 
ings, — being that mental operation by which we 
receive a certain class of truths of the utmost con- 
sequence to us as responsible beings. It is a process 
which every one feels, but which cannot be defined ; 



204 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

and it can be illustrated only by tracing its influence 
in regard to those objects to which it is more par- 
ticularly directed. 

The objects of faith are twofold, — truths ad- 
dressed to our understanding, and benefits offered 
or promised. We have formerly had occasion to 
trace the action of faith in regard to truth, — espe- 
cially a class of truths which are calculated, when 
really believed, to exert a powerful effect upon our 
moral feelings and conduct. Its operation, we have 
seen, is to bring these truths before us in such a 
manner, that they exert the same kind of influence 
as if the facts or events were .objects of sense. The 
man who believes these truths, so as thus habitually to 
feel their power, is he who receives them in faith. 
This is the province of faith in regard to truth ; we 
have next to analyze its operation in regard to offered 
or promised benefits, — and this we can best do by 
means of an example. 

Let us take the illustration of a man affected with 
a disease supposed to be mortal : he is told that a 
remedy has been discovered of infallible efficacy ; 
and that a person is at hand who is ready to admin- 
ister it. Does he perceive his danger ; does he 
believe the virtue of the remedy ; does he confide 
in the sincerity of the individual who offers it : this 
is faith. The immediate and natural result of his 
faith is, that he asks for the remedy which is offered ; 
and this result is inseparable from such belief, ac- 
cording to the uniform sequence of volitions in every 
sound mind. The man who professes to admit the 
facts, and does not show such a result of belief, pro- 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 205 

fesses what he does not actually feel. If he per- 
ceives not the extent of his danger, he asks not the 
remedy, because he values it not ; and the same 
effect may follow if he doubts either its efficacy or 
the sincerity of him who offers it. In this case, it is 
also to be observed, that a reflection is thrown upon 
the character of this individual, by imputing to him 
an offer of what he has either not the power or the 
intention to perform. But if the man really believes 
the truths, he applies for the remedy ; and he re- 
ceives it. Thus his faith saves him ; because by 
means of it he sought the offered aid. Could we 
suppose him merely to admit the facts, without ask- 
ing the remedy, his belief would avail him nothing. 

Such appears to be the simple view we are to 
take of Faith, when we apply it to the great benefits 
which are presented to us in the Christian revelation. 
This is addressed to us as beings in a state both of 
guilt and of depravity ; and as having no means of 
our own by which we can rescue ourselves from 
condemnation and impurity. It unfolds a dispensa- 
tion of peace, by which, in perfect consistency with 
the harmony of his character, the Deity offers mercy 
and forgiveness, — and an influence from himself 
which has power to purify the moral being. These 
benefits are conferred on every one who believes ; 
the man who is convinced of his guilt and perceives 
his impurity ; who feels his inability to rescue him- 
self; who admits the efficacy of the remedy, and 
confides in the sincerity with which it is offered ; this 
is he who believes. His faith saves him ; because, 
acting on his conviction, according to the uniform 
S 



206 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN 

sequence of volitions in every sound mind, — he asks 
the promised aid, — and asking, receives it. Much 
of the confusion in which the subject has been in- 
volved appears to have arisen from metaphysical 
refinements in which the various parts of this mental 
process are separated from each other. They form 
one harmonious whole, which cannot be broken. 
The man will not seek the remedy who believes not 
its efficacy, and perceives not his moral necessities ; 
but, however he may profess to admit these facts, if he 
follows not out his belief to its natural result in ap- 
plying for the remedy, his mere belief will not profit 
him. The grounds on which these truths are 
addressed to us are contained in that chain of evi- 
dence on which is founded the whole system of 
Christianity, — taken along with the conviction which 
every man receives of his actual moral condition, 
from the voice of conscience within. The sincerity 
of the offer we derive from our impression of the 
unchangeable attributes of the Deity. Accordingly, 
he who believes is said to give glory to God, — that 
is, to receive his statements with absolute confidence, 
and to form an honourable conception of the sin- 
cerity of his intentions. He who believes not re- 
jects the statements of the Almighty as false, — and 
treats him with the contempt which we apply to one 
whom we suppose to promise what he has no inten- 
tion to bestow. The man who comes to God with 
the hope of acceptance is therefore required to come 
in the assurance of faith, — or an implicit conviction 
that he is sincere in his intentions of bestowing the 
blessings which he offers ; and whosoever hath not 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 207 

this assurance does dishonour to the divine charac- 
ter, — or " maketh God a liar." 

It were vain to enter upon the various systems 
and opinions in which this important doctrine has 
been misrepresented by its enemies, and often per- 
verted by those who profess to be its friends. Two 
of these may be briefly noticed. Some have main- 
tained that the doctrine of an unconditional pardon 
sets aside the obligations of morality, because it has 
no regard to the personal character of the individual, 
or holds out the offer of acceptance to faith without 
obedience. Others contend that an essential part 
of faith is an immediate and absolute assurance of a 
man's own acceptance in the sight of the Deity ; and 
that he who has not this is in a state of unbelief. 
These two opinions, so different from each other, 
are equally founded upon misconception of the 
nature and provisions of the Christian economy. 

In regard to the former, it is only necessary to 
remark, that the revelation of Christian truth is not 
confined to an offer of pardon to the guilty ; its great 
object is the recovery and purification of the moral 
being ; and there is an essential and inviolable union 
between these two parts of the great scheme of re- 
demption. It provides in the most effectual manner 
for the interests of morality, by the purification of 
the desires and affections, the springs of action ; it 
is the morality of the heart. It proclaims a system 
of morals more pure and more exalted far than ever 
was contemplated by the wisest of men : it exhibits 
an example of the perfect state of a moral being, in 
the character of the Messiah ; and enforces the imi- 



208 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAI* 

tation of this example as indispensable in every one 
who professes to be his disciple. These different 
parts of the scheme can never be separated, and 
there cannot be a greater perversion of reasoning, or 
a greater misconception of the prominent features of 
the gospel of peace, than to allege that it does not 
provide, in the most effectual manner, for the highest 
interests of morality. 

The other opinion is equally founded upon error, 
namely, that which considers it essential to faith that 
a man be assured of his personal acceptance in the 
sight of the Deity. It is obvious that this is a 
sophism clearly opposed to sound reasoning, and to 
the first principles of the philosophy of the moral 
feelings. For faith, viewed as a mental process, 
must always have for its object facts ; and these 
facts must rest upon such evidence as is sufficient 
to convince the understanding of their truth. To 
talk of faith, without such facts and such evidence, 
is a mere logical fallacy, or an absurdity in terms. 
But there is no disclosure of the personal accept- 
ance of any individual, and, consequently, on no 
principle of sound reasoning can this ever be con- 
sidered as the object of faith. This doctrine, there* 
fore, is applying a most important principle of the 
mind, not to facts, which alone can warrant the ex- 
ercise of faith, but to a vision of the imagination, 
which admits of no evidence, and cannot be sub- 
jected to any test of its truth. 

Widely different from all such flimsy and imagin- 
ary hypotheses is the great system of Christian 
truth, — harmonious and consistent in itself, — and 



TOWARDS THE DEITY. 209 

challenging the approbation of the soundest under- 
standing. It reveals, as we have seen, a dispensa- 
tion of mercy, in accordance with the highest ideas 
we can form of the Divine perfections. It is sup- 
ported by a chain of evidence which carries convic- 
tion to the mind of the most rigid inquirer - r and thus 
it is a sound and legitimate object of faith. It 
reveals also a provision for purifying the moral 
nature ; and this in every case accompanies the dis- 
pensation of mercy to those who receive it. The 
effects of this powerful agency, therefore, become 
the test and the evidence of the reality of faith. 
Does a man seek a proof of his acceptance, — the 
reference is to facts in his own moral condition. He 
is to look for it in a change which is taking place in 
his character, — a new direction of his desires, — a 
new regulation of his affections, — an habitual impres- 
sion, to which he was a stranger before, of the pres- 
ence and the perfections of the Deity, — and a new 
light which has burst upon his view, respecting his 
relations to this life and to that which is to come. 
He is to seek this evidence in a mird which aims 
at no lower standard than that which will bear the 
constant inspection of infinite purity ; he is to seek 
it, and to manifest it to others, in a spirit which takes 
no lower pattern than that model of perfection, — the 
character of the Messiah. These acquirements, 
indeed, are looked upon, not as a ground of accept- 
ance, but a test of moral condition ; not as, in any 
degree, usurping the place of the great principle of 
faith, but as its fruits and evidences. As these, then, 
are th? only proofs of the reality of this principle, so 
S2 



210 THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN, ETC. 

they are the only basis on which a man can rest any 
sound conviction of his moral aspect in the sight of 
the Deity ; and that system is founded on delusion 
and falsehood which, in this respect, holds out any 
other ground of confidence than the purification of 
the heart, — and a corresponding harmony of the 
whole character. Such attainment, indeed, is not 
made at once, nor is it ever made in a full and per- 
fect manner in the present state of being ; but, where 
the great principle has been fixed within, there is a 
persevering effort, and a uniform contest, and a con- 
tinual aspiration after conformity to the great mode 
of perfection. Each step that a man gains in this 
progress serves to extend his view of the high pat- 
tern to which his eye is steadily directed ; and, as 
his knowledge of it is thus enlarged, he is led by 
comparison to feel more and more deeply his own 
deficiency. It thus produces increasing humility, 
and an increasing sense of his own imperfection, 
and causes him continually to feel that, in this war- 
fare, he requires a power which is not in man. But 
he knows also that this is provided as an essential 
part of the great system on which his hope is estab- 
lished. Amid much weakness, therefore, and many 
infirmities, his moral improvement goes forward. 
Faint and feeble at first as the earliest dawn of the 
morning, it becomes brighter and steadier as it pro- 
ceeds in it's course, and, " as the shining light, 
shineth more and more unto the perfect dav." 

THE END. 



QUESTIONS 

FOR THE 

EXAMINATION OF STUDENTS. 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, 

SECTION I. 
Page 15. " 

In what twofold light is man to be contemplated ? — What is 
the office of the intellectual powers ? — With what kind of truths 
are they more especially conversant? 

What relations does he sustain viewed as a moral being? — In 
what respect are these two parts of his mental constitution per- 
ceived to be distinct from each other ? — What is the case in a 
well-regulated mind ? — What ought to be made to contribute to 
man's purity as a moral being ? 

Of what fact does a slight observation convince us? — What 
are some of the circumstances which bear a part in producing 
this derangement ? — What is the effect of the bustle of life ? — 
With what things are we most deeply concerned as moral 
beings ? — From what source do we in this case receive benefit ? 
— What takes place under such influence? — In what do we see 
the first of these exemplified ? 

To what anticipation does this subject lead us ? — What con- 
jecture is rendered highly probable by certain facts in our mental 
phenomena ? — How should we contemplate impressions so re- 
called, and why? 

Compared with this part of man's nature, what other things 
are thrown into the background? — Why? — What science there- 
fore is to be considered as the highest of all human pursuits? — 
What do we feel besides its importance ? — What sources of 
knowledge have we in this great inquiry to which nothing ana- 
ogous is" found in the history of physical science ? — How will 



212 QUESTIONS, 

some probably view and appeal to the second of these?— What 
is the author's reply to this, and on what founded ? — To what is 
the disregard of Scripture light in these investigations corn- 
pared ? — How is the comparison carried out ? 

What are we enabled to attain from these combined sources 
of knowledge ? — When in an especial manner do we do so ? — 
What tendency has the science when cultivated on these prin- 
ciples ? 

SECTION II. 
Page 22. 

To how many classes is the knowledge received through ou* 
intellectual powers referable ? — How may they be distinguished ? 
— How is the former procured ? — What operations do they con 
stitute ? — What does the full exercise of them require ? — How 
does it appear that such culture is not essential to every indi 
tidual ? 

What is said of the knowledge derived from the other source ? 
— Under what name are these principles treated of in a former 
work ?— How do they differ from our knowledge of the other 
kind ? — What are their main positive characteristics < 7 

What inference should we naturally draw from the intellectual 
endowments bestowed upon man? — What do we accordingly 
find ? — To what part of our constitution are they referable? — 
What place do the convictions arising from this source seem to 
occupy? — In what other respects do they resemble them? — 
From what cause will it probably appear that these truths have 
been inconclusive? — By what fact is the force of this analogy in 
no degree weakened ? — Why? — What different results in differ 
ent men are accounted for on this ground ? — To what is our 
appeal chiefly made incases of this kind? — What two elements 
of character must go together in every sound inquiry in moral 
science ? 

What is one of the objects of divine revelation ? — What u 
introduced by means of it ? — What is it of importance tc 
remark ? 

In classifying the first principles of moral truth, what stands 
first in order? — What second? — From what does this belief 
arise?— Upon what is our sense of his moral attributes fixed? 
— What is said of the prevalence of this belief in the existence 
of a supreme and ruling intelligence? — What attributes are 
common to the God of the Scriptures and the god of the an- 
cient philosophy ? — W T hat was the character of the conceptions 
of the ancient sages on this subject? — What was the remark of 
an African chief to one of the missionaries I 



QUESTIONS. 213 

What is the third of these principles ?— What reciprocal 
feeling exists in this case, and what precept is founded 
upon it ? 

What the fourth? — In reference to what are they stated here ? 
— To what do we appeal for their truth? — Why do we not go 
abroad among savage nations to inquire whether the impression 
of them be universal ? — To whom do we confidently appeal ? 

What is stated as a point of the utmost practical importance ? 
— If we do not suppose them to originate in this way, to what 
alternative are we reduced ? — Why can we not believe that they 
are derived entirely from revelation ? — What is said of the other 
supposition? — What is said of the a priori argument for the ex- 
istence and attributes of the Deity ? — To what, other arguments 
may the same observation be applied ? — Upon what considera 
tions are these chiefly founded? — What may be conceded in 
reference to these arguments? — What, notwithstanding, must 
be said of them ? — What minds only are adapted to feel their 
force? — What, on the other hand, is the character of the truths 
they are intended to establish ? — What therefore should we ex- 
pect as to the evidence upon which they rest ? — What is said of 
the powerful reasonings of Butler ? — What then ? — What is 
said of the origin of remorse ? — For what does conscience 
plead ? — What is said of its authority ? 

To what else do similar observations apply? — How may this 
question be disposed of? — What is recognised by the common 
consent of mankind, and with how absolute a conviction ? — How 
does the hardened criminal show that he recognises such princi- 
ples as a part of the moral constitution ?— How illustrated ? — 
How does the criminal show the same recognition in defending 
himself ?— What would be the consequence were such principles 
not to be universally recognised? — In what respect are human 
laws deficient ? — To what may this controlling internal principle 
be likened ? 

What conviction accompanies the consciousness of these 
principles ? — What impression arises from this ? — To what does 
this again give rise ? — What effect has this uniformity of moral 
feeling and affection? — How illustrated? — What is the remark 
of Butler? 

Upon the whole therefore, what is there ground for as 
suming ? 



214 QUESTIONS, 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS. 
Page 35. 

What first claims our attention in analyzing the distinguishing 
principles of man as amoral being? — By what, besides actions, 
are we guided in forming our judgment, and why ? — What i3 
the first-named element which enters into the economy of an 
intelligent and responsible agent? 

What is the determining principle of the conduct ? — Under 
what conditions does the connected act follow? 

To how many classes are the objects of will referable ? — With 
what two distinct mental conditions are these connected? — In 
what consists the act which is the result of volition? — What 
other principle is to be kept in view in connexion with the de- 
sires and affections ? — What is the character of this principle ? 

What fact is next to be attended to? — How does it appear 
that every affection does not lead to the conduct which might 
flow from it? — What do we find on another step backwards? 

To how many heads may the principles here adverted to be 
referred ? — From what may the determination or decision arise? 
— From what does this usually result ? — How exemplified ? — 
How does this apply to the emotions of anger and benevolence ? 

From what other source may the determination arise ? — What 
is this principle called, and what office does it perform in every 
morally healthy mind ? — To what does it excite, and how is its 
general influence exerted ? 

To what is one of the chief diversities of human character 
owing? — What knowledge do we acquire froi i this source, and 
how are we able to turn it to account ? — How exemplified ? 

What other and higher class of emotions remains t& be speci- 
fied ?— Where does the author propose tu consider this subject ? 
— State the general division of trie nnncipies which constitute 
our moral feelings. 

What may these be called ? — What other class of feelings is 
there connected with them ? 

When do we feel desire? — When hope? — When confidence ? 
— When faith? — When do we give way to despair? — When 
experience pleasure, or joy and grief? — When are we subject to 
fear, and when to its reverse ? — Explain the manner in which 
similar emotions attend on the affections. 



QUESTIONS. 215 



PART I. 



OF THE DESIRES, THE AFFECTIONS, AND SELF-LOVB. 
SECTION I. 

Page 43 

How is desire defined ?— W hat do its objects embrace ? — How- 
is the object pursued in each particular cuse determined? — How 
consequently are different objects regarded by different indi- 
viduals ? 

How are we to be guided in forming a classification of the 
desires ? —In referring them to appropriate heads, what is the first 
named ? 

What is necessary in respect to the animal appetites ? — What 
is the consequence of allowing them to break through restraint, 
and become leading principles of action ? — To whom do these 
remarks in a special manner apply ? 

What is next enumerated ? — How is it justly to be regarded ? 
— In what does it properly originate ? — What effect has the in 
fluence of habit ? — What does it often become ?— W r hat is said 
of its engrossing effect, and by what in this case is it usually 
accompanied ? — To what does it lead when it breaks through 
the restraint of law and justice ?— To what, therefore, is it 
always liable to be opposed ? 

What stands next in order? — What is this?— How is its 
strength evinced?— In what class of men especially do we 
behold its influence? — What higher form does it sometimes 
assume ? 

What is mentioned in the fourth place ?— How does this differ 
from the former ? — WTiat is its tendency ? — In what classes of 
men is it seen 1 — What more commendable form does it some- 
times assume? 

What is mentioned in the fifth place ? — How has this been 
considered by most writers ? — How has it been known to mani- 
fest itself? — The reason of this? — In what else is it found? — 
For what is it necessary ? —What does it become when 
abused ? 

What is the sixth principle named? — Under what circum- 
stances may it be considered a highly laudable principle ? — To 
what does the healthy exercise of it prompt a man, and what 
the reverse ? — How is the character of this desire to be deter- 
mined ? — How extensive is its operation ? — What is thought of 



216 QUESTIONS. 

a man totally regardless of character ? — May there bs circum- 
stances, however, in which this indifference may be laudable ? 
— What effect has the desire of the approbation of the virtuous 
and the vicious respectively upon the conduct ? — What other 
modification is there of this principle, and what is said of its 
operation? — How is pride distinguished from this? 

Of what is our regard to the opinion the origin, and what is 
said of its influence on society and manners ? — Of what else is 
it the source? — What is the foundation of this? — Upon what 
does much of a man's respectability in life depend ? — In what 
class of persons is this love of esteem of extensive influence ? — 
To what expedients does it prompt some men? 

To what is assigned the «p^enth place in this enumeration? — 
Upon what does the tendency of this principle depend? — To 
what may it be applied ? — Why is it necessary that it should be 
under the control of a well-regulated judgment ? —In whom ought 
it to be especially cultivated, and why? 

What stands the eighth in order? — What is the tendency and 
the peculiar characteristic of this principle ? — In what respects 
has it an advantage over others before mentioned ? — What effect 
has it upon its possessor? — In what does this mental condition 
consist ? — To what does it accordingly lead ? 

What do the emotions now mentioned include ? — What other 
principle ought to be mentioned, and how is it characterized ? — 
What facts may be accounted for on this principle ? — To what 
class of men does the greatest degree of real enjoyment belong ? 

What lies in a great measure at the foundation of character? 
— What is requisite for a sound moral condition? — What will 
be the consequence of their being thus controlled, and what of 
their being left without restraint? — When have we evidence of 
this ? — From what particular desires have some of the greatest 
evils arisen ? — What is the effect upon the mental character of 
givinjg loose to sensual or selfish propensities ? 

With what may an ill-regulated state of the desires at the 
same time consist? — Can this be considered as the healthy con- 
dition of a moral being, and why ? — What precepts of the sacred 
writings bear upon this point ? — What is subservient to the at- 
tainment of perfect moral purity ? — In order to this attainment, 
what is it necessary that man should feel ? 

SECTION II. 
Page 56. 

How does the operation of the affections differ from that of 
the desires ? — In what light are they to be viewed, and how is 
their operation to be considered ? — How exemplified ? — What is 
£&id of this distinction ? 



QUESTIONS. 217 

How therefore may an affection be considered ? — How have 
the affections been divided, and why is this division to be objected 
to ? — To what only does this latter class tend ? — What appella- 
tions therefore are to be preferred, and what do they respectively 
include ? 

I. JUSTICE. 

How does the propriety of including justice among the affec 
tions appear ? — Strictly speaking, what might it be considered ? 
— What is the important consideration relating to it? — What do 
the requirements of justice embrace? — How have these rights 
usually been divided ? — Of what do these principles form the 
basis ? — What is said of this code of relative duty ? — How are 
these great principles of justice combined in the actual arrange- 
ments of civil communities ? — What is said of their operations 
under different circumstances? 

How is the word justice used in these observations ? — In what 
other sense is the term employed? — In which sense does it 
form a branch of the philosophy of the moral feelings ? 

In what, therefore, does the sense of justice consist? — To 
what heads does this seem referable? — What has a man as a 
guide for his conduct in particular instances ? 

Under the first head — to what is justice due? — In this case 
what does it constitute ? — What does it imply ? — What, in this 
last respect, does it allow us ? — Where is the great rule for our 
guidance in such cases found, and what is the test of our con- 
duct in individual instances ? 

What, secondly, does justice require of us ? — What does this 
constitute? — What takes place in civil communities? — What 
else may the principles of justice recognise? — To what, how- 
ever, are these principles directly opposed? 

What, thirdly, does justice enjoin ? — In what does this con- 
sist ? — To what else does it extend? — How does it require us to 
conduct towards rivals ? — To what modification is the former of 
these rules liable ? — How far will the rules of justice prompt a 
man to go in such cases, and of what will he at all times 
beware ? 

What is the fourth dictate of justice? — In what does this con- 
sist? — What does justice require when an action is capable of 
being referred to different motives ? — When is the exercise of 
such justice peculiarly requisite? — Why? — Viewing conduct in 
this manner, what may we often perceive ? 

When, fifthly, is justice especially to be exercised? — What 
does this constitute ? — In what does it consist? — To what is it 
opposed ? — Of what therefore is candour compounded, and to 
what does it lead ?— What is its operation?— What has been re- 
marked in reference to it ? 

T 



218 QUESTIONS. 

To what, sixthly, is justice due ? — To what does this apply T 
— Tn what way, besides in their interest and reputation, may 
persons be injured ? — What minds are peculiarly susceptible to 
this kind of injury, and how will a person of correct feelings 
accordingly demean himself? — Of what are persons of honest 
and upright minds sometimes guilty? — In what may this be 
shown ? — To what do the lower and the higher degrees of this 
principle respectively pertain? — What else may be referred to 
this head, and to what is it opposed ? — How is flattery to be con- 
sidered ? 

What other class of injuries will the conscientious mind 
avoid with peculiar anxiety? — What is said of this class of 
offences? — To whom does a peculiarly deep guilt attach? — Of 
whom is equal or greater malignity affirmed? — How does the 
career of such persons often differ from that of inferior offend- 
ers ? — What else may be assigned to the same head? — To 
whom does this kind of power belong ? — What is a source of 
peculiar regret to the friend of virtue ? — What considerations 
ought to weigh with such ? 

II. COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE, 

Page 65. 

In what respects is the condition of men diversified in the 
present life ? — How are such diversities to be viewed ? — What 
may we safely reckon as holding a prominent place among these 
purposes? — What is the natural effect of the due exercise of 
these affections ? — What effect does it produce on our feelings 
towards others ? — From what power do these affections tend to 
withdraw us? — How is their due cultivation therefore to be 
considered? — Upon whom does their chief henefit terminate ? 
— What the consequence of neglecting them? — By what is 
the diligent exercise of them accompanied? 

What more do the benevolent affections often require of us 
than is demanded by the principle of justice ? — What is to be 
borne in mind on the other hand ? — How illustrated ? 

Towards whom, in the first place, are compassion and bene- 
volent exertion due ? — What does this exercise of them often 
call for ? — How do we feel our way to the proper measure of 
these sacrifices ?— What is the most easy form in which benevo- 
lence can be gratified'? — How may the same affection be exer 
cised in a higher degree ? — How may the two modes be charac 
terized ? — What are the properties of this high and pure benevo 
lence ? 

Towards what, secondly, is benevolence to be exercised T— 
what does this consist ?— What belongs therefore to this 
rtment ? 



QUESTIONS. 219 

What is the third field of its operation? — In what does this 
consist ? — To what does it lead ? — To what else does it extend ? 

Towards what, in the fourth place, is benevolence to be exer- 
cised? — To what situations does this apply? — What does it 
include 7 — What is its more appropriate name? — What does it 
imply ?— What is apt to be forgotten ? 

In regard to what, fifthly, is benevolence to be exercised? — 
From what does this prevent us ? — What does it also imply ?— 
What therefore is its ultimate aim ? 



III. VERACITY. 

Page 70. 

What is founded on confidence in the veracity of mankind ? 
—To what does it relate ?-*What, for example ? — How is it in 
respect to the most common events of every day ? — What natu- 
ral tendencies are mentioned as existing in all men ? — What is 
the consequence of this in regard to children and inexperienced 
persons?— How many are the elements essential to veracity? 

What is the first ? — To what is this essential ? — What does it 
require of us?— Against what does it consequently guard us? — 
From what does the sound exercise of judgment, connected 
with the love of truth, differ ? — To what else is the same prin- 
ciple applicable ? — To what is it thus opposed? — In what de- 
partments, therefore, is the love of truth equally important, and 
what does it include ? — Where and how do we acquire a degree 
of caution ? — To what does this sometimes lead in minds of a 
certain description ? — To what does the want of caution lead ? 
— What is the part of a well-regulated mind ? 

What is closely connected with the love of truth in receiving 
facts ? — In what does this consist ? — To what is it consequently 
opposed ? 

In what may direct fallacy consist?— How else may true 
statements convey an erroneous impression ? — By what example 
may these sources of fallacy be illustrated? — From what sources 
does the false impression in this case arise ? — In what other cases 
may the same effect be produced? — To what does a certain 
common saying refer ? 

What rule is to be referred to veracity under this department ? 
— What is this ? — To what is it opposed ? — On what is such a 
character founded '( — What moreover does it imply? — To what 
else is sincerity opposed ? — To what further is it repugnant ? 

What is the third element of veracity? — To what is this 
opposed ? — What impression is given bv this straight-forward 
integrity of purpose ? — What further ? 



220 QUESTIONS* 



IV FRIENDSHIP, LOVE, AND GRATITUDE. 

Page 76. 

What is said of the relation of these affections to each other ? 
—In what do they consist? — With what do the feelings and con- 
duct to which they lead correspond ? — How are the exertions 
arising out of them directed ? — How is this last consideration 
reckoned 1 — How is its operation sometimes impeded ? — How 
does the exercise of gratitude differ from that of love and 
friendship ? 

v. PATRIOTISM. 

Page 77. 

How is patriotism to be considered ? — To what does it lead ? 
— What devolves upon every member of the community? — 
What is it in the power of every one to do ? How may he finally 
exert himself? 

VI. THE DOMESTIC AFFECTIONS. 

Page 78. 

What is included in this extensive and interesting class ? — 
What do these call forth l — To what do they lead in the con- 
jugal relation? — To what in the parental? — To what in the 
filial? 

How ought the father to consider the son ? — What should he 
do in the prosecution of this great purpose ? — What will be the 
effect of this upon the son ? — How do the same principles ope- 
rate in the relation between the mother and the daughter? — ■ 
Why? — By what means are the best feelings of our nature 
cultivated in the domestic circle ? — What is said of a domestic 
society bound together by these principles ? 

THE DEFENSIVE AFFECTIONS. 

Page 81. 

What feelings are mentioned as constituting a part of our 
moral constitution, and what is necessary in order to their an- 
swering important ends ? — What is their proper object, and to 
what do they lead us ? — How does it operate in regard to op- 



QUESTIONS* 221 

pressors and the oppressed ? — What is a still more refined exer- 
cise of this class of feelings ? 

To what does resentment naturally lead ? — How ought this 
to be done ? — Why may not this properly be left in the hands of 
the person injured ? — Who are least inclined to make allowances 
for others? — What is the natural result of this ? — When are the 
defensive affections exercised in an unwarranted manner " — To 
what is the sound exercise of them opposed ? 

What three points in relation to the affections remain to be 
considered ? 

In what does the exercise of attention consist ? — To what 
does it lead? — To what particular case does this especially 
apply ? — How is this evinced ? — What goes to compose sympa- 
thy ? — What, however, is to be kept in mind in relation to the 
principle of self-love? — To what source have some referred our 
ideas of benevolence? — How are such discussions to be re- 
garded? — How is the application of self-love in such cases 
chiefly useful ? — Upon what does the rule of conduct rest ? — 
How are they aided in their practical application? 

What is said of the man who acts habitually under the influ- 
ence of these rules ?— How is he described as governing his 
conduct? — What are the good effects resulting from this whole- 
some state of mental discipline ? — What the reason of this ? 

What other view is to be taken of the advantages derived 
from this source ? — How is this exemplified ? — To whom is a 
similar impulse given, and under what circumstances? — What 
will this refined species of philanthropy chiefly seek ? — To what 
else will it lead ? 

What, is to be noticed next to the power of attention ? — Upon 
what is this founded ? — What is the tendency of all emotions? 
— What that of actions ? — Of what does an affection consist, 
and what is the natural progress of the mind ? — How exempli- 
fied? — How is this apt to be considered, and what is the true 
account of it ? — What is requisite that this may take place in 
the sound and healthy manner? — What the consequences of 
neglecting this? 

What is the first of the two conclusions arising from this sub- 
ject ? — What is the evil in this case, and what the consequence ? 
— What is the second ? — What suggestion is made grounded 
upon this consideration? — What maybe the effect of suspicions 
of this kind ? 

What consideration of great moment connected with pauper- 
ism is here thrown out? — When does political science pass its 
proper boundary ? — What, on the other hand, is not to be denied ? 

What is the third point which remains to be mentioned? — 
How illustrated in the case of the mother ? — From what motive 
does she act ? — To what else doestne same principle apply, and 
what is their character? — Analogous to what is the purpose 



222 QUESTIONS. 

which they serve in our moral economy ? — How exemplified ? — 
Apply the comparison. — What effect, has the violation of these 
feelings, and what the performance of them ? — What is said of 
the man who lives hahitually in the exercise of a cold and barren 
selfishness ? — What more than this attaches to such a character? 
— What contrary inference however will not hold good, and 
why ? — WTiat is possible in regard to the culture of the affec 
tions? — On what condition are we entitled to acknowledge the 
operation of that great principle ? — With what does this cor 
respond ? 

What else is to be observed on this branch of the subject ?— 
How shown ? — How are the more strictly benevolent affection* 
influenced ? — What beautiful principle is thus perceived in the 
moral system, and how is it illustrated ? — What is to be borne 
in mind on the other hand ? 

What are we further to remember in regard to the affections 
and desires? — How is this mental tranquillity represented to us? 
— What is mentioned as a constant source of pure enjoyment ? 
— What is the effect of such a disposition ? — What is to be said 
of the reverse ? — What else can we not fail to perceive ? — What 
do we see in all this ?— From what does much of the actual 
misery in the world arise ? — What do we find also by innumera- 
ble examples ? — What is further to be remarked ? 

What does the author remark in conclusion ? — How is this 
quality there represented ? — What also do we there find exposed ? 
—What is the substance of the quotation with which the sub- 
ject is concluded ? 

SECTION III. 
self-love.— Page 96. 

What dispute has there been in respect to the term Self-love ? 
— W T hat fact is stated respecting which there can be no doubt ? 
— How is the principle to be considered ? — What is necessary to 
its answering important purposes ? — When thus regulated, what 
does it constitute, and what when it becomes morbid in its 
exercise ? 

What should be the tendency and effect of a sound and ra- 
tional self-love ? — Why ? — To what should it therefore lead ? — 
What does it include '{ — Viewed in this manner, how does self- 
love appear? — -What the impression on which its influence 
rests ? — What is to be reckoned among these sources of satis- 
faction ? — What is to be kept in mind on the other hand ? — What 
is the remark of Butler ? — What that of the author ? — What else 
accords with the observation of any man ? — What follows the 
neglect of a due exercise of the affections, and what effect has 



QUESTIONS. 223 

It ?— What is further evident ?— Why ?— What has Bishop Butler 
shown, and how does self-love operate when it prevails over 
appetite ? — How does it do this ? — From what is it quite dis- 
tinct, and how ? — Why is this distinction of importance ? 

To what then does self-love lead? — To what do the affections 
lead ? — What is essential to a healthy state of the moral being ? 
— What is the comparative danger in regard to the affections 
and to self-love ? — How is this to be prevented ? — What do we 
find accordingly?— How illustrated? — What else is to be ac- 
counted for in the same manner ? — What do we thus perceive in 
respect to the moral principle or sense of duty ? 

What is the consequence of self-love becoming deranged in 
its exercise and objects? — How may one do this? — What deeds 
may be performed on this principle ? — How evinced ?— To what 
do we hence attach a peculiar value ? — Where is our highest 
conception of such a character realized ? 



PART II. 

OF THE WILL. 

Page 103. 

What is will, or simple volition ? — State the process. — From 
what do the actions thus produced arise? — Describe more fully 
the mental process.— What follows ?— Describe it.— What is 
the final result ? 

What class of agents is brought into the chain of mental ope- 
rations, and what are they called ? — What was attempted to be 
shown in another treatise ? — What is required for the due opera- 
tion of moral causes? — In regard to what particularly does this 
necessity exist? — Upon what do we proceed in our intercourse 
with mankind? — What can we foretel, for example? — With 
how much confidence do we rely upon the integrity and veracity 
of some persons ? — What do we gradually thus acquire, and 
how ? — How exemplified ? — What do we learn in our endeavours 
to exert influence upon others ? — How do we proceed when in 
certain cases certain motives or truths fail of effect ? — From what 
conviction do we do this? 

What do we recognise therefore in all such cases? — Why is 
it no objection to this that men act in very different ways with 
the same motives before them ? 

Supposing a man to deliberate in regard to a particular line of 
conduct, what are the circumstances calculated to act on his 
volition ? — What is the conduct of different men in deciding on 
their actions in particular cases? — Suppose the case refers to 



224 QUESTIONS. 

one of the desires having no immediate relation to the interest! 
of other men ? 

What three characters have thus been presented to view ? — 
What is said of the first ? — Why do we depend upon his conduct 
with so much confidence ? — What is said of the third, and what 
do we require to know in order to predict his conduct ? — What 
is said of the second, and why? — What do they involve? 

What inquiry of intense interest is connected with this sub- 
ject ? — To how many heads are these referable ? 

What is the first? — What does the highest class of these 
comprehend ? — What is required for this purpose ? — How do the 
sacred writers speak of voluntary ignorance ? — To whom will 
this be obvious? — To what does this equally apply ? — Of what 
do the important truths of natural religion consist ? — What is 
the first great truth which is taught by it, and from what sources 
is the evidence derived ? — In regard to what else besides his 
being are we assured, and how 1 — What may be derived from 
these two sources, and what is said of him who fails to attend 
to them?-- "What says an eminent writer ? 

To what else do similar observations apply ? — How are these 
supported, and how transmitted to us ? — How are they further 
confirmed 1 — In what character are we addressed, and what 
duty devolves upon every individual ? — For what is every man 
in the highest degree responsible ? — For what is he further re 
sponsible ? 

What is mentioned among the sophistries by which men shut 
their minds against serious inquiries ? — In what particular is thia 
illustrated ? 

What is required in this matter next to the acquisition of 
knowledge ? — What will he perceive who honestly attends to 
what is passing within ? — What power has he when a particular 
desire is present to his mind ? — Putting aside all metaphysical 
subtleties, what does this constitute man ? — What is the first 
mental state in this important process ? — What term is used as 
including both? — What is the second state? — If these be found 
to harmonize with the inclination, what ensues ? — Suppose the 
inclination is condemned by these, what then ? — What may 
happen, however, and what may the consequence be ? 

What third condition may take place? — What is the conse- 
quence in this case though the actual deed be prevented ? — In 
what does purity of heart consist ?— What is the effect of the 
inclination being thus cherished ? — What expression is some- 
times applied to this, and why ? — What is the character of the 
mental movements in the whole of this course? — From the first 
step of departure in what does the process consist ? — What 
question occurs in viewing such a process philosophically? — 
What is said of the derangement of the harmony of the moral 
feelings ?— In what may it consist and how does it proceed ?— ■ 



QUESTIONS. 225 

What effect has the cherishing of the desire ?— What followf 
according to tbe mental economy ? 

What other mental condition is to be mentioned in this con 
nexion? — How does this bear upon the individual, though the 
deed may be prevented? — How does he also stand in the eye of 
Omniscience ? — What may happen in this manner .' — What is the 
character of this conduct ? 

What gradually results from the state of mind now described ? 
—What is the nature of this habit ? — What takes place on the 
other hand I — How was this principle formerly illustrated, and 
in what respects does the comparison hold ? — What is the final 
effect of habits of vice upon the power of conscience and upon 
the judgment? — What knowledge may a man in this situation 
retain, and yet what does it amount to ? — How does he now 
view moral relations ? — What does he know not ? — What may 
still consist with this state of moral destitution ? — What is the 
purport of the allusion to Byron, and what the author's 
remark ? 

What is to be said therefore of the principle of habit, and to 
what does it apply ? — What is said as to the continuance of good 
habits? — How did they arise, and what is founded on this? — 
What is the case in regard to habits of vice? — How illustrated ? 
— What is the striking fact in this case I 

What important truth therefore is deserving of the deepest 
attention? — What inference of moment in regard to practical 
life arises from this ? — Why? — What do we see in the whole 
history of habits? — How is this result brought about? 

What practical tendency of great interest have these consider- 
ations ? — What is requisite when the judgment is convinced of 
the injurious nature of a particular habit? — Describe the process 
by which its tendency will be counteracted. — What is neces- 
sary in order that this result may take place? — What if this be 
not attended to ? — What fact is to be explained on this prin- 
ciple ? — What particular case is mentioned? — Hew explained ? 

What may be said of these principles? — What is the first of 
the important conclusions resulting from them ? — Has this fact 
been long recognised, and when is it distinctly stated ? — What 
is the philosopher's in the cases mentioned ? — What alternative 
follows in regard to such a state of mind ? — To what perception 
are we thus led? — What do we necessarily believe respecting 
the power of the Creator? — W T hat reason, moreover, have we 
for supposing that he will exert this power ? — What idea accord- 
ingly do we form of the system disclosing such communication? 
— To what then does this subject lead our attention? — What 
does sound philosophy teach us on this head ? — How much more 
does Christianity teach us on this point than philosophy? — 
What inference ought we to draw from this accordance of 
•cience and revelation? — If none can be found who need not 



226 QUESTIONS. 

such a moral transformation, what great truth are we forced to 
acknowledge ? 

What do we learn from the whole inquiry? — To whom are 
these considerations of the highest practical interest? — What 
momentous point is there in this downward career? — What is 
the character and consequence of the peace then cherished ? — 
What may occur in the progress towards this fearful issue ? — 
What is to be inferred while these indications of life continue? 
— W T hat is suspended on each moment? — Wlr^t is the path- of 
duty under such circumstances ? — What caution is necessary at 
this point, raid how is he to view his situation? — How may his 
progress still be, and why? — What is, however, the effect of 
each advantage gained? — What is each step in all this contest? 
— In what does it consist '( — What does the man feel in this 
course ? — What is the character of this impression? 

What reasons have we for chinking that the pure and holy 
One will thus hold intercourse with his moral creature? — What 
do we rind it impossible to believe ? 

What other principle is there of great efficacy in this matter, 
independent of the conviction of an actual communication from 
the Deity ? — How may it be illustrated ? — How is this applied to 
God ? — Who is the man that lives by faith ? — What is such a 
man taught to expect ? — What is this? — What assertion is again 
advanced with confidence I 



PART III. 

OP THE MORAL PRINCIPLE, OR CONSCIENCE. 

Page 129. 

Respecting what has there been much dispute ? — What has 
been the fate of this controversy? — What point does the author 
waive, and for what fact does he contend? — What is said of it 
as an element of our moral nature ? — Where is the evidence of 
the existence and nature of this principle ? — To what and for 
what purpose do we make an appeal on this subject? — How 
does its office differ from that of the judgment ? — What do we 
find upon referring to the sacred writings? — By what quotation 
is this remark sustained ? — What else do we there find in regard 
to the decisions of conscience ? 

W x hat then is the province of conscience ? — How does it do 
this ? — How does it rank among the moral powers ? — What ap- 
pears in viewing it in this relation ? 
, How docs reason act upon our intellectual acquisitions f— - To 



QUESTIONS. 227 

what does this particularly apply ?— What is the effect of rea- 
son's being suspended ? — Describe it at full. 

In all this process to what is there a striking analogy? — How 
is man led by self-love, by the desires, and by the affections ? — 
What is the regulating power in this process, and what effects 
does it produce ? — Kow does it do this? — How does it regulate 
his desires and pursuits ? — What does he thus learn ? — How 
therefore is conscience to be characterized ? — How much further 
does the analogy extend ? — What is the effect of derangement 
on the harmony of the moral feelings ? — What is the state of 
the judgment in this violation of moral harmony ? — With what 
may the utmost degree of human depravity consist ? — In what 
lies the derangement ? — What is such a condition of mind in 
reference to the moral feelings? — Trace out the leading points 
of the analogy. 

To what has allusion thus far chiefly been had ? — What other 
important purpose is answered by this faculty ? — What ought we 
to say in strict philosophical language? — How does the process 
however, appear? — How do we acquire the knowledge of a 
First Cause ? — How is this conclusion peculiarly impressed upon 
us ? — What is the result of tracing backwards a series of finite 
yet intelligent beings? — What conclusions in this case are inad- 
missible ? — What is the only rational conclusion at which we 
can arrive ? — How do we learn the goodness and benevolence 
of the Deity ? — How does it appear that this part of the argu- 
ment is clearly insisted upon in the sacred writings ? 

How do we necessarily conceive such a being to exist ? — By 
what other process equally obvious do we arrive at a knowledge 
of these ? — What is the chain of reasoning by which we come 
to this conclusion ? — In what respects do we conceive of the 
existence of these qualities in the Almighty different from their 
existence in men ? — From what impediments are they exempted 
in him ? — What do we therefore conclude ? — What is this 
termed ? — From what conviction cannot even the vicious man 
get free? 

What appears the character of such a being when viewed 
apart from any inferior creature ? — What results when viewed in 
relation to man in a state of moral discipline ? — Describe the 
nature of this difficulty. — How does the exercise of forgiveness 
in a moral governor differ from that in an individual ? — How is 
it in the case of a moral governor of infinite perfection ? — In 
what point do the highest efforts of human science fail ? — How 
is the demand met ? — What grand truths do we learn from that 
source ? — What conviction do we arrive at by a fair process of 
mental reasoning ? 

How is the truth of these considerations impressed upon us ? 
— Under what aspects is man to be contemplated in order to 
behold in him a fabric worthy of his Maker? — What conviction 



228 QUESTIONS. 

is forced upon us when we view the actual state of man?— 
What is to be said of the manner in which this condition arose, 
or of the origin of moral evil ? — With what are we chiefly con- 
cerned in this matter, and what does philosophy compel us to 
believe ? 

With what besides the inductions of moral science do we 
contrast the actual state of man? — What conclusion do we 
come to in contemplating his character purely as a matter of 
historical truth '( 

What do we arrive at in endeavouring to trace the manner in 
which mankind have departed so widely from this high pattern ? 
—What is an inquiry of much gi eater importance ? — Than what 
can there not be a more interesting inquiry ? — In what light alone 
ire we obliged to view it? — What is to be said of the facts 
before us ? — What fact is chiefly alluded to ? — What is the result 
*f the cultivation of a due harmony between these ? — What of 
A violation of it? — How has this formerly been illustrated? 

What similar chain of sequences is to be observed? — What 
jnay be taken for an example ? — What would be the consequence 
«of a proper direction of the mind to the truths conveyed to us 
respecting the Deity ? — What are these emotions ? — What close 
relation ought to be preserved, and what depends upon it ?— 
With what mental process is the preservation of this harmony 
connected ? — What if the first step in this process be neglected ? 
— When will this be the case in a still higher degree? — What 
tendency has then commenced in the mental economy? — How 
are the truths connected with the divine perfections then re- 
garded ? — Of whom does such appear to be the moral history? 

What other bad effect arises when the moral harmony of the 
mind has been impaired to this extent? — Why is this? — By 
what is this followed ? — What do the inventions of the mind 
thus become, and what is the final result ? 

How are these great principles of ethical science laid down in 
the sacred writings? — How are the various steps in this course 
of moral degradation represented ? — With what is this view of 
the subject notwithstanding consistent? — How does this ap- 
pear? 

What other point is to be referred to the principles now stated ? 
— What impressions have superficial observers deduced from 
the fact ? — Is this inference warranted, and what principle ought 
to be often repeated ? — What depends on this ? — What else ? — 
Why? 

What other point deserves consideration in connexion with 
this subject ? — In what does this important process consist ? — 
By what should it be accompanied ? — What is its character, and 
what depend uponttiis degree of its exercise? — What has there 
been repeated occasion to mention ? — By what is this condition 
influenced ?— In what does it originate ?— What is the primary 



QUESTIONS. 229 

effect of this loss of mental harmony ? — What is there reason 
to believe apart from this condition of the mind ? — "What is the 
qpinion of Butler ? — What consequence flows from the want of 
this simple exercise of the attention? — What is the first step in 
the backslider's return to virtue? — What is it more primarily? 

What two points remain to be noticed before leaving the sub 
ject of the moral principle ? * 



$ I. OP THE ORIGIN AND IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL DI6TINC 
TIONS, AND THEORIES OP MORALS. 

Page 149. 

What has been considered in previously treating the moral 
powers? — What objection may possibly be urged against this 
mode of viewing the subject ? — What is the author's reply ? — ■ 
How do we find man endowed in his physical relations ? — What 
might he plausibly maintain in regard to them ? — Though this 
be true, still what remark is made of it? — How is this applied? 
— When we have done this, what may we conclude ? — What is 
the boundary of our knowledge in this matter ? 

What will probably be admitted ? — Wha may be reckoned 
among these? — In what do these doctrines agree?— What do 
these profess ? 

What do we perceive in contemplating the conduct of men as 
placed in certain relations to each other ? — To what do we refer 
in forming this opinion of them? — On what condition do we 
view him with approbation, or the reverse ? — What conviction 
have we relative to this matter? — What is the next question? — 
State the point in dispute still more fully. — What is contended 
on the one hand ? — What is maintained on the other ? — What 
have those who adopt the latter hypothesis next to explain ? — 
To what have the various modes of explaining this led ? 

Give the outlines of the system of Mandeville. — By another 
modification of this system, whence are our impressions of 
virtue and vice said to be derived ? — What is to be said of this 
system? 

What is Mr. Hume's system termed?— State its leading char- 
acteristics. — How does Professor Mills define morality ? 

What is the fundamental principle of the selfish system of 
morals ?— Give an account of this theory particularly as held by 
Hobbes.— On what fallacy is this system founded? — How does 
this appear ?— How does the hypothesis appear in the light of 
facts ? 

What peculiar modification of this system maybe mentioned, 
end with what design adopted ? — What is to be said of this f 
U 



230 QUESTIONS. 

What is the theory of Paley? — What two considerations 
aiay be urged against this doctrine as applied to practical pur- 
poses '( 

If these observations are well founded, to what conclusion are 
we necessarily brought ? — To what else does the same objection 
apply ? — What is the consequence of departing from this great 
principle 1 ? — What further may be confidently stated as a matter 
of fact ? — What does he simply ask himself, and how does he 
decide ? 

What seems then to be the foundation of all these theories ? 
— What other modification is there of these theories 1— What do 
we mean by the immutability of moral distinctions as opposed 
to all these theories? — By what is an absolute conviction of this 
forced upon us ? — What is disclosed by the system which gives 
so much authority to conscience ? — What has already been shown 
respecting this, and what more may be said of it ? — How does 
this appear '( — What effect has this reciprocity of moral feeling 
upon human conduct? — To answer this purpose what is re- 
quired? — What else is equally clear, and what does it indicate? 
— What further may be said respecting this uniformity ? — What 
is Butler's remark concerning conscience? 

What other system remains to be noticed, and what is it 
called ? — State the system minutely. — What defect is there 
about this system ? 

In regard to the whole of this subject what important distinc- 
tion is to be made? — What few observations are here to be 
added ? — What appears to be the office of reason ? — Has it any 
bearing upon the affections ? — How illustrated ? 

In what other cases is an exercise of reason necessary ? — 
How shown ? — What is the office of reason and conscience 
respectively in such cases ? — Do they always harmonize ? — How 
illustrated ? — How do we feel and speak in such cases f — How 
do we expect such a man to acquire wisdom? — In what other 
circumstances does reason act in regnrd to moral decisions ? — In 
what respects do we perceive a difference in the habits of judg- 
ing of different individuals ? 

What else is reason concerned in ? — How may this be illus- 
trated ? — What other office is frequently assigned to reason in 
moral decisions ? — How is this explained ? 

How may this important distinction be recapitulated ? 



QUESTIONS. 231 

?'j II. OP THE HARMONY OP THE MORAL FEELINGS. 

Page 167. 

On whatever system we consider the moral feelings, what do 
we perceive ? — To what do these different classes of them re- 
late? — What other interesting inquiry is connected with this 
subject ? — What is one of the objects to be answered by the 
moral principle ? 

Viewing man as an immortal being, what is his highest con- 
sideration f — What stands in immediate connexion with this first 
of all concerns? — What duties follow? — What is said of the 
last ?— What, however, is the important consideration ? 

What is obvious to every person of reflection respecting him 
whose life is devoted to recreation ? — What must be admitted 
also respecting a life of business? — What is said of the engage- 
ments of benevolence and public usefulness? — When do they 
do so ? — What is finally ever to be kept in mind ? — What is the 
consequence of want of due attention to this consideration? 

What is it scarcely necessary to add ? — When only do some 
of these objects of attention usurp the place of others ? — With 
what is acting from the desire of notoriety at the same time con- 
sistent ? — How is it with the ascetic, on the other hand? — What 
is said of this?— What else is worthy of remark? — Who will 
have the justest sense of the various duties of life, and pay the 
most adequate attention to them?— In what departments of 
action will this appear conspicuous ? 

Wriatdoes this high consistency of character tend to promote? 
— How does it do this ? — In what other way ?— To what does it 
accordingly tend ? 

To what is such uniformity of feeling equally opposed ? — 
What may this be called, and how does it show itself? — What 
will be the necessary influence of a sincere religious belief ? — 
What does the want of this influence imply ?— What is the con- 
sequence of such inconsistency ? 

What warning arises from their mutual error ? — How is this 
illustrated? — What is the fair induction in both cases? — How 
does this appear ? — What caution is to be administered to those 
who have detected the deception ? 

What counsel is given to those who profess Xo be influenced 
by the highest of all motives? — What things are easily acquired? 
— What, after all, is their value ? — What is the seat and what the 
influence of true religion? — What is its effect when thus ex- 
hibited? 



232 QUESTION*. 



PART IV. 

OF THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN TOWARDS THE DEITT. 

Page 175. 

To what heads is the healthy state of a moral being- referred 
in the sacred writings ? — To what do the two former of these 
topics lead? — To what the latter? — To whom are we responsi- 
ble for the duties of the former class? — What do those of the 
latter respect? — To what have human systems of ethics chiefly 
attended ? — What is the fact in the Scriptures ? — What is pointed 
out as qualifying man for intercourse with the Deity ? — By what 
passages is this confirmed ? 

What is the character of such declarations ? — What do we 
infer from our relation to God as moral Governor and Creator? 
— What other solemn truth is it equally impossible to repel ? 

What inquiry is there therefore of intense interest connected 
with this subject ? 

What is the first head to which it may be referred? — 
What does it imply, therefore, and to what is it opposed ? — To 
what must this be extended? — What state of mind formerly 
referred to is here described? — To what else may the same 
remark be applied ? — What is said of these mental conditions ? 
— Upon what besides the mind which cherishes these evils does 
the Deity look with disapprobation ? — What, may be said of the 
pursuits of such a man? — Of what are we ordinarily in danger? 
— How do these considerations appear to the Most High ? 

What two classes of characters are clearly pointed out in the 
Scriptures? — To how many laws is this fact to be referred? — 
Describe the first at length. — State the second. 

Under what relations may the state of mind governed by an 
habitual sense of the Divine presence be considered? — What 
does the former include? — To what does it lead the attention? 
— What does the second division include ? — What kind of char- 
acter springs from these two mental conditions? — What does 
such a man feel? — What further does he feel ? 

What is the second head ? — What is said of the man who 
bears upon his mind this sublime impression ? — What does he 
perceive in reference to that place? — Specify. — What does such 
a submission of soul at the same time allow? — Suppose these 
sources of distress are not removed, what then ?— How will the 
ills of life appear when viewed under that aspect ? 

What is the third head ? — In whom will this be a prominent 



QUESTIONS. 233 

ieeling? — To what does it naturally lead ? — How is the gospel 
dispensation of peace represented ? — What disposition is fre- 
quently referred to as peculiarly acceptable to the Deity ? — What 
extracts confirm this?— What is naturally associated with this 
state of mind T 

What is the fourth point specified ? — To what will these feel- 
ings have a special reference ? — What has been considered in 
respect to this divine Person ? 

What arises from the whole mental condition thus delineated ? 
— What does this imply ? — What more ? — What does it compre- 
hend?— With what does this character seem to correspond ? — 
What is said of its elements, and how are we to estimate its 
sublimity and its truth? — What will be the feeling entertained 
towards them all ? — What is said of that great system of ethical 
purity? — What only is requisite to yielding an absolute consent 
to its supreme authority ? 

Where are we to seek for that which is of all conceivable 
things of the highest moment? — What says an inspired writer? 
— What is said of the happy lot of the man who cultivates the 
habitual impression of the Divine presence ? — What does he find 
in the works, ways., and perfections of the Eternal One ? — What 
is the tendency of this exercise ? — From what and to what does 
it raise us? — What effect has it by leading us to compare our- 
selves with the supreme excellence ? — What says an eloquent 
writer ? — How is this disposition related to the acquirements of 
philosophy? — What results from his advances in the wonders of 
nature? — For what does such a one inquire ?— What does he 
learn, and in what conviction does he rest ? — What is affirmed 
respecting these views and convictions? 

What is said of the points which have been stated ? — What is 
to be said of him who calls in question this sublime truth? — To 
what must we leave him? 

What does the author next proceed to investigate? — How 
many views may be taken of this point, and how are they to be 
considered ? 

To what are we taught in the sacred writings to refer man's 
restoration from ruin? — What have we already seen ? — What, 
however, is the immediate object of our attention ? — What is 
the character of this operation, and how may it be analyzed ? — 
What are the offices of reason, attention, and conception respect- 
ively in this process ? — What is effected by these means I — 
What is this mental operation, and what is essential to its sound 
exercise ! — State the mode of its reception and operation. 

What can we discover by attention to these considerations? — 
How does faith differ from enthusiasm? — What is the first great 
inquiry to those who would preserve themselves from the influ- 
ence of false notions ? — What error is to be avoided on the other 
hand ? — To what source may these two modifications of character 
U2 



234 QUESTIONS. 

be traced ? — In what does the misapplication of the reasoning 
powers in both consist ? 

What is the second office of faith ?— What does this amount 
to? — What operation is involved in it ? — Of what do we speak 
in common language?— Of what does the alleged belief of such 
a man nrobably consist ? — Whence may he have acquired these 
points, and how may he endeavour to support them ? — What 
similar case may be adduced? — What is the character of both? 
— What other character may we suppose ? — From what does 
this arise ? — What is the consequence ? 

What is intimately connected with this subject ? — Between 
what does a close connexion exist ? — What is said of our pos- 
session of power ? — How does this appear ? — What is said of 
the due exercise of this power ? 

In what d es the sound exercise of that mental condition 
which we call Faith consist? — What do the sacred writers say 
of it, and to what do they ascribe consequences so impoxUnt? — 
By what simple narrative is this principle illustrated 1- -How is 
the woman represented in this simple occurrence ? — What was 
the object of her faith? — What the ground of her faith? — Wliat 
did sbe do under the influence of this conviction ? — How did 
her faith save her ? — What more than simple belief was requisite 
to her salvation ? — To what therefore are the important results 
of faith really ascribed ? — Of what may we speak in the same 
manner? — In so doing, to what do we ascribe such results? — To 
what does the inspired writer refer when he says that without 
faith it is impossible to please God? 

From what has much misconception arisen on this subject ? 
— What is to be said of us as physical and intellectual beings ? 
— What as moral beings ? — What are chiefly the objects of faith 1 
— State this more particularly. — How is this distinction alluded 
to by the sacred writers ? — What are the objects of sight here 
intended to express ? — What remark is to be made of them ? — 
In what way is the attention to be withdrawn from them? — 
What is the special province of faith ? — What therefore is the 
next great point in our inquiry ? 

When entering upon this field, what is the first great object 
that meets our view ? — From what do we trace his operation, 
and what do we infer ? — Where has he fixed the impress of his 
moral attributes, and what do we, by the joint, operation of con- 
science and reason, perceive him to be ? — What is said of our 
knowledge of these attributes? — How do they force themselves 
upon our conviction ? 

What insuperable conviction arises from our conception of 
such a being ? — What do we feel in respect to this life ? — What 
gives a still deeper interest to this consideration ? — How is this 
truth powerfully expressed by the sacred writer ? 

What is affirmed with respect to these truths ? — When do 



QUESTIONS. 235 

they especially force themselves upon our conviction? — How 
are they detailed and impressed upon us in the sacred writings? 
— With what impression in our moral constitution do these prin- 
ciples meet? — What is the office of faith in regard to these? — 
Who is the man who lives by faith ? 

In what circumstances will a new train of feeling arise in a 
man's mind ? — How does he feel concerning his daily conduct ? 
— What is his conviction as to the time past of his life?— 
What inward conviction has he along with this impression ? — 
Under what circumstances will this be fixed still more deeply in 
the soul ? — With these truths upon his mind, what event will 
be contemplated with the deepest interest? — Of what is the 
man assured who acts habitually under the influence of these 
truths ? 

What constitutes a peculiarly solemn hour to any man ? — 
What holds true of every man who, after serious inquiry, appeals 
to his own heart ? — If one's heart condemns him in this review, 
what must he feel ? — Why cannot we fly to the mercy of the 
Deity for refuge in this extremity ? — To what extent can we not go 
in this matter ? — Why ? — What follows if we find each individ- 
ual fixing a different standard, and extending it so as to favour 
his own condition? — What must he perceive? — What can he 
not but acknowledge ? — What decision will he necessarily 
arrive at ? 

By what are we led to this conclusion ? — What is said of our 
efforts to find a refuge ?— By what are we here met, and to what 
does it call us? — How does it come supported? — What does it 
disclose ? —What necessities does it meet ? — How is it adapted 
to each? — What does it thus form? 

How is a participation in the benefits of this revelation re- 
ceived ? — To what has this expression given rise ? — State some 
of the different views which have been entertained on the sub- 
ject ? — What is to be gathered, however, from its holding so 
prominent a place in the scheme of Christian truth? — In what 
other relation does it hold an important place, and for what rea- 
son ? — What does any one feel with regard to it? 

How many are the objects of faith ? — Wliat have we before 
seen the operation of faith to be ? — Who is the man who receives 
6uch truths in faith ? — What have we next to do in regard to 
faith, and how may that best be done ? 

State the illustration employed? — Suppose the man rejects 
the remedy, what reflection does he thereby cast upon the char 
acter of the individual? 

How does this apply to the office of faith in the matter of 
salvation? — From what has much of the confusion in which this 
subject has been involved arisen ? — What do they form?— Who 
is the man that will not seek the remedy ? — Supposo he contents 
himself with merely admitting the tacts?— In what are the 



236 QUESTIONS. 

grounds contained on which these truths are addressed to us 
— From what do we derive the sincerity of the offer ? — What is 
he said to do who believes? — What is meant by this? — What 
does he do who believes not? — What therefore is required in 
him who comes to God with the hope of acceptance? — What is 
to be said of him who hath not this assurance ? 

W r hat were it vain to undertake ? — What are the two systems 
mentioned by which this doctrine has been misrepresented and 
perverted ? 

What is to be remarked in regard to the former? — For what 
and how does Christianity provide? — W T hat does it proclaim? — 
What does it exhibit ? — What else is said on this head ? 

What is the other equally erroneous opinion ? — What is ob- 
vious in regard to this ? — How does this appear ? — What then is 
a mere logical fallacy ? — How does this apply to the subject 
before us ? — To what does this doctrine therefore amount ? 

What is the true character of the Christian system as opposed 
to all such hypotheses ? — What does it reveal ? — How is it sup- 
ported? — What further does it reveal 7 — What is the test and 
evidence of the reality of faith? — Where is a man to seek for 
proofs of his acceptance ? — In what particularly is he to look for 
it ? — How are these acquirements to be looked upon ? — What are 
besides proofs of the reality of the principle? — What causes a 
system to be founded on delusion and falsehood ? — What is said 
of the making of such attainment ? — What is the effect of each 
step that a man gains in this progress? — To what is he led by 
the enlargement of his knowledge ? — What does it thus produce 
—•What further does he know? — In what circumstances does 
his moral impiovement go forward ? — To what is it in conclusion 
compared 1 



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